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1 Compendium
This PhD dissertation addresses in a sequence of five essays the question how fiscal policy
and economic output are interrelated in emerging Europe and how this relationship
is shaped by the respective politico-economic environment and the individual-level
support for economic reforms. Four out of these five papers have already been published.
They are reprinted in this dissertation in the format of the respective journal version.
Reprint permissions have been granted by the publishers.
This compendium sets the stage and motivates in Section 1.1 the just mentioned
research question in the light of the developments during the 2008–09 so-called “Great
Recession” (attributed to Paul Krugman). Section 1.2 outlines the various dimensions
of the underlying analytical debate, from which the structure of the five essays has
been derived, summarizes the main findings and emphasizes the value added of the
research provided in each essay in comparison to existing studies.
1.1 Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession
Already before the Great Recession an intensive analytical debate on the macroeconomic
impact of fiscal policy had emerged in Europe. At that time the structural composition
of fiscal policies and the appropriate design of budgetary reforms in the light of aging
societies dominated the debate. For instance, the so-called “Lisbon Strategy” aimed
to improve economic performance within the European Union (EU) and assigned
public finances an important role to enhance employment and economic growth (see
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009).
The Great Recession has then sparked renewed interest in fiscal policy. The extraor-
dinary intensity of the downturn forced the implementation of sizable fiscal stimulus
packages at the beginning of the crisis. Headline fiscal positions strongly deteriorated
(not only due to discretionary fiscal expansion but also, if not mainly, due to the
operation of automatic stabilizers). A few EU countries, especially those that had
maintained elevated public debt levels already in 2008, experienced severe sovereign
solvency pressures in 2010. These problems heralded a new stage of the crisis, during
which the original private sector solvency problems eventually spilled over to the public
sector. As a consequence, all EU countries are currently confronted with the challenge
to implement decisive fiscal action to consolidate their budgets, a process that will have
to continue in most countries until 2012–13.
The Great Recession posed also demanding challenges for an appropriate fiscal policy
reaction in emerging Europe – a region where for the first time since the start of
transition in the early 1990s the capacities of public finance systems were put under real
pressure. Figure 1.1 shows that the countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern
1
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Europe (CESEE)1 were severely hit by the crisis – though quite heterogeneously: while
Poland is the only EU country whose economy continued to grow, the three Baltic
countries experienced a double-digit decline of real GDP, amounting in Latvia to as
much as 18% in 2009.
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Source: European Commission, AMECO database. 2010−12 data are forecasts as at end-April 2011.
Figure 1.1: Real GDP Growth in the CESEE-10 Compared with Austria
Ideally, fiscal policymakers can resort in such a situation to strong automatic sta-
bilizers, to discretionary stimulus packages and to favorable borrowing conditions in
order to properly cushion the economic downturn. In reality it is however very hard,
if not impossible, to have all three of them at the same time, especially in emerging
countries with poor fiscal institutions, a lack of trust in the government or an insufficient
historical track record of fiscal adjustment. As a consequence, countries can end up in
the situation of not having the possibility to provide any fiscal support in times when
it is actually mostly needed (see Kaminsky et al., 2004). This situation of limited fiscal
space did indeed materialize in CESEE during the Great Recession.
First, while discretionary fiscal policy was expansionary in most countries of the region
in the pre-crisis boom period (basically due to excessive public spending, see Chapter
3), it was only exceptionally possible to implement sizable stimulus packages during the
crisis (Poland). Second, despite the overall lack of fiscal stimuli, fiscal headline positions
strongly deteriorated during the crisis (with the exception of Hungary), which can be
traced back to a stronger-than-expected revenue erosion. It should be noted that during
the crisis public deficit and public debt ratios deteriorated, on average, less strongly in
1The subsequent figures relate to the ten EU member states in CESEE, abbreviated by CESEE-10.
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the CESEE-10 than in the EU-27 (see Figure 1.2). However, the tolerance threshold for
public indebtedness might be lower for emerging economies than for advanced economies
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006). Third, also financing conditions deteriorated
remarkably during the crisis. This is illustrated by the development of CDS premia for
government bonds, which rapidly increased at the end of 2008 and the beginning of
2009 and, despite a steady recovery thereafter, are still above the levels observed before
the crisis (Figure 1.3).2,3 A few countries were accordingly confronted with sovereign
liquidity problems and had to resort to the IMF and the EU for multilateral assistance
(Hungary, Latvia, Romania).
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Figure 1.2: Development of the General Government Budgets of EU Member States in CESEE,
2006–12
Altogether, this brief diagnosis indicates that during this crisis public finance sys-
tems in most of the CESEE-10 have neither been able to appropriately contribute to
business cycle stabilization nor to withstand a large business cycle shock, pointing
to both limited crisis mitigation capacity and limited crisis resilience. Scholars have
frequently emphasized that it is the quality of fiscal institutions, which is decisive for
2Darvas (2010) expects that risk premia in CESEE will remain for a prolonged period higher than
their pre-crisis levels as a consequence of the crisis-related rise in overall risk perceptions (“flight to
quality”) and unjustifiably low CDS levels before the crisis.
3Interestingly, at the beginning of the crisis the sovereign CDS premia for euro area periphery countries
(left panel in Figure 1.3) were considerably lower than those in the CESEE-10. This picture was
however reversed once several euro area periphery countries have been confronted with serious
sovereign solvency concerns since early 2010.
3
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Figure 1.3: Credit Default Swap Premiums for Government Bonds with 5-Year Maturity
the availability of fiscal space and the effectiveness of discretionary measures. One
frequently discussed solution is the application of adequate expenditure ceilings in
order to contain government spending during good times. Expenditure growth should
be kept in line with cautious estimates of potential GDP growth and excess revenue
during boom times should be saved and used in the situation of the next economic
downturn (see Talvi and Vegh, 2005). Besides numerical fiscal rules, it is also important
to improve the quality of fiscal institutions by enforceable and transparent multi-year
rules and by independent fiscal councils, which provide regular assessments to decrease
information asymmetries between fiscal policymakers and the public (as advocated,
e.g., by Darvas, 2010; Ódor, 2011). Beetsma et al. (2009) showed that both planned
budgetary adjustment and adherence to these plans are positively related to a strong
medium-term budgetary framework and tight numerical fiscal rules. As a result, fiscal
discipline should be enhanced and trust in fiscal policymaking be endorsed, which, in
turn, should keep borrowing costs during recessions in check. Iara and Wolff (2010)
provided respective evidence for eleven euro area countries: stronger fiscal rules contain
sovereign bond spreads, particularly in times of elevated market uncertainty and if
the rules have a strong legal foundation. While the beneficial effects of fiscal rules are
widely acknowledged, it is also important to monitor their impact on the composition
of public spending (see Chapter 4). During episodes of rule-enforced fiscal adjustment,
short-sighted politicians may namely have an incentive to abandon long-term invest-
ment projects instead of cutting current outlays. Pitlik (2010) found for the EU-15
that government investment has indeed been limited by stringent quantitative fiscal
constraints.
4
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To sum up, the Great Recession clearly revealed that it is crucial to have a profound
knowledge on the relationship between fiscal policy and economic output. This relation-
ship seems to be subject to the respective politico-economic environment, to different
business cycle conditions or to different degrees of economic and financial integration.
Despite the hard effort in the discipline to model the various channels of interference,
there is still a lack of empirical evidence. Moreover, existing empirical approaches suffer
from various methodological shortcomings (see also Chapter 4) and the evidence is
rather inconclusive. Perotti (2000), for instance, concluded that there is no academic
consensus on even the basic effects of fiscal policy, e.g. whether a fiscal expansion has
indeed an impact on output mostly via its direct demand effects. Finally, there are
only rare attempts in the literature to provide evidence for the countries in emerging
Europe and to account for their transition-specific circumstances. This dissertation
tries to fill parts of this research gap. The concrete structure and the value added in
comparison to existing research is outlined in the next section.
1.2 Dimensions of the Analytical Debate and Contribution of
the Dissertation
When discussing the relationship between fiscal policy and economic output, it is useful
to recall several dimensions of the corresponding analytical debate. Figure 1.4 sketches
the relation between fiscal variables F and economic output Y and distinguishes between
different directions of causality and different lengths of the examined time horizon
(short run vs. long run). The sequence of essays in this dissertation has been structured
along these different dimensions.
F Y
F Y
F Y
F Yshort
run
long
run
fiscal multipliers and automatic stabilizers
cyclicality of fiscal policy
long-run growth impact
Wagner’s Law
politico-economic environment,
institutional framework
Figure 1.4: Relationship between Fiscal Variables and Economic Output
1.2.1 Fiscal Policy and Output in the Short Run
Short-run settings deal with the interaction of fiscal policy and business cycle fluctuations.
Theoretical foundations in terms of general equilibrium models are delivered by Aiyagari
5
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et al. (1992) or Baxter and King (1993). Vector autoregressive (VAR) models with
quarterly data are the dominant workhorse in empirical investigations (e.g. Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002). In terms of the previous section, we are not only interested in
the crisis mitigation capacities of public finance systems, but also in their capacity to
remain resilient to a business cycle shock. In Figure 1.4 the first aspect is captured by
fiscal multipliers and automatic stabilizers and the second aspect by the cyclicality of
fiscal policy. Obviously, both aspects are interrelated and that in a nonlinear manner. A
more pronounced countercyclical pattern of public finances improves their business cycle
smoothing capacity. However, if the cyclical response of fiscal variables is too strong
(even though it is countercyclical), public debt sustainability might be questioned,
procyclical discretionary measures are then needed to avoid a budget crisis and, as a
consequence, fiscal policy is not able to contribute to effective business cycle smoothing
at all.
Chapter 2 addresses the aspect of fiscal multipliers, i.e. the cyclical output response
to a discretionary change in government spending or taxation. Studying domestic fiscal
multipliers is already a value per se, as there is only scant, mostly preliminary, empirical
evidence for the CESEE countries. However, as shown in the previous section, the
Great Recession left only limited room for sizable stimulus packages in CESEE. Given
the high degree of economic integration of the CESEE countries with Western Europe,
where actually considerable discretionary measures have been implemented, it is rather
of interest whether and how fiscal measures abroad spill over to the CESEE countries
via trade, interest rate or exchange rate channels. Respective empirical evidence is very
scarce. We use quarterly data from 1995 to 2009 and estimate for five Central and
Eastern European countries (CEE-5) an open economy structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) model, identified by imposing reasonable restrictions on contemporaneous
responses in the system. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first SVAR
models that explicitly accounts for the transmission of a foreign fiscal shock (assumed
to be generated in Germany) to key domestic macroeconomic variables in CEE. We
find that a foreign fiscal shock affects domestic fiscal variables and vice versa, which
highlights the importance of cross-country coordination of fiscal policies within the
EU. All the CEE-5 respond to a fiscal expansion abroad with fiscal easing at home
(more strongly on the public spending than on the revenue side). We find negative
cross-border fiscal spillovers for Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while in
Poland and Hungary, output reacts positively to a fiscal expansion in Germany. For
domestic fiscal shocks, which we also explore, we find Keynesian responses in Hungary
and Slovakia, while non-Keynesian responses are present in the Czech Republic, Poland
and Slovenia. Our results imply that “one-size-fits-all” policy recommendations would
be too simplistic for the CEE-5; a deeper understanding of the reasons for cross-country
differences in response to fiscal shocks is required to be able to provide adequate
information to policymakers in these countries.
Chapter 3 deals with the cyclicality of fiscal policy as the second short-run aspect.
Besides providing evidence for the size of budgetary elasticities and automatic stabilizers
in the CESEE-10, it also investigates the cyclical pattern of discretionary fiscal policy
before the outbreak of the Great Recession as several scholars made the point for pro-
6
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cyclical government expenditure in developing and emerging market countries during
good times (among others, Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Ilzetzki and
Vegh, 2008). Three main conclusions can be provided. First, automatic stabilizers –
based on pre-crisis estimates of the European Commission – are small in the CESEE-10
in comparison to the euro area average. They mostly operate on the revenue side,
while the response of government expenditure to GDP changes is quite inelastic.4
Second, based on changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, we can show that
discretionary fiscal policy has indeed been pro-cyclical in the CESEE-10. Discretionary
fiscal easing in boom times has been especially pronounced in Romania, the Baltic
countries and also in Slovenia. Third, besides pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy,
sovereign liquidity constraints are identified as an additional reason for limited fiscal
space in CESEE.5
1.2.2 Fiscal Policy and Output in the Long Run
On the one hand, long-run settings examine the impact of fiscal policy on long-run
economic growth. Economic theory started to allow for an explicit growth impact of
fiscal policy items only with the emergence of endogenous growth theory (see the pioneer
publications of Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990; Romer, 1990). Empirical investigations are
dominated by cross-section regressions (e.g. Barro, 1991) and panel growth regressions
with multi-year averages (e.g. Fölster and Henrekson, 2001). On the other hand,
the economic literature has also widely accounted for Wagner’s law (Wagner, 1883),
which postulates an income-elastic demand for government expenditures. In the long
run, a higher degree of economic development is expected to increase the demand for
government expenditure, especially for social expenditures. Although one would expect
that respective evidence is limited to samples of high-income economies, Akitoby et al.
(2006) found a cointegrating relationship between output and government spending
consistent with Wagner’s law in a sample of 51 developing countries. Moreover, Arpaia
and Turrini (2008) provide evidence for the EU-15 that Wagner’s law pertains more
to catching-up economies than to advanced economies, i.e. an income elasticity of
government spending larger than unity seems to be related more to the speed of
economic development than to its level.
Applying these two long-run dimensions to the CESEE economies is rather challenging,
if not impossible. One constraint is the fact that these countries are still subject to
the transition to their equilibrium wealth levels. Long-run economic growth, at least
in theory, has to be understood as the growth of economic output in the steady state.
Conceptually, it is thus rather bold to analyze long-run growth effects of fiscal policy,
4This came to the fore during the crisis as sharp declines in real GDP and domestic demand eroded
tax bases and budgetary balances strongly deteriorated.
5Domestic capital markets in CESEE are still not that developed and, as a consequence, governments
in the region tend to borrow more externally and more in foreign currency than advanced economies.
At the beginning of the Great Recession, when CESEE governments had to rely on these external
financing sources in order to meet maturing liabilities or roll them over, access to international
capital markets became precarious (see Figure 1.3) and a few, but not all, governments in CESEE
faced serious liquidity constraints.
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if the countries under investigation are still out-of-equilibrium. A second constraint
comes from the data side. Macroeconomic time series for CESEE countries are only
available since the mid-1990s. Empirical studies of long-run growth effects use typically
four- or five-year averages to wash out short-run business cycle effects. Doing so, we
would only get about 3–4 observations over time and we would thus have insufficient
degrees of freedom in the panel estimations.
Therefore, this dissertation follows a different approach. I leave the investigation
of Wagner’s law in CESEE to future research (I am not aware of any paper that has
already done this). Instead, Chapter 4 provides a systematic literature review for
the long-run growth impact of different public finance components, thus adding an
additional dimension to Figure 1.4. Studying the impact of budgetary composition
in CESEE is important, given that these countries have gone through incisive fiscal
reform steps during the last 20 years (e.g. large-scale privatizations, widespread
introduction of flat-rate income tax schemes). On the basis of this literature review,
econometric shortcomings in existing empirical investigations are summarized in order
to stimulate further research in the area. So far, empirical investigations have mostly
been concentrated on advanced economies, have primarily employed linear functional
relationships and have not taken the reverse causality problem satisfactorily into
account. The literature review is then used to create empirical proxies of “growth-
friendly” spending and taxation categories and respective data is prepared for the
CESEE-10 in comparison to the EU-15. This exercise reveals that the CESEE-10 have
a more “growth-friendly” fiscal structure than the EU-15. In particular, the share of
distortionary taxes is considerably smaller, while the size of infrastructure expenditures
is clearly larger. This is a promising sign, given that several scholars found that the
growth effect of infrastructure expenditure is stronger in countries with less developed
infrastructure. However, a simple rule “more infrastructure expenditure, more growth”
cannot succeed if the type of financing, the quality of fiscal institutions or potential
nonlinearities are neglected.
1.2.3 Role of the Politico-Economic Environment
As already alluded in Section 1.1, the quality of fiscal institutions, the structure of
the countries’ social security and tax systems, the design of fiscal rules, the type of
budgetary legislation or the extent of political budget cycles (i.e. pre-electoral fiscal
expansion to increase the probability of re-election) can clearly determine the described
relationships between fiscal policy and economic output.
Chapter 5 captures two dimensions of the institutional environment – democratic
progress and the quality of public governance – and examines for a sample of 28
countries in emerging Europe how they shape the support for economic reform, such
as privatization and the market economy. This information is important for the fiscal
policy-output nexus as privatizations have direct budgetary consequences and a stronger
preference for government involvement in the economy – depending on the respective
institutional environment – is eventually responsible for the extent of discretionary fiscal
measures. For instance, Brender and Drazen (2005) showed that political budget cycles
8
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are more prevalent in countries with weak democratic institutions. Expansionary fiscal
policies regardless of the cyclical position can, in turn, aggravate the pro-cyclicality
bias and thus reduce the room for budgetary maneuver in bad times.
In Chapter 5 we use data from the 2006 round of the Life in Transition Survey
(LiTS) of the EBRD and can show that, on average, nearly 50% of respondents in
all countries support revising privatization by taking assets from the current owners
through either renationalization or renationalization followed by reprivatization. Mass
public support for revising privatization is important for economic efficiency: the threat
of revising privatization weakens the incentives of current owners to invest in their
business. In corrupt countries, elites may use public sentiment against privatization
to redistribute assets to themselves and their supporters (e.g., Yukos case in Russia).
These redistributions, in turn, weaken prospects for legitimizing property rights in
the eyes of the public. To draw policy implications from the popular support for the
revision of privatization, one needs to understand the nature of the phenomenon.
We can show that under autocracy and weak governance institutions there is no
significant difference in support for revising privatization between high- and low-skilled
respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the
difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and
low skilled grows dramatically. Thus, skills and good institutional environments
are complements rather than substitutes. These results hold not only for public
support for revising privatization, but also for a market economy more generally. Our
findings indicate that preferences over economic policy are conditional on the quality
of democracy and governance. This evidence contributes to the existing literature in
different ways. First, we find an answer for the low support of privatization status quo in
transition economies, allowing for the interaction between individual-level and country-
level characteristics, whereas existing papers have only examined direct individual-level
determinants of support for economic reform in emerging markets (Duch, 1993; Gibson,
1996; Kaltenthaler et al., 2006). Second, we explore the direct impact of the institutional
environment on individual-level attitudes towards reform. Existing investigations have
primarily included country-fixed effects in cross-country evaluations of household surveys
instead of differentiating between different country-level characteristics. Third, we focus
on mass support for policy instead of focusing only on elite decision-making (as, e.g.,
Shleifer and Treisman, 2000).
Based on LiTS, Russia shows an uniquely low support of democracy and free markets
among transition countries. We therefore use in Chapter 6 data from another rich
household survey in emerging Europe – the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS). Studying within-country variation considerably reduces the scope of unobserved
cultural variation, which may be correlated with social capital and has a direct effect
on attitudes towards free markets and regulation. Moreover, the RLMS allows us to
utilize a richer set of measures of social capital than in other surveys. Third, the large
sample from within one country (over 10,000 respondents) ensures representativeness at
the country level which is harder to guarantee with smaller samples (e.g., in LiTS only
1,000 respondents are included per country). The RLMS reveals that, on the one hand,
about one-half of the Russian population is disappointed with transition although living
9
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standards and life satisfaction have broadly improved 2000–07. On the other hand, a
high demand for government regulation and increased state intervention coexists with
a low level of trust in state institutions and recognition of high and rising corruption.
We test the predictions of the model developed by Aghion et al. (2010) to resolve these
paradoxes and can show that it is the lack of social capital in Russia that drives the
demand for government regulation and bad attitudes towards transition. The society
chooses to demand regulation and tolerate corruption in order to reduce externalities
imposed by uncivic business.
The results delivered in Chapters 5 and 6 emphasize the value of using micro-level
data when studying the support for economic reform, the involvement of the government
in the economy and the related impact of the institutional environment. Coming back
to the fiscal policy-output nexus, it is also a promising avenue for future research
to examine more closely the response of households to (announced) fiscal stimuli
or consolidation measures. If households adjusted their consumption and savings
decisions in a non-Ricardian manner, public finance systems should be more effective
in contributing to business cycle smoothing. Johnson et al. (2006) used the U.S.
Consumption Expenditure Survey and showed that private consumption displayed large
contemporaneous responses to income tax rebates and changes in social security taxes
(although both of them were announced a way in advance). Investigating a similar
question for European countries is, to the best of my knowledge, still an open issue.
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1 Introduction and Motivation12
The 2008−09 “Great Recession” has sparked renewed interest in fiscal policy. The 
extraordinary intensity of the downturn forced the implementation of sizeable 
 fiscal stimulus packages at the beginning of the crisis. Headline fiscal positions 
strongly deteriorated (not only due to discretionary fiscal expansion but also, if not 
mainly, due to the operation of automatic stabilizers). A few EU countries, especially 
those that had maintained elevated public debt levels already in 2008, experienced 
severe sovereign solvency pressures in 2010. These problems heralded a new stage 
of the crisis, during which the original private sector solvency problems eventually 
spilled over to the public sector. As a consequence, all EU countries are currently 
confronted with the challenge to implement decisive fiscal action to consolidate 
their budgets, a process that will have to continue in most countries until 2012−13.
Given the scale of both the fiscal stimulus packages during this crisis and the 
ensuing austerity measures, the obvious question that arises is how effective can 
fiscal policy actually be in mitigating business cycle fluctuations, especially within 
the financial and economic architecture of today’s highly interdependent world. 
The Economic Transmission of Fiscal Policy 
Shocks from Western to Eastern Europe
This paper studies the transmission of a foreign fiscal policy shock (assumed to be generated 
in Germany) to key macroeconomic variables in five Central and Eastern European economies 
(CEE-5). We use quarterly data from 1995 to 2009 and estimate an open economy structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model identified by imposing reasonable restrictions on contem-
poraneous responses in the system. Our model is able to identify well-known episodes of fiscal 
policy action in the countries under review. We find that a foreign fiscal shock affects domes-
tic fiscal variables and vice versa, which highlights the importance of cross-country coordina-
tion of fiscal policies within the EU. All the CEE-5 respond to a fiscal expansion abroad with 
fiscal easing at home (more strongly on the public spending than on the revenue side). We 
find negative cross-border fiscal spillovers for Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while 
in Poland and Hungary, output reacts positively to a fiscal expansion in Germany. For domes-
tic fiscal shocks, which we also explore, we find Keynesian responses in Hungary and Slovakia, 
while non-Keynesian responses are present in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Our 
results imply that “one-size-fits-all” policy recommendations would be too simplistic for the 
CEE-5; a deeper understanding of the reasons for cross-country differences in response to fis-
cal shocks is required to be able to provide adequate information to policymakers in these 
countries.
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Generally speaking, fiscal multipliers are smaller if there are considerable leakages 
(i.e. parts of the stimulus are saved, e.g. for precautionary reasons, or spent on 
 imports). Multi-country models show that fiscal multipliers are the smaller, the 
more open an economy is (see Spilimbergo et al., 2009). Thus it is important to 
examine not only the impact of domestic fiscal shocks3 on output, but also to study 
the channels and the extent of spillovers from fiscal shocks generated in major 
 foreign trading and financial partner countries. 
Empirical evidence on the economic effects of domestic fiscal shocks is mostly 
available for high-income OECD countries (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, for 
the U.S.A.; Perotti, 2004, for the U.S.A., the U.K., Australia and Germany; 
 Giordano et al., 2007, for Italy; de Castro and Hernández de Cos, 2008, for 
Spain), while there is only scant, mostly preliminary, evidence for the economies 
in emerging Europe (e.g., Lendvai, 2007, for Hungary; Bencˇ ík, 2009, for Slovakia; 
Mirdala, 2009, for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; or Ponomarenko and Vlasov, 2010, for Russia). Moreover, there have 
been only limited empirical attempts to examine the transmission of a foreign 
 fiscal shock to domestic macroeconomic variables in Europe (among others, Beetsma 
et al., 2006, or Badarinza, 2008).
This paper focuses on five Central and Eastern European economies (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, in the following referred to as 
CEE-5)4 and develops a model that allows not only to examine the impact of 
 domestic fiscal shocks on key macroeconomic variables, but also to check the 
 response of domestic variables to a fiscal shock in an important foreign economic 
partner country. We chose Germany to be this country, first, because the CEE-5 
have strong trade relations with Germany (on average, about 30% of total CEE-5 
exports go to Germany) and second, because over the past few years, Germany 
implemented considerable discretionary fiscal measures,5 which potentially induced 
substantial economic spillovers to the CEE-5. 
Learning more about such spillovers is also important given that the crisis left 
only limited room for sizable stimulus packages in the CEE-5 (Hungary even had 
to implement pro-cyclical consolidation measures amounting to more than 4% of 
GDP, according to the OECD, 2009) owing to a predominantly pro-cyclical fiscal 
stance during the pre-crisis boom period and liquidity constraints at government 
debt markets in many of these countries (see Eller, 2009). It is also interesting to 
examine what types of responses can be observed in the CEE-5 for the period 
from 1995 to 2009: Did these countries respond to a fiscal expansion in Germany 
3 A fiscal shock is defined as an unexpected, random discretionary change in government spending or taxation. Our 
approach assumes symmetry of results, i.e. we do not impose different reactions to fiscal expansions and to fiscal 
contractions in our setting. Thus, any argument put forward for a fiscal expansion holds inversely also for a fiscal 
contraction (see also our qualifications in section 4.2).
4 Other countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe could not be included due to the lack of satisfactory
fiscal data.
5 According to the European Commission (2009), the cumulative 2009−10 net effect of the German fiscal stimulus 
package is estimated to amount to 1.9% of 2008 GDP (with revenue-decreasing effects outweighing expenditure-
increasing ones, and about 70% of the stimulus occurring in 2009 and the rest in 2010). The same study also 
estimated the size of the corresponding stimulus packages in the CEE-5 (except for Hungary, which implemented 
a pro-cyclical consolidation package, and Slovakia, which provided a negligibly small stimulus package) to be 
1.5% of GDP in Poland and 0.5% of GDP in the Czech Republic and Slovenia respectively.
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with fiscal easing, or did they count on positive cross-border fiscal multipliers in 
their consolidation efforts?
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the channels of the 
cross-country transmission of fiscal shocks and describes the development of an 
open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model with both foreign 
and domestic fiscal shocks. This model requires a detailed documentation of the 
restrictions imposed on contemporaneous responses in the system, which are 
 necessary to achieve identification. Section 3 discusses the preparation of the data 
series and the empirical specification of the SVAR model. The estimation results 
and some robustness checks are described in section 4. Section 5 summarizes 
the basic findings and highlights their implications for policymaking and further 
research.
2 Theory and Methodology
2.1 Cross-Country Transmission of Fiscal Shocks
Conceptually, the literature in this area relies on the framework of a two-country 
Mundell-Fleming model with flexible prices to distinguish at least three channels 
for the cross-country transmission of fiscal shocks (see Beetsma et al., 2006, or 
Badarinza, 2008). 
First, a fiscal expansion in a foreign economy increases aggregate demand and 
thus also the demand for domestic goods and services through the trade channel, 
which, in turn, has a positive effect on domestic output. 
Second, a foreign fiscal expansion affects domestic output via terms-of-trade 
changes through the real exchange rate channel. In the foreign economy, prices 
 increase after a fiscal expansion due to higher aggregate demand; and they are 
 expected to increase more strongly than world market prices since the latter are 
typically not affected one-to-one by the fiscal action of a single country. As a 
 consequence, the terms of trade of the foreign country improve as the real effective 
exchange rate appreciates and imports increase (while exports decrease). The 
 domestic economy benefits from this situation in terms of higher output as long as 
it is a net exporter to the foreign economy. 
Third, the interest rate channel captures the impact of a rising interest rate in a 
foreign economy after a fiscal expansion; this interest rate rise could either be due 
to a non-accommodative monetary tightening to keep inflation in check or due to 
the pressure on investments induced by higher aggregate demand. The higher 
 foreign interest rate could then translate into higher domestic interest rates (with 
a negative impact on domestic output), simply due to the fact that a higher foreign 
interest rate attracts more capital imports from the domestic economy, reducing 
domestic exchange reserves and thus also domestic money supply.
The specific sign and size of the cross-border fiscal multiplier depend on the 
interaction between these different channels. The overall impact of a fiscal expansion 
abroad on domestic output is expected to be positive if the trade and exchange rate 
effects outweigh the negative interest rate effect. Certainly, the actual cross-border 
effect depends on a number of country-specific characteristics, such as the degree 
of bilateral trade integration, the structure of bilateral trade balances, the  exchange 
rate system, the size of the country where the expansion is generated, the degree 
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of capital mobility, or the behavior of the central bank.6 This theoretical ambiguity 
calls for answers from an empirical investigation. Using the methodological frame-
work described below, we investigate how domestic macroeconomic variables 
 respond to a foreign fiscal impulse. While the interest rate channel can be explicitly 
considered in this framework, the trade channel and the exchange rate channel 
can be addressed only implicitly (via the direct domestic output response) given 
that we do not include trade volumes in our setting to keep the model tractable.7
2.2 Open Economy Structural VAR Model with Fiscal Shocks
To get information on the size of fiscal multipliers, a structural vector autoregressive 
(SVAR) model in the tradition of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has frequently been 
implemented. Building on this approach, we develop an open economy SVAR 
 model accounting for both foreign and domestic fiscal shocks, imposing contem-
poraneous restrictions to achieve identification.
We consider the structural form of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
A
0
x
t
=A(L)x
t–1
+Bε
t
, (1)
where A
0
 is the m × m matrix of contemporaneous effects, A(L) represents the 
 impact of lagged effects (matrix lag operator notation8) and B is an m × m structural 
form parameter matrix. Our m ×  l vector of endogenous variables xt consists of the 
following variables: foreign fiscal balance ( f
t
*),9 domestic government purchases of 
goods and services (g
t
), domestic net taxation (τ
t
), domestic output (y
t
), nominal 
effective exchange rate (e
t
), domestic inflation (π
t
) and a short-run interest rate (i
t
), 
i.e. x
t
 = (f
t
* g
t
 τ
t
 y
t
 e
t
 π
t
 i
t
). The structural shocks, denoted by εt, are assumed to be 
linearly related to the structural model residuals with zero mean and a diagonal 
variance-covariance matrix, i.e. ε
t
~ 0, = 2Σε σdiag i{ }( ) . The corresponding reduced 
form VAR model is given by:
x
t
 = R(L)x
t–1
+u
t
, (2)
where R(L) = A
0
–1A(L) and u
t
 = A
0
–1Bε
t
. Using this relation between reduced 
form residuals and structural shocks, we can now specify the model for innova-
tions A
0
u
t
 = Bε
t
 as follows:
6 Simulations by Breuss (2006), applying both a calibrated two-country Mundell-Fleming model with flexible 
prices and the Oxford Economic Forecasting World Model, have shown that the cross-border effect will be bigger if 
the fiscal shock is generated in a large economy, if there is a fixed exchange rate system (as in this case the output 
increase is not reduced by an appreciation, which would be implemented in a flexible exchange rate system to 
counteract increasing domestic prices) or if the central bank pursues an accommodative policy.
7 Even if we were able to include trade-related variables, it would be difficult to empirically disentangle the exchange
rate channel from the trade channel (see Badarinza, 2008) as, in the end, both of them affect output via changes 
in trade volumes. Moreover, we do not incorporate a real exchange rate but a nominal one, which enters into a 
type of arbitrage equation for the foreign exchange market (in line with Dungey and Fry, 2009, and Kožluk and 
Mehrotra, 2009).
8 A(L)x
t-1
= A
1
x
t-1
+A
2
x
t-2
+...+A
q
x
t-q
, where A
j
 are m × m matrices for each j = 1,...,q .
9 Note that the foreign fiscal balance is scaled to GDP and inversely defined to interpret an increase in f
t
* as a fiscal 
expansion, i.e. f
t
* = (g
t
*–τ
t
*)/y*. We do not distinguish between a spending and a net tax shock in the foreign 
country to keep the model tractable.
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(3)
with	the	innovations	(reduced	form	residuals)	that	may	be	correlated,	i.e.	for	any	
k,l-pair	of	endogeneous	variables,	we	could	have	cov( , ) 0u utk tl ≠ ,	and	the	structural	
shocks	that	are	uncorrelated,	i.e. cov(ε
t
k,ε
t
l) = 0.	A
0
	contains	the	contemporaneous	
responses	of	variable	k	to	an	innovation	in	variable	l,	and	α
kl
	can	thus	be	interpreted	
in	terms	of	an	elasticity.	For	the	fiscal	variables,	α
kl
	captures	both	the	automatic	
response	(automatic	stabilizers)	and	the	systematic	discretionary	response	to	inno-
vations	 in	 the	 other	 system	 variables.	 B,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 contains	 the	
	contemporaneous	 responses	 of	 variable	 k	 to	 a	 structural	 (exogenous)	 shock	 in	
	variable	l.	The	structural	fiscal	shocks	(ε
t
f*,ε
t
g,ε
t
τ)	represent	the	random	discretionary	
shocks	to	fiscal	policies	(for	this	type	of	classification	see	Perotti,	2004).
2.3   Restrictions on Contemporaneous Responses in the System to Achieve 
Identification
In	line	with	the	order	conditions	by	Breitung	et	al.	(2004),	2m2 – m(m+1)/2	restric-
tions	have	to	be	imposed	to	achieve	just-identification	of	equation	(3).	In	our	case	
m = 7,	i.e.	we	need	a	total	of	70	restrictions	on	A
0
	and	B.	One	can	see	in	equation	
(3)	that	we	have	actually	imposed	73	restrictions	–	the	validity	of	this	over-identi-
fying	situation	will	be	tested	later	on	by	means	of	a	likelihood	ratio	test.	The	re-
strictions	and	the	underlying	economic	assumptions	are	discussed	in	detail	below.
2.3.1  Restrictions on Fiscal Responses
In	our	model	the	domestic	economy	is	assumed	to	be	small	and	open	(CEE	country)	
and	 strongly	 integrated	 with	 a	 large	 foreign	 economy	 (euro	 area,	 Germany	 as	
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proxy as discussed already in the introduction) so that a fiscal shock in the foreign 
country could have a considerable impact on the domestic economy (but not 
 necessarily the other way round). We assume that the large foreign country is a 
“fiscal leader” and does not react – at least not in the same quarter – to changes in 
variables of the domestic economy. Consequently, α
f*l
 = 0, ∀ ≠l f * in the first row 
of equation (3). A similar reasoning is provided by Kožluk and Mehrotra (2009) to 
model the spillover of a monetary policy shock in a large foreign country (China) 
to small and open trading partner economies (Southeast Asia).
The second and third rows in equation (3) describe the domestic fiscal 
 responses to innovations in the other system variables. We build on a series of 
closed economy fiscal SVARs that have been implemented for a small but growing 
sample of OECD countries using the identification approach developed by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The key to identification here is the observation that 
it takes typically more than a quarter for fiscal policymakers to respond to, say, an 
output shock because of decision lags. The systematic discretionary response 
 contained in α
kl
 can therefore be set to zero when using quarterly data. As a result, 
we are left with the automatic response only, for which we can use available external 
information or reasonable assumptions on the elasticity of public spending and net 
taxes.
Let us first identify the structural fiscal shocks on the right-hand side of equation 
(3). Like Giordano et al. (2007), who also investigated an SVAR with three fiscal 
variables, we achieve a Cholesky-type identification by imposing assumptions on 
the ordering among the structural fiscal shocks. As mentioned before, we assume 
that the large foreign country is the fiscal leader, and thus the decision on the 
 foreign fiscal balance “comes first.” That is, ß
f*g
 = ß
f*τ
 = 0, while both ß
gf*
 and ß
τf*
  are 
expected to be different from zero, allowing domestic fiscal policy to react 
 contemporaneously to a foreign fiscal shock. We further assume that spending 
 decisions by the government are taken before taxes are set, i.e. ß
gτ
 = 0 while βτ g ≠ 0 . 
In a second step we can now make additional assumptions on the elasticities of 
the domestic fiscal variables with respect to the macroeconomic variables in the 
system (relevant for the restrictions in matrix A
0
 and to be interpreted as auto-
matic response of fiscal variables to innovations in the macroeconomic variables): 
– Output elasticity of public spending: Under the EU’s fiscal surveillance frame-
work, the European Commission (2004) estimates budgetary elasticities of the 
EU Member States on a regular basis. According to these estimates, a 1% 
 decline in GDP drives up government spending on average by nearly 0.1% in 
the CEE-5. The lion’s share of this pretty inelastic response of public spending 
to output can be attributed to unemployment benefits, which are not included 
in our spending measure but enter with a negative sign into the net tax variable 
(see also section 3.1). Our spending variable consists of the sum of government 
consumption and government gross fixed capital formation, of which public 
wages account for, on average, nearly 50%. Typically, public wages show a 
 certain inertia in adjusting to business cycle fluctuations. For example, a tem-
porary output decline does not induce immediate lay-offs of public sector 
 employees. Given all these facts, we feel safe to assume that α
gy
 = 0. 
– Output elasticity of net taxes: Existing fiscal SVAR investigations for  various 
OECD countries mainly follow the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
and compute elasticities for different types of taxes and transfers. Weighted 
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averages are then calculated over these sub-elasticities to get α
τy
. The following 
tax revenue categories are distinguished: personal income taxes, corporate 
 income taxes, indirect taxes (e.g. VAT), social security contributions and all 
other current and capital transfers that government receives (e.g. property or 
inheritance taxes). The literature uses a mixture of assumptions and estima-
tions to get the elasticity for each of these categories. For instance, de Castro 
and Hernández de Cos (2008) regress the growth rate of each tax base on 
GDP growth and take the estimated slope coefficient as the output elasticity.10
Perotti (2004) and Giordano et al. (2007) employ similar regressions but also 
use some simplifying assumptions, such as an elasticity of one for indirect 
taxes, an elasticity of zero for corporate income taxes if they are collected with 
a lag longer than a quarter (e.g. in Germany), an elasticity of zero for property 
and inheritance taxes as they are likely to be inelastic to output at a quarterly 
frequency, or an elasticity of –0.2 for transfers.11 The resulting value for α
τy
 is 
0.5 in Italy, 0.62 in Spain, 0.76 in the U.K., 0.92 in Germany and 1.85 in the 
U.S.A. In the case of Germany, the calibration of α
τy
 is primarily determined 
by the assumption of unit-elastic indirect taxes as the estimated output elasticity 
of personal income taxes is statistically not different from zero (see Perotti, 
2004). In this paper we assume for the CEE-5 a benchmark elasticity of 
α
τy
 = 0.8. This is supported by the European Commission’s estimates of the 
output elasticity of total government revenues, ranging from 0.88 in Slovakia 
to 1.02 in Hungary and Slovenia (reported in Eller, 2009), and mildly  corrected 
downward because of the small output elasticity of transfers. Furthermore, 
the share of indirect taxes in total general government revenues is compara-
tively high in the CEE-5 (on average clearly above 30%), which also backs a 
value for α
τy
 that is not too far away from that of Germany.
– Price elasticity of public spending: Following Perotti (2004), we can distinguish 
the wage component from the non-wage component of public purchases of 
goods and services. On the one hand, public wages may be indexed to  inflation; 
however, it is quite unlikely that this indexation occurs within a quarter. This 
implies a quarterly elasticity of real public wages to inflation of –1, i.e. in real 
terms (we are using real-valued variables in the estimations) public wages 
shrink proportionally to the increase in inflation. On the other hand, we can 
assume that a considerable part of the non-wage component of public spending 
is indexed to the price level within a quarter, implying an elasticity of zero in 
real terms for these spending categories. Given that in the CEE-5 public wages 
account for nearly 50% of the employed spending measure (except for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, for each of which a share of about 30% applies), 
Perotti‘s benchmark of α
gπ
 = –0.5 provides a reasonable upper bound, which 
we use in our baseline specification, assuming that the whole non-wage 
 component is indexed to the price level within a quarter. At the other extreme 
– under the assumption that there is no quarterly price indexation for 
10 However, besides GDP growth, only a time trend is included as explanatory variable, making the estimations 
susceptible to omitted variable biases. This is admittedly difficult to resolve given a considerable degree of model 
uncertainty in these estimations.
11 The number is not higher as, basically, only unemployment benefits respond to output changes within a quarter, 
and they account only for a small share in total primary expenditures.
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all spending categories – we get α
gπ
 = –1 as a lower bound. Thus, a range of 
 parameters for  α πg ∈ − −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦1, 0.5  can be considered; the impact of different 
 calibrations will be checked in the robustness section.
– Price elasticity of net taxes: Existing fiscal SVAR studies calculate α
τπ
 analogously 
to α
τy
 by distinguishing between different tax categories. While the elasticity for 
personal income taxes and social security contributions is typically estimated 
(α
dirtax,π
), some simplifying assumptions are used for the other categories, such 
as a price elasticity of zero for real corporate income taxes and for real indirect 
taxes (corresponds to unitary elasticities in nominal terms). For transfers, a 
similar argument as for public wages is applied, namely a lack of quarterly 
price indexation and thus a price elasticity of –1 in real terms. As a result, the 
literature gets a positive value for α
τπ
, which is largely driven by the negative 
transfer elasticity and is 0.78 in Spain (de Castro and Hernández de Cos, 2008), 
0.87 in Germany, 1.21 in the U.K. and 1.25 in the U.S.A. (Perotti, 2004). 
Given the stated assumptions, α
τπ
 = 0 if α
dirtax,π
 = –1, α
τπ
 = 1 if α
dirtax,π
 = 0, and 
α
τπ
 > 1 if α
dirtax,π
 > 0. In this paper we start with the benchmark of α
τπ
 = 0.5 
(i.e. α
dirtax,π
 = –0.5) and then try different calibrations within reasonable ranges 
(see section 4.2).
– Exchange rate elasticities of fiscal variables: We set α
ge
= α
τe
= 0 because the 
 contemporaneous response of domestic fiscal variables to exchange rate inno-
vations is deemed to be negligible. This assumption is also backed by Dungey 
and Fry (2009) – one of the rare papers that include exchange rates into a fiscal 
SVAR to identify jointly fiscal and monetary shocks (for New Zealand).
– Interest rate elasticities of fiscal variables: We set α
gi
 = α
τi
 = 0 because our revenue 
and expenditure data do not include property income or interest payments on 
public debt (in line with Perotti, 2004).
2.3.2 Restrictions on Non-Fiscal Responses
In the fourth row of equation (3) we let real GDP respond contemporaneously to 
the fiscal variables, while output does not respond to prices, interest rates and 
 exchange rates within a quarter. For the former assumption, one could argue that 
it takes more than a quarter for fiscal policy to affect the economy because of 
 implementation lags (argument put forward by Fatás and Mihov, 2001). However, 
as Perotti (2004) emphasized, government spending is a component of GDP, and 
if we set α
yg
 to be zero, we would implausibly assume that an increase in public 
spending crowds out private GDP one-to-one. A similar argument can be put 
 forward for net taxes, as they are a component of disposable income, and for the 
foreign fiscal balance, if we assume that a foreign fiscal shock has an immediate 
 effect on domestic exports, which are, again, a component of GDP.
In rows five and seven of equation (3) we treat the interest rate and the 
 exchange rate as “fast” financial variables that immediately react to innovations in 
the other system’s variables, with one notable exception: α
iy
 = 0. This restriction is, 
as in the case of the fiscal policy response, backed by the assumptions that it takes 
more than a quarter for the central bank to react to an output shock due to  decision 
lags or due to the lack of real-time output data (therefore the systematic discre-
tionary response is zero) and the automatic response (say, a reduction of interest 
rates due to less credit demand in the case of a slowing economy) does not imme-
diately materialize as commercial banks set their interest rates more in line with 
The Economic Transmission of Fiscal Policy Shocks 
from Western to Eastern Europe
52  FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Q2/11
central bank rate adjustments than in response to short-run credit demand 
 fluctuations.
Finally, in row six we apply a “sticky” Calvo pricing scheme,12 analogously to 
Kožluk and Mehrotra (2009), and assume that inflation does not respond within a 
quarter to innovations in the other system’s variables, except for a non-zero 
 response to output that can be motivated by automatic price markups in the case 
of soaring aggregate demand.
3 Data and Empirical Specification
3.1 Data Issues
There is a broad discussion in the literature whether different types of public 
 expenditures and revenues have a different impact on economic output. This 
 discussion is based on, inter alia, a branch of endogenous growth theory that 
 distinguishes between “productive” and “non-productive” public spending as well 
as “distortionary” and “non-distortionary” taxation and assigns a different long-run 
growth impact to these categories (see, e.g., Devarajan et al., 1996). Investigations 
for Hungary (Horváth et al., 2006, and Lendvai, 2007) show that the composition 
of domestic fiscal shocks is particularly important when it comes to evaluating the 
effects of fiscal policy.
Given that we have only a limited degree of freedom in our model due to 
 comparatively short data series for the CEE-5, we chose to address these composi-
tion arguments by a two-way breakdown of the government budget and use a 
 narrow definition of government spending and taxation to fit more clearly the 
 direct impact of a fiscal action on the use of resources by the private sector (in line 
with Perotti, 2004). We argue that public spending on goods and services has 
 effects different from those of transfers: Only the former affects directly the use of 
resources. Hence, our variable for government purchases of goods and services (g
t
) 
consists of government consumption plus government investment, while transfers 
are subtracted from government revenues to get our variable for net taxes (τ
t
). The 
inclusion of net taxes should capture the net impact on the private sector and is 
supported by the view that in the short and medium run fiscal policy operates 
mostly via a demand channel. The foreign fiscal balance is also constructed 
 according to these definitions and scaled to GDP. 
For the fiscal variables we use quarterly budgetary data from the Quarterly 
Non-Financial Accounts for General Government (QNFAGG) of Eurostat’s 
 Government Finance Statistics. Several characteristics of this dataset are of 
 relevance for our empirical investigation. First, compilation practices differ across 
countries and across different expenditure and revenue items (for an overview, see 
European Communities, 2006). Basic data are transformed by Eurostat to fully 
comply with the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA 95) and to ensure 
 comparability between countries. Second, raw data series are collected at different 
frequencies. While tax data are available from tax offices at monthly frequency, a 
few items are missing at quarterly frequency (e.g. public wages in kind) and are 
estimated based on previous years’ data or on budget data. Third, adjustments are 
implemented in the compiled data to deliver satisfactory accrual figures (e.g. cash-
12 Price stickiness helps to obtain an increase in the real interest rate that also brings about a monetary contraction.
The Economic Transmission of Fiscal Policy Shocks 
from Western to Eastern Europe
FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Q2/11  53
based tax data are time-adjusted with a one-month delay to obtain accrual data). 
The use of accrual figures (an expense is recorded when goods are delivered or 
services are rendered) is important for our setting as they capture the effective 
economic response to a fiscal shock better than cash data. Fourth, QNFAGG data 
have been available for the CEE-5 only since 1999, and thus we use annual figures 
for the years 1995 to 1998 and the seasonal pattern of the years 1999 to 2009 to 
interpolate quarterly values for j = 1995,...,1998, i.e.
F F FF T jij j
ik
kk j
T
= ⋅ −= +
∑ 1
1
,  (4)
with F representing the respective fiscal variable, i denoting quarters and 
T = 2009. Finally, concerning the overall quality of QNFAGG data for the CEE-5, 
the quality report of Eurostat (2008) confirms considerable advances (compared 
to 2006) with regard to the consistency between quarterly and annual data, the 
timeliness and coverage of data, or the estimation of accrual data on a quarterly 
basis. Further improvements are requested for budgetary revisions, whose impact 
should be reduced further. 
In the estimations we use quarterly data (from the first quarter of 1995 to the 
fourth quarter of 2009) that are real-valued, seasonally adjusted and denominated 
in local currency. Output, fiscal variables and the nominal effective exchange rate 
are expressed in logs. The fiscal variables are available in nominal terms only and 
so we deflated them by using the CPI. Both output and fiscal variables show a strong 
seasonal pattern; hence they were seasonally detrended by applying the Tramo-Seats 
procedure (also used by, among others, Giordano et al., 2007). Table A.1 in the 
appendix describes the calculation of the variables and their data sources in detail.
3.2 Empirical Specification of the Model 
The reduced form VARs are estimated by ordinary least squares in levels form, 
 allowing cointegration between the variables. The choice of lag length for the 
models reflects the use of quarterly data and a rather short estimation sample. We 
also consider the results from misspecification tests, in particular in order to avoid 
residual autocorrelation. The resulting lag lengths amount to 2 in the case of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, and to 3 for Slovakia. All models 
include a constant and a linear trend as deterministic terms.13 The estimation 
 samples for the individual economies are as follows: Q1 1995 to Q4 2009 for the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and Q1 1996 to Q4 2009 for Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
The structural form VARs are then estimated by maximum likelihood and 
a scoring algorithm, using the estimated variance-covariance matrix from the 
 reduced form VAR (see Breitung et al., 2004).14 Attaining convergence is compli-
13 One constant only is included in the case of Poland to attain convergence in the estimation of the structural form 
coefficients. A shift dummy variable is also included in the cases of Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, taking the value 
1 from Q2 2000 to Q4 2000 and 0 otherwise in order to deal with residual outliers (due to the selling of UMTS 
licenses in Germany in this period, which had a considerable non-discretionary one-off effect on the German fiscal 
balance). 
14 For the SVAR estimation we use the software JMulTi, developed by Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), downloadable from 
http://www.jmulti.de.
The Economic Transmission of Fiscal Policy Shocks 
from Western to Eastern Europe
54  FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Q2/11
cated in our system due to the relatively large number of variables in relation to 
the sample size. A slight variation of the specification across countries helped to 
resolve this issue. In the cases of Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia we smoothed 
the domestic fiscal variables using four-quarter moving averages to account for 
short-term volatility, which was not fully eliminated by the Tramo-Seats seasonal 
 adjustment procedure. Further, in the case of Poland, the foreign fiscal shock is 
specified as a shock to the primary general government fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio. 
The validity of the three overidentifying restrictions is tested by a likelihood 
ratio test. The overidentifying restrictions are rejected at a 5% significance level 
only in the case of Slovenia.15 The impact of structural fiscal shocks is evaluated by 
impulse responses. In order to account for parameter uncertainty, we use Hall 
percentile 95% confidence intervals, obtained by bootstrapping methods with 
1,000 replications (see Benkwitz et al., 2001). As our main interest is in the long-run 
impact of fiscal shocks, we examine the accumulated impulse responses over time. 
4 The Economic Effects of Fiscal Shocks
4.1 Baseline Results
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal shocks implied by the model 
 estimates. The structural VAR approach allows the empirical assessment of many 
potential links between macroeconomic variables, but in this study we concentrate 
on the reactions to structural fiscal shocks, both foreign and domestic. We start by 
analyzing cross-country fiscal spillovers and then turn to the reaction of domestic 
variables to domestic fiscal shocks. 
The estimated structural fiscal shocks for the CEE-5 and Germany (available 
from the authors upon request) reassemble well-known periods of fiscal tightening 
(such as in Germany in 2000 and 2007, in the Czech Republic in 2005, in Poland 
in 2005 and 2007, in Slovakia in 2002−03, and in Slovenia in 2002) and fiscal 
 easing (in Germany in 2002−03 and 2005, in Poland in 2004, in Slovakia in 2000, 
in Slovenia in 2001, and in Hungary in 2006). In the context of the 2008−09 
 crisis, expansionary fiscal shocks can be observed in all these countries, except for 
Hungary, where the pro-cyclical fiscal consolidation is reflected by – on average 
– positive shocks to net taxes and negative shocks to government spending. 
 Negative tax shocks are most pronounced in this period in the Czech Republic, 
while positive spending shocks predominate in both the Czech Republic and 
 Poland.
The results in terms of how variables respond to temporary structural shocks 
in fiscal variables (both domestic and foreign) are presented in tables 1 to 3, charts 
1 to 3 and charts 5 and 6. The tables show the cumulative reaction of each variable 
to each of the structural fiscal shocks of the system after two, four and eight 
 quarters. The charts are cumulative impulse-response functions depicting the 
 reaction of real GDP and domestic fiscal variables to temporary structural (1%) 
shocks in foreign and domestic fiscal variables.
15 The test statistic from the likelihood test amounts to 0.711 for Poland (p-value: 0.871), 2.627 (p-value: 0.453) for 
the Czech Republic, 5.038 (p-value: 0.169) for Hungary, 2.141 (p-value: 0.544) for Slovakia, and 17.584 (p-value: 
0.001) for Slovenia. Although the results of the test for Slovenia would imply that probably we should work with a 
just-identified model, we decided to use the overidentified model for consistency reasons.
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Table 1
Cumulative Responses to a Foreign Fiscal Shock 
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8
Government 
spending g 0.6 2.4 * 7.8* 2.2 * 6.0* 14.8* 0.6 * 1.1 * 1.8* 1.2 3.1 * 3.9 0.3 0.3 –0.6*
Net taxes τ –8.1* –12.4 * –16.2* –0.5 –1.0 –2.0 –0.6 –1.1 –1.9 –0.4 –3.4 –11.8* –0.5 –1.6 –3.1 *
Output y –0.6* –1.6* –4.0* –0.1 0.3 2.6 0.9 * 1.3* 2.6 * –3.7* –6.1 * –4.3* –1.2 * –2.0* –2.4 *
Exchange rate e 1.3* 2.3* 1.7 0.9 2.7 * 6.0* –0.9 –1.1 –1.5 –0.8 –1.9 * –2.5 0.3 0.1 –1.0
Inflation rate π –0.0 –0.4 –1.5* –0.2 –0.6 –1.4 –0.8 * –1.2* –1.7 * –0.6 –0.5 –4.3* –0.4 –0.9 * –1.5*
Interest rate i 0.3 0.8 1.4 * –0.3 –0.7 –1.1 –0.5 –1.4 * –2.5* –0.4 –1.2 1.0 –0.4 * –0.5* –0.8*
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note:  This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary shock in the German fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (easing of 
the German fiscal balance by 1% of GDP). An asterisk indicates statistical signif icance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile confidence interval (obtained by bootstrapping 
methods with 1,000 replications) does not include a zero impulse response.
Table 2
Cumulative Responses to a Domestic Spending Shock
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8
Foreign fiscal 
balance f* 0.20 * 0.78 * 2.10 * –0.28* –0.62 * –1.06* 0.26 0.73 * 1.73 * –0.06 –0.17 –0.42 –0.02 0.30 1.09*
Net taxes τ –0.01 –0.03 –0.05 0.05* 0.07 * 0.06* –0.01 –0.02 –0.05 –0.00 –0.01 –0.05 –0.01 –0.01 –0.04*
Output y –0.00* –0.01* –0.04* 0.01* 0.02* 0.01 –0.00 –0.01* –0.02* –0.01 * –0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 –0.01
Exchange rate e 0.01 0.03 * 0.03 * 0.03* 0.05* 0.06* 0.02 * 0.03 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.02* –0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 *
Inflation rate π 2.50 * 2.20* 0.23 3.12 * 4.64* 6.42 * 2.46 * 3.36 * 3.82* 3.04* 1.86* –0.01 1.45* 1.56* 1.32 *
Interest rate i 0.66 * 0.51 –0.39 0.85* 1.72 * 3.37 * 1.47 * 2.27 * 2.43 * 0.76 * 1.18 * 1.96 0.28 0.26 –0.06
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note:  This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary 1% shock in domestic public purchases of goods and  services. 
An asterisk indicates statistical signif icance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile confidence interval (obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications) does not 
 include a zero impulse response.
Table 3
Cumulative Responses to a Domestic Taxation Shock
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia
2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8 2 4 8
Foreign fiscal 
balance f* –0.12 –0.48 * –1.55* 0.34 * 0.85* 1.71 * –0.73 * –1.73 * –3.90 * 0.38* 1.33 * 3.20* –0.06 –0.44 * –0.95 *
Government 
spending g 0.01 * 0.02* 0.02 0.02 * 0.03 * 0.05* 0.01 * 0.02* 0.04* 0.02 * 0.03 * –0.01 0.01 * 0.01* 0.01*
Output y 0.00 0.01 0.03 * –0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 0.00 0.02* –0.02 * –0.05* –0.10 * 0.01 * 0.02* 0.02*
Exchange rate e 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 –0.00 –0.00 0.04 –0.01 –0.02* –0.03 * –0.00 –0.01 –0.01
Inflation rate π –0.01 –0.16 0.34 –0.49 –1.12 * –1.69 * 0.19 0.88* 3.18 * 0.88* 2.25* 2.51 * 0.15 0.84* 1.46 *
Interest rate i –0.22 –0.59 –0.90 * –0.18 –0.19 –0.40 –0.04 0.43 3.00* –1.00* –2.42 * –5.33 * –0.12 0.38 0.77*
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note:  This table shows the cumulative response (in %) of the endogeneous variables at quarters 2, 4, and 8 after a temporary 1% shock in domestic net taxes. An asterisk indicates statis-
tical signif icance in the sense that the 95% Hall percentile confidence interval (obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications) does not include a zero impulse response.
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We find that there are considerable feedback effects between the foreign fiscal 
variable and the two domestic fiscal variables. On the one hand, if Germany 
 implements a fiscal expansion, all the CEE-5 will respond with an expansion of 
public purchases of goods and services (the response is particularly strong in 
 Hungary and the Czech Republic); in Slovenia, the response is reversed after the 
second year of reaction (see chart 1).16 The Czech Republic and Slovakia respond 
with a sizeable cut in taxes and Slovenia with a fairly small one, while in Hungary 
and Poland net taxes do not respond to the foreign shock (see chart 2). On the 
other hand, our model estimates imply that the German fiscal balance responds to 
fiscal shocks in the CEE-5 as well (see tables 2 and 3). This result is, however, not 
that robust when we use alternative specifications (see section 4.2). 
Fiscal shocks in Germany and the reactions in the CEE-5’s GDP apparently 
involve both negative and positive cross-border spillovers (see chart 3). In Slovenia, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, output reacts negatively to a fiscal expansion in 
Germany (in Slovakia, this response is statistically significant only up to the  second 
year after the shock). The effect is strongest in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
where after a temporary 1 percentage point shock in the German fiscal balance-
to-GDP ratio real GDP contracts by 4% cumulatively over two years. In both 
countries, foreign fiscal expansion is accompanied by an increase in domestic 
 government spending and interest rates,17 both of which have a negative impact on 
output (see also below). Thus, on the one hand, this result corroborates the view 
that the negative interest rate channel outweighs the potentially positive trade and 
exchange rate channels in these two countries. On the other hand, the negative 
cross-border fiscal multiplier is transmitted here also via a non-Keynesian output 
response to a foreign-induced domestic fiscal expansion. The interest rate channel 
does not play a clear-cut role in Slovenia as interest rates respond negatively to 
 foreign fiscal expansion and there is no response of output to interest rates. 
 However, as in the Czech Republic, the foreign fiscal expansion results in cuts in 
net taxes, which have a negative impact on Slovenian output.18
In Poland and Hungary, a fiscal expansion in Germany has a positive impact on 
domestic output (in Hungary, the impact is statistically significant only ten quarters 
after the shock), pointing to a more dominant role of the trade and exchange rate 
channels here. The positive cross-border fiscal spillover in Hungary is consistent 
with spending reacting positively to the foreign fiscal expansion and resulting in a 
positive output response. The positive transmission of a foreign fiscal expansion to 
Poland can also be traced back to a negative response of the interest rate (policy-mix 
coordination could be the reason), which, in turn, has a positive effect on output.
It could be argued that the quantitative importance of the trade channel may 
be related to the degree of trade integration between each one of the CEE-5 and 
Germany. Chart 4 presents a scatterplot showing the level of trade integration 
16 Such an empirical mechanism concerning the propagation of fiscal shocks in the euro area to the Polish economy is 
also found in Kolasa (2009), who uses a DSGE framework.
17 The positive response of the interest rate to a fiscal shock in Germany is statistically significant in Slovakia when a 
90% instead of a 95% confidence interval is used.
18 It should be noted that the results for Slovakia and Slovenia are based on a sample which is dominated by the period 
when they were not members of the euro area. Current and future interest rate reactions are expected to be strongly 
influenced by the currency union framework.
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Response of Public Purchases of Goods and Services to a Foreign Fiscal Shock
Chart 1
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic government spending to a temporary shock in the German fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal 
balance by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dotted lines), obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications.
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Chart 2
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic net taxes to a temporary shock in the German fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance 
by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dotted lines), obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications.
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 between the CEE-5 and Germany (average share of exports to Germany in total 
exports for the period from 1999 to 2009 against the (median) accumulated 
 reaction of output to a fiscal shock in Germany after two years. The relationship 
between these two variables is rather weak, indicating that the role that integration 
plays as a factor modulating the propagation effects of foreign fiscal shocks is 
 overcome by other transmission channels.19
The results concerning domestic fiscal multipliers show a mixture of both 
Keynesian and non-Keynesian responses of output to domestic fiscal expansions 
(see charts 5 and 6). Output in Hungary tends to increase when fiscal policymakers 
implement a fiscal expansion. These reactions are, however, not very precisely 
 estimated for net taxes and only statistically significant in the first year for spending; 
therefore they are relatively short-lived.20 We can also observe a strong Keynesian 
response in Slovakia for the revenue side, where real GDP contracts by 0.1% 
 cumulatively over two years after a (temporary) 1% shock to net taxes. Output in 
Poland and the Czech Republic, by contrast, responds in a non-Keynesian manner 
to a domestic fiscal shock: It decreases after a rise in public purchases of goods and 
services or a cut in net taxes. This also holds for Slovenia, but only for the revenue 
side. Non-Keynesian output responses to fiscal shocks – in particular to fiscal 
 contractions with the argument that fiscal tightness mitigates concerns about debt 
sustainability and reduces the expected tax burden on the private sector, thus 
stimulating private sector demand – were also found for the CEE-5 by Rzon´ca and 
Ciz˙kowicz (2005), for emerging market economies by Kandil and Morsy (2010) 
and for a sample of EU countries by Giudice et al. (2007).
Further conclusions21 concerning the response of fiscal policy to monetary 
shocks can be drawn from investigating the impulse-response functions corre-
sponding to the reaction of government expenditure and net taxes to structural 
interest rate shocks. Accommodative fiscal policy on the expenditure side can be 
observed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak 
 Republic, where public spending decreases after a positive interest rate shock. In 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, by contrast, net taxes respond negatively to a 
shock in the interest rate. The net effect evaluated at the median response  indicates 
that the non-accommodating effect tends to be slightly higher than the reduction 
of government expenditure following a contractive interest rate shock.
Turning to the reaction of monetary policy to fiscal policy shocks (see also 
 tables 2 and 3), all countries, with the exception of Slovenia, tend to react to an 
expansion of public spending by increasing their interest rates (in Slovakia and the 
19 To examine cross-country differences in the response of domestic output to a foreign fiscal shock in a more instructive 
manner, it would be useful to present partial regression plots where the conditional correlation between the cumulative
impulse response and the variable of interest is shown and relevant country-specific characteristics are used as control 
variables (such as the structure and governance of fiscal policy, the degree of economic integration and openness, the 
size of and distance between the economies under investigation, the exchange rate system or the type of monetary 
policy reaction). However, this exercise makes only sense in a cross-section setting with considerably more than 
five observations. This is also why chart 4 – an unconditional correlation between the output response and trade 
integration – is shown here primarily for suggestive reasons.
20 It should be noted that our results for Hungary differ from those of Lendvai (2007), who finds for the period Q1 1997 
to Q4 2005 that increasing government expenditure leads to a contraction in GDP, using a structural VAR with a 
“Cholesky” identification scheme á la Fatás and Mihov (2001).
21 In the following, we discuss further interesting impulse responses without presenting the respective charts, which are, 
however, available from the authors upon request.
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Chart 3
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of domestic real GDP to a temporary shock in the German fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio (easing of the German fiscal balance 
by 1% of GDP) and the 95% Hall percentile confidence bands (dotted lines), obtained by bootstrapping methods with 1,000 replications.
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Czech Republic this response is statistically significant only up to half a year after 
the shock). The reactions to shocks to net taxes are more heterogeneous across the 
CEE-5 economies: Accommodative monetary policy (increase in the interest rate 
after a positive net tax shock) can be observed in Slovenia and Poland after the 
 second year, and non-accommodative reactions are present in the Czech Republic.
The analysis of the reaction of domestic fiscal variables to structural output 
shocks identifies well-functioning responses related to automatic stabilizers. A 
positive shock in output tends to reduce government expenditure and increase net 
taxes in practically all cases under study. The strong positive reaction of inflation 
Cumulative output reaction to a temporary fiscal shock in Germany after 2 years (%)
Average share of exports to Germany in total exports from 1999 to 2009 (%)
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Chart 4
Source: Authors’ estimations, Eurostat.
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Chart 5
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of real GDP to a temporary 1% shock in domestic government spending. Based on 95% 
Hall percentile confidence bands (which are not shown here to get a better overview), statistical significance is given in the Czech Republic, in 
Poland and in Hungary up to five quarters after the shock, and in Slovakia up to three quarters after the shock.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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to public spending shocks can also be easily framed in the setting of simple 
 aggregate supply-aggregate demand models. 
4.2 Robustness Checks and Caveats
Before concluding, we present various robustness checks that have been executed 
to ensure that the baseline results still hold when alternative specifications are 
taken into account.22
First, we account for the concern that the identified fiscal shocks might actually 
have been anticipated. Given that government expenditure or tax changes have 
considerable legislative lags and are widely publicized prior to their implementation, 
economic agents may adjust their behavior as soon as these changes are announced 
and not necessarily at the time they are implemented. Such a phenomenon may 
distort the impulse responses shown in the previous section (for a technical 
 underpinning, see Canova, 2009). 
In order to check to what extent fiscal foresight may be an issue in our sample, 
we follow Perotti (2004) and assume that publicly available forecasts for fiscal and 
macroeconomic variables reflect government announcements of future expenditure 
and tax changes. We then check whether such forecasts are systematically correlated 
with our VAR-based innovations in order to reveal their predictability. Table 4 
shows the replication of Perotti’s preferred specification, with the estimated 
 reduced form residuals from equation (2) for government spending and net taxes 
being regressed on vintage projections of the growth rate of government consump-
%
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Chart 6
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Note: The curves represent the cumulative median response of real GDP to a temporary 1% shock in domestic net taxes. Based on 95% Hall 
percentile confidence bands (which are not shown here to get a better overview), statistical significance is given in Slovakia and Slovenia for all 
shown quarters after the shock, in the Czech Republic starting six quarters after the shock and in Poland starting eight quarters after the 
shock.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
22 Detailed robustness check results, which are not explicitly shown in this section, are available from the authors upon 
request.
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tion and GDP for the countries in our sample (taken from various issues of the 
OECD Economic Outlook). With the exception of the Czech Republic, where a 
robust correlation with GDP growth forecasts can be found for net taxes, we 
 cannot confirm the predictability of VAR innovations in our setting.23 This 
 corroborates the findings of Perotti (2004) for five high income OECD countries. 
The lack of statistically significant fiscal foresight can be explained by the fact 
that economic agents indeed respond when discretionary measures materialize 
and not when they are announced, as budgetary announcements are most likely 
not taken at face value due to their preliminary character. This view is also 
 supported by Johnson et al. (2006), who found, using data from the U.S. 
23 The significant correlation between government consumption forecasts and government spending innovations vanishes 
for Hungary and Poland when we use alternative specifications, i.e. when we replace government consumption 
forecasts with projections for the general government financial balance as a percentage of GDP or when we include 
– besides forecasts for the current year j – also forecasts for the year j+1.
Table 4
Predictability of Fiscal News
A. Reduced Form Residuals for Government Purchases of Goods and Services
GC_1 GC_2 GDP_1 GDP_2 Number 
of obser-
vations
R²
Czech Rep. 0.002 –0.002 0.001 –0.001 49 0.04
(0.30) (0.26) (0.59) (0.74)
Hungary –0.004 0.008** 0.000 –0.002 49 0.11
(0.15) (0.04) (0.92) (0.71)
Poland 0.000 0.002** –0.001 0.000 49 0.12
(0.97) (0.03) (0.38) (0.80)
Slovakia 0.001 0.002 –0.000 –0.000 35 0.07
(0.51) (0.27) (0.82) (0.73)
B. Reduced Form Residuals for Net Taxes
GC_1 GC_2 GDP_1 GDP_2 Number of 
obser-
vations
R²
Czech Rep. –0.002 –0.000 0.016 ** –0.013 49 0.16
(0.79) (0.98) (0.02) (0.14)
Hungary 0.002 –0.003 –0.006 0.007 49 0.01
(0.82) (0.78) (0.52) (0.66)
Poland 0.001 0.002 –0.001 0.001 49 0.03
(0.73) (0.38) (0.55) (0.64)
Slovakia –0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 35 0.08
(0.34) (0.86) (0.48) (0.85)
Source:  Authors’ estimations using data from the OECD Economic Outlook, various issues since 1997/1 (the earliest available forecasts for the four 
listed countries).
Note:  These projections are not available for Slovenia, which has become an OECD member only in 2010.  Coefficients are estimated with OLS. 
 p-values for the null hypothesis of a coefficient equal to zero are in parentheses. ** indicates signif icance at the 5% level. All  regressions contain 
a constant (not reported). The dependent variables are the estimated reduced form residuals from equation (2) for  government purchases of 
goods and services (panel A) and net taxes (panel B).  GC and GDP represent the projected real annual growth rate of government consump-
tion and GDP, respectively. „_1“ and „_2“ refer to the two most recently published forecasts: „_1“ („_2“) indicates that for annual growth in a 
 given year j, we use  the projections published in December (June) of year j-1 for the first quarter, the projections  published in June of year j 
(December of year j-1) for the second and third quarters, and the projections published in December (June) of year j for the fourth quarter.
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 Consumer Expenditure Survey, that private consumption displayed large contem-
poraneous responses to income tax rebates and changes in social security taxes 
although both of them were announced well in advance.
Second, we address the issue to what extent the responses of fiscal and macro-
economic variables in the CEE-5 are truly due to a fiscal shock in Germany or to a 
different common exogenous shock not incorporated in the empirical model (such 
as global business cycle or trade shocks). Estimates based on data from before the 
Great Recession indicate that these responses were at least partly driven by the 
observations corresponding to the recession year 2009.24 Moreover, analogously 
to Kožluk and Mehrotra (2009), we include a world price for crude oil (average 
quarterly price for Brent oil in USD per barrel) as the eighth variable into the 
 system, assuming that all the endogenous variables – including the foreign fiscal 
balance – respond within the same quarter to a shock in oil prices, while the oil 
price does not instantaneously react to any shock in the system.25 The baseline 
 results change only slightly: The mean responses are generally slightly smaller, and 
the positive cross-border fiscal multiplier in Poland becomes statistically insignifi-
cant. While the response of the German fiscal balance to domestic fiscal shocks 
partly vanishes – especially in the case of spending shocks – the oil price itself 
 responds unexpectedly strongly to some of the fiscal shocks. This indicates that 
this specification is not able to fully capture a global (probably non-energy related) 
shock that has a common impact on the variables in our model. As an issue for 
 future research, a global VAR (GVAR) approach à la Dées et al. (2007) might be a 
practicable approach to obtain more satisfactory answers in this respect.
Third, the baseline results are based on estimated structural VAR models 
whose restrictions are partly calibrated using elasticities imported from existing 
studies, which are justified in section 2.3.1 above. We re-estimated several models 
using restrictions with other plausible values for the implied elasticities of the 
 domestic fiscal variables, based on upper and lower bounds of existing estimates. 
The results were left qualitatively unchanged.
While the setting used in the model allows the specification of very rich 
 dynamics in the variables composing the VAR, a few caveats related to our modeling 
strategy should be mentioned. As in the case of unrestricted linear VAR models, 
our structural VAR specification does not allow different responses to positive 
versus negative structural shocks. In principle, a model could be specified in which 
different parameters are active depending on the sign (and eventually the size) of a 
structural shock. In our case, the complexity of such a specification for the limited 
amount of data available makes it impossible to include such nonlinearities in 
the model. 
Moreover, the difficulties in reaching convergence in the estimation of the 
structural form coefficients (see section 3.2) prevented various additional modifi-
cations, such as restricting the sample to the pre-crisis period (in this case we 
 attained convergence for Slovakia only), or scaling domestic spending and net 
24 For instance in the case of Slovakia, when we use data only up to Q2 2008, a shock in net taxes has not a significant 
impact on the foreign fiscal balance and a foreign fiscal shock has not a significant impact on domestic public 
spending anymore.
25 This specification delivers five overidentifying restrictions, whose validity was confirmed for Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, while it was rejected for Slovakia (at the 1% level). For Slovenia we were not able to attain 
convergence when estimating the structural form coefficients.
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taxes to GDP (in this case we attained convergence for the Czech Republic only). 
Nevertheless, we feel that our model allows an examination of rich dynamics in 
response to fiscal shocks, in contrast to smaller systems, where the structural 
form estimation may have been an easier task.
5 Conclusions and Further Research
In this study we analyze the economic impact that an unexpected, discretionary 
change in fiscal policy both in the domestic economy and in an important trading 
partner country (Germany) has on five Central and Eastern European economies 
(CEE-5: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) from the 
first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2009. For this purpose, we develop 
an open economy structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model that incorpo-
rates both foreign and domestic fiscal shocks. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is one of the first SVAR models that explicitly accounts for the transmission of a 
foreign fiscal shock to key domestic macroeconomic variables in CEE. To identify 
our seven-variable SVAR model, we restrict the contemporaneous responses in 
the system; the restrictions are calibrated by referring to existing (closed  economy) 
fiscal SVAR models and by importing available estimates for fiscal elasticities in 
the CEE-5. Our model is able to reassemble well-known episodes of fiscal policy 
action in the countries under investigation.
We find that the fiscal policy stance in the CEE-5 is affected by fiscal policy 
changes in Germany. If Germany undertakes a fiscal expansion, all the CEE-5 will 
react with fiscal easing too – more on the public spending than on the revenue 
side. At the same time, in a few specifications, fiscal shocks in the CEE-5 have an 
impact on the German fiscal balance as well. There are indications that common 
reactions to the recession in 2009 prompted responses in both ways. 
The evidence is less homogeneous for cross-country fiscal multipliers. The 
 negative economic transmission of a fiscal shock in Germany to the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia is apparently due to a stronger weight of the negative interest rate 
channel in comparison to the potentially positive trade and exchange rate  channels. 
In Poland and Hungary, in turn, the positive response of real GDP to a fiscal shock 
in Germany points to a more dominant role of the trade and exchange rate  channels 
in these economies. There is also some evidence for an impact on the policy mix in 
Poland and Slovenia, where the short-term interest rate responds negatively to a 
foreign fiscal expansion. Not only the response to a foreign fiscal shock is hetero-
geneous, but also the response to a domestic fiscal shock. In particular, Keynesian 
responses can be found in Hungary and Slovakia, while non-Keynesian responses 
are present in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. 
This evidence implies that fiscal policy in an important foreign economic 
 partner country is a matter of common concern, underlining the importance of 
formal and informal coordination within the EU. However, given the heterogeneity 
in the domestic responses, “one-size-fits-all” policy recommendations would be 
too simplistic for the CEE-5. To learn more about the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of fiscal shocks and to promote a better understanding of country-specific 
policy preferences, it would be useful to examine more closely the reasons for the 
heterogeneity across countries. In order to find out whether various country- 
specific characteristics explain cross-country differences in the impulse responses 
in a statistically significant manner, it would be indispensable to expand the  sample 
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and include additional countries with satisfactory fiscal data (e.g. a panel consisting 
of OECD countries). 
Potential nonlinear effects related to the interaction of budget deficits and the 
level of public debt may be a promising avenue explaining the differences in 
 responses to fiscal shocks in the CEE-5. High levels of public debt coupled with 
high deficits, for instance, may be a trigger for non-Keynesian effects. A thorough 
analysis of such effects using nonlinear structures would be an important issue of 
further research. Moreover, a generalization of our proposed model in order to 
consider responses to different components of government spending and revenues 
could also shed light on the source of the cross-country differences found in this 
analysis. 
Finally, it should be noted that different identification and estimation methods 
from those used in this study could have been used to assess our research question. 
In particular, sign restrictions have often been implemented to identify structural 
shocks in similar frameworks (for example in Dungey and Fry, 2009). Notwith-
standing the recent criticism of this identification method – particularly as regards 
the estimation and interpretation of impulse-response functions (see Fry and 
 Pagan, 2011) – its application may prove fruitful in future research efforts. Caldara 
and Kamps (2008), for instance, showed that the effects of spending shocks do not 
really change across different identification approaches, while the differences in 
the way tax shocks are identified is important. Further extensions with regard to 
the estimation method could be Bayesian vector autoregressions (BVAR), as in 
Afonso and Sousa (2009) or Kamal (2010), or structural factor-augmented VAR 
(SFAVAR) models. These methods are quite data intensive and computationally 
challenging; hence we leave their application to our setting to future research.
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Annex
Table A1
Description of Variables
Variables Description and calculation Unit Treatment Source
Foreign fiscal 
balance
f* Fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio in Germany, calculated as 
f*=(g*-t*)/y*; definitions for g*, t*, and y* follow those for g, t, 
and y below; the balance is inversely defined to interpret an 
increase in f* as a fiscal expansion
% Seasonal 
adjustment
Eurostat, Government 
Finance Statistics, 
Quarterly Non-Financial 
Accounts for General 
Government
Government 
spending
g Government purchases of goods and services = government 
consumption + government investment = compensation of 
public employees (ESA-code D.1) + intermediate consumption 
(ESA-code P.2) + government gross fixed capital formation 
(ESA-code P.51); general government sector
log  
domestic 
currency 
 millions
Interpolation 
for 1995-1998, 
deflation using 
CPI, seasonal 
adjustment
Eurostat, Government 
Finance Statistics, 
Quarterly Non-Financial 
Accounts for General 
Government
Net taxes τ Net taxes = government revenues - transfers = indirect 
taxes (ESA-code D.2) + direct taxes (ESA-code D.5) + social 
security contributions (ESA-code D.611) – social benefits and 
social transfers in kind (ESA-code D.62 + D.6311 + D.63121 + 
D.63131) – subsidies (ESA-code D.3); general government 
sector
log domestic 
currency 
millions
Interpolation 
for 1995-1998, 
deflation using 
CPI, seasonal 
adjustment
Eurostat, Government 
Finance Statistics, 
Quarterly Non-Financial 
Accounts for General 
Government
Output y GDP at 2000 market prices (chain-linked volume) log 
domestic 
currency 
 millions
Seasonal 
adjustment
Eurostat
Exchange rate e Nominal effective exchange rate (41 trading partners), 
period-average; an increase corresponds to an appreciation
log index 
(1999=100)
Eurostat
Inflation rate π Year-on-year change of the nationally defined consumer price 
index (all-items HICP is only available starting from 1996)
% wiiw
Interest rate i Short-term interest rate, period average, corresponding to the 
three-month interbank offered rate in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland, to the money market rate in Slovenia, and 
to the treasury bill rate in Hungary
% per 
annum
Eurostat, Bloomberg, 
IMF
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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1 Introduction
At the current juncture, recessionary tendencies as a consequence of the global 
financial crisis pose demanding challenges for an appropriate fiscal policy reaction 
in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE). On the one hand, fiscal 
prudence and sustainability are key issues when it comes to keeping the trust of 
international investors and guaranteeing the availability of external financing. On 
the other hand, the risk of a recessionary downward spiral pushes the case for dis-
cretionary fiscal policy measures that go beyond the built-in countercyclical re-
sponse of tax and government spending systems to a drop in GDP. Against this 
background, this short contribution first elaborates to what extent discretionary 
measures are needed in the EU Member States in Central, Eastern and Southeast-
ern Europe (CESEE-10) given the (pre-crisis) size of automatic stabilizers and, 
second, delineates the cyclical pattern of discretionary fiscal policy observed over 
the past few years and outlines current fiscal positions to improve our understand-
ing of the room for fiscal policy maneuver in these countries.1 2
2  Comparison of Automatic Stabilizers in the CESEE-10 
and the Euro Area
During an economic downturn, the structure of tax and public spending systems 
automatically stabilizes the business cycle in at least three ways. First, sizeable tax 
bases (such as income, profits or consumption expenditure) erode and thus the 
overall tax burden decreases. Second, the public expenditure category with the 
most pronounced countercyclical pattern – unemployment benefits – increases as 
the number of unemployed goes up. Third, many expenditure categories improve 
1 Cutoff date for data: April 16, 2009.
2 Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Foreign Research Division, markus.eller@oenb.at. The author would like 
to thank Peter Backé, Catherine Keppel and Zoltan Walko (all Foreign Research Division) and Lukas Reiss 
(Economic Analysis Division) for valuable comments as well as Salvador Barrios and Andrea Schaechter (both 
European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) for providing updated figures on 
budgetary elasticities and answering a number of questions in March 2009.
Fiscal Position and Size of Automatic
 Stabilizers in the CESEE EU Member States –
Implications for Discretionary Measures1
In the EU Member States in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE-10), budget-
ary positions have been observed to react less strongly to GDP changes than in the euro area. 
In the observation period, automatic stabilizers mostly operated on the revenue side, while the 
response of government expenditure to GDP changes was quite inelastic. In most CESEE-10 
countries, the government expenditure-to-GDP ratio is smaller than the euro area average. 
Thus, the automatic response of the budget balance to the present downturn is expected to be 
rather moderate. Moreover, the room for discretionary fiscal measures is limited as there are 
no sufficient buffers owing to the predominantly procyclical fiscal stance during past “boom 
times” in several countries and, currently, government debt markets in many countries are 
rather illiquid.
JEL classification: E62, H6
Keywords: Automatic stabilizers, fiscal space, output gap, cyclicality of fiscal policy,  discretionary 
fiscal policy
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the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy as they show a certain inertia in adjusting to 
business cycle fluctuations. For example, a temporary output decline does not in-
duce lay-offs of public sector employees, a stop of public infrastructure projects or 
the closing of schools and hospitals. Accordingly, Deroose, Larch and Schaechter 
(2008) argue that “it is predominantly the differences in size of governments that 
impact how strong automatic stabilizers are.” Consequently, this section presents 
(1) estimates on both public revenue and expenditure elasticities and (2) cross-
country figures on public expenditure-to-GDP ratios (as a frequently used proxy 
for government size).
2.1 Budgetary Elasticities and Sensitivities
For the implementation of the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework, the European 
Commission estimates the budgetary elasticities of the EU Member States on a 
regular basis (see European Commission, 2004). Chart 1 shows the updated bud-
getary elasticities of the CESEE-10 and the euro area.
The data show that a 1% drop in GDP reduces total government revenues by 
nearly 1%. As a consequence, the revenue-to-GDP ratio remains almost constant 
over the business cycle, pointing to a largely proportional tax system (Deroose, 
Larch and Schaechter, 2008) in the euro area and in most of the CESEE-10 coun-
tries. On average, the elasticity of government revenues in the CESEE-10 is only 
slightly smaller (by about one decimal point) than in the euro area. The response 
of government expenditure to changes in GDP proves to be rather inelastic. A 1% 
decline in GDP drives up government spending by 0.10% in the CESEE-10 and by 
0.17% in the euro area. Notably, Poland and Slovenia show by far the highest ex-
penditure elasticities of the CESEE-10 at 0.17 and 0.13, respectively.
Overall, budgetary positions react less strongly to GDP changes in the 
CESEE-10 than in the euro area. A cyclical drop in GDP by 1%, ceteris paribus, 
increases the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio by 0.37 percentage points on average in 
the CESEE-10 (ranging from a 0.27 percentage point change in Lithuania to a 0.47 
percentage point change in Slovenia), compared with an increase by half a percent-
age point in the euro area.
A few caveats have to be taken into account when interpreting these numbers 
at the current juncture. First, the European Commission’s calculation of expendi-
ture elasticities is based exclusively on unemployment benefits. These, however, 
account for only a small share in total primary expenditure (about 3.5% in the 
euro area). Other potentially business cycle-dependent categories, such as health 
or pension expenditure, have so far not been included in the European Commis-
sion’s calculations, and the presented expenditure elasticities are therefore likely 
to be underestimated. Second, the effective automatic response of budgetary items 
to a 1% decline in GDP strongly depends on the composition of this decline. In 
the case of progressive income taxation and proportional profit taxation, for in-
stance, the fiscal deficit ratio is expected to be much more sensitive to a decrease 
in wages than to a decrease in profits.
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2.2  Government Expenditure-to-GDP Ratio and Structure 
of Public Expenditure
Chart 2 indicates that in 2008 in most CESEE-10 countries (except Hungary) the 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio was smaller (mostly around or below 40%) 
than the euro area average (about 46%; Austria’s share comes to nearly 50%). This 
restricts the buffers for automatic stabilization and, as a consequence, the public 
sector’s capacity to dampen short-run business cycle fluctuations. But it should be 
noted that in most CESEE-10 countries the government expenditure-to-GDP ra-
tio is larger than in other emerging economies with a similar level of develop-
ment.
It should be acknowledged that – driven by the ongoing catching-up process – 
the CESEE-10 spend more, on average, on (“crisis-resistant”) infrastructure proj-
 Chart 1
Size of Automatic Stabilizers
Budgetary Elasticities
Source: European Commission (DG ECFIN).
Note: In response to a percentage change of the potential output gap, budgetary elasticities represent the percentage change in the level of general
government expenditures or revenues, while the overall budgetary sensitivity represents the percentage change of the general government
balance-to-GDP ratio. The presented numbers are based on multiannual averages for the period from 1995 to 2004 (more recent data
are not yet included in the European Commission’s calculations). For Bulgaria and Romania, estimations are available only for overall budgetary
sensitivity. Cross-country averages are GDP-weighted.
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ects than the euro area. The Czech Republic e.g. assigns an average of about 10% 
of GDP to infrastructure spending, while the corresponding figure for Austria 
comes to no more than 6%. (For education or health expenditure or the compen-
sation of public sector employees, such a significant difference cannot be ob-
served.)
3 Fiscal Space
The governments in the CESEE-10 exhibit a comparatively low degree of indebt-
edness. On average, gross public debt as a percentage of GDP is only half as high 
in the CESEE-10 as in the euro area. In 2008, the debt ratios stood clearly below 
20% in Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic countries, below 30% in Slovenia, Slova-
kia and the Czech Republic and at 45% in Poland. Only Hungary’s debt ratio of 
72% surpassed the euro area average of 68% (European Commission, Interim 
Forecast, January 2009).
Moreover, headline fiscal positions in most of the CESEE-10 countries have 
improved since 2002 or 2003, respectively. Despite considerable economic growth 
during this period, however, most of the CESEE-10 countries (with the exception 
of Bulgaria and the Baltic countries) have run budget deficits of only slightly below 
3% of GDP; Hungary even reached a deficit of 9.3% of GDP in 2006 before re-
ducing the shortfall to an estimated 3.4% in 2008.
Table 1 shows the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as 
a percentage of GDP and differentiates between boom, neutral, and downturn 
stages of the business cycle (i.e. years with clearly positive, moderate and clearly 
negative potential output gaps, respectively) since 2000.
First, an easing CAPB apparently prevailed in most of the CESEE-10 coun-
tries, especially in Romania, the Baltic countries, Poland and also Slovakia. In 
these countries, the observed improvement of fiscal positions has been achieved 
more via brisk economic growth than via a consolidation of cyclically adjusted bal-
ances.
Second, in six countries out of the CESEE-10, more than 50% of the nonneu-
tral years since 2000 were characterized by a procyclical discretionary fiscal 
 Chart 2
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stance.3 Fiscal easing during boom times was especially pronounced in Romania, 
the Baltic countries and Slovenia, while a tendency for fiscal tightening during 
downturn times can be observed in Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Latvia and 
 Estonia.4
3 Procyclicality of fiscal policy is not limited to the CESEE-10. For the euro area in the period from 1999 to 2007, 
Deroose, Larch and Schaechter (2008) showed that there is a clear procyclical stance in both stages of the business 
cycle (which is especially pronounced in Germany); euro area fiscal policy appears to have been more strongly 
procyclical than fiscal policy in the U.S.A.
4 There are some differences in the size of the output gap when looking at the deviation from trend GDP instead of 
the deviation from potential GDP (particularly in Bulgaria, the Baltic countries and Poland). But the direction of 
the output gap and thus the presented cyclical pattern of fiscal policy remain largely unchanged.
Table 1
Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy in the CESEE-10
Country Cyclical 
condition
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008e Average Procyclical 
fiscal policy, 
% of non-
neutral years
Annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance, % of GDP
Bulgaria boom 1.1 0.2 0.8 –3.2 3.0 0.4 20
neutral –0.1
downturn
Czech Republic boom 0.1 1.3 0.1 0.5 33
neutral –0.7 –1.8 –1.4
downturn –0.4 0.1 3.5 1.1
Estonia boom –0.2 –0.9 0.3 –0.4 –2.1 –0.7 71
neutral 0.1 1.5
downturn 2.1 –0.3 0.9
Hungary boom 0.6 –2.0 –2.4 5.0 1.7 0.6 29
neutral 0.3 1.6
downturn –1.7 –5.5 –3.6
Lithuania boom –0.7 0.7 –0.2 –1.4 –1.1 –0.5 63
neutral –0.4
downturn –0.4 –1.2 1.2 –0.1
Latvia boom –0.2 –1.1 –0.7 –0.6 –0.6 88
neutral 0.4
downturn 1.2 0.2 –0.3 0.6 0.4
Poland boom –0.9 1.0 –0.1 –0.0 57
neutral –0.2 0.0
downturn –1.5 0.5 –1.4 1.7 –0.2
Romania boom –1.1 –2.1 –0.4 –1.4 –1.2 80
neutral –0.7 –0.1
downturn –1.3 –1.3
Slovakia boom 0.5 –0.5 0.0 40
neutral 4.4 0.1 –1.1 –1.5
downturn –4.1 5.6 –2.4 –0.3
Slovenia boom –1.4 0.7 –0.6 –0.4 88
neutral –0.6
downturn 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5
Source:  European Commission, AMECO database; 2008e indicates estimates as at end-October 2008.
Note:   The adjustment of the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as a percentage of GDP at current market prices is based on potential GDP. A negative (positive) change 
of CAPB indicates f iscal easing (tightening). The cyclical condition refers to the direction of the potential output gap, i.e. the gap between actual and potential GDP at 2000 
market prices. A neutral cyclical condition represents small output gaps whose size is between the 40th and 60th percentile of the country-specif ic distribution of output gaps 
since 1997. In these neutral times, it is not clear whether the economy is in a boom or a downturn stage, and therefore we do not make deductions about the cyclicality of 
f iscal policy during these times. A boom condition represents positive output gaps above the 60th percentile (i.e. actual GDP lies clearly above its potential), while a downturn 
condition represents negative output gaps below the 40th percentile (i.e. actual GDP lies clearly below its potential). Figures in bold indicate that discretionary f iscal policy 
was procyclical (i.e. either f iscal easing during boom times or f iscal tightening during times of downturn). Figures in italics indicate that data were not available for the entire 
observation period.
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It should be noted, however, that while the potential output gap figures 
 available for 2008 still indicate that production is clearly above potential in the 
CESEE-10, the potential output gap went down considerably against 2007 (espe-
cially in the Baltic countries).5 Accordingly, the easing of most cyclically adjusted 
balances in 2008 can hardly be interpreted as being procyclical. This aspect relates 
to the difficulty that potential output gap estimates are based on uncertain future 
growth trajectories. Real-time and ex post output gaps may considerably differ 
because of statistical data revisions – particularly in the case of an unexpected 
downturn. Thus fiscal policy decisions might well have been based on information 
that later turned out to have incorrectly indicated the stage of the business cycle 
because forecasting errors for real GDP had been too pronounced (see also Euro-
pean Commission, 2006).
4 Current Fiscal Policy Choices
The presented (pre-crisis) estimations of budgetary elasticities and the compara-
tively small government expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the CESEE-10 indicate that 
the automatic stabilization function of tax and expenditure systems is not as 
strongly pronounced in the CESEE-10 as it is in the euro area.6 Notwithstanding 
the above-mentioned caveats, the automatic response of the budget balances to the 
economic downturn can be expected to be rather moderate. At first sight, this ap-
pears to point to a stronger need for a discretionary fiscal stimulus under the cur-
rent cyclical conditions.
One could argue that in most CESEE-10 countries, recent fiscal positions (es-
pecially the gross debt ratio) indicate a certain leeway for taking active counter-
cyclical measures. However, there are several limitations in this respect. First, as 
discussed in section 2, procyclical discretionary fiscal policy during boom times 
has reduced the room for fiscal maneuver in several countries. Second, given con-
tinuing liquidity problems at the government bond market, the financing of bud-
get deficits through bonds (or even the roll-over of maturing public debt) is cur-
rently uncertain. Third, the room for fiscal stimulus is more generally limited by 
the negative effects expansionary policies would most likely have on investor con-
fidence and thus on the availability of external financing.
A recent examination by the OECD (2009) reveals the size of fiscal stimulus 
packages in OECD countries (as implemented and/or announced up to March 24, 
2009). In response to these packages, fiscal balances are expected to ease by about 
1% of 2008 GDP in Slovakia and Poland (the same response as in Austria) and by 
even 3% of 2008 GDP in the Czech Republic (the same response as in Germany) 
over the period from 2008 to 2010. In Hungary, by contrast, the overall fiscal 
package has a strongly restrictive impact – the fiscal balance is expected to tighten 
by more than 4% of 2008 GDP.
It is not certain in advance whether these fiscal stimuli will be capable to con-
tribute effectively to stabilizing the economy in the CESEE-10. Evidence from 
5 According to the European Commission’s estimates of October 2008, the potential output gap is expected to be-
come clearly negative in Estonia and Latvia in 2009 and in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland in 2010.
6 It remains to be seen whether these relations continue to hold also in the future or whether the global financial 
crisis turns out to be a major structural break that considerably changes the size of automatic stabilizers or the 
cyclical pattern of fiscal policy.
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multi-country models suggests that fiscal multipliers are smaller the more open an 
economy is, as domestic fiscal expansion is likely to leak abroad through imports 
(European Central Bank, 2009, box 7). A further reduction of fiscal multipliers 
can be expected if the agents behave in a Ricardian manner and parts of the fiscal 
injection flows directly into higher private savings (see Hemming, Kell and Mah-
fouz, 2002). Irrespective of Ricardian behavior, in the current setting households 
may also use additional fiscal benefits to increase their savings for precautionary 
reasons or to repair their balance sheets. The estimates on fiscal multipliers as pre-
sented in OECD (2009) are adjusted for the degree of openness and increasing 
saving propensities. They indicate that fiscal multipliers for the four OECD Mem-
ber States in CESEE do not strongly differ from those for Western Europe, though 
they are clearly smaller than those for the U.S.A. or Japan. An increase of, e.g., 
government investment by 1% is found to lead to a 0.7% rise in GDP in the first 
year after the stimulus in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (the same re-
action intensity as in Austria), while in Poland this response is found to be higher 
by one decimal point (the same intensity as in Germany).
To sum up, as automatic stabilizers in the CESEE-10 are comparatively weak, 
there is obviously need for discretionary fiscal measures during the current severe 
economic downturn. But it is not clear whether fiscal stimuli can be realized in 
these countries at all because of limited room for budgetary maneuver. Further-
more, uncertainty about how effective fiscal stimulation packages in the CESEE-10 
would be in dampening the current downturn is rather high.
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4 How Productive is the Structure of
Fiscal Policy in Emerging Europe?
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Abstract
This essay shows that our understanding of the long-run growth impact of fiscal policy
can be enhanced if, on the one hand, a more disaggregated approach is applied and
the composition of public expenditures and revenues is considered and, on the other
hand, notable cross-country differences are accounted for. A systematic literature
review not only detects considerable econometric deficiencies in existing empirical
investigations, but also forms the base for creating descriptive statistics for the EU
member states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE-10) in order
to reflect the theoretical classification of productive vs. nonproductive government
spending and distortionary vs. nondistortionary taxation, respectively. Overall, the
CESEE-10 have apparently a more “growth-friendly” fiscal structure than the EU-15.
In particular, the share of distortionary taxes is considerably smaller, while the size of
infrastructure expenditures is clearly larger. However, in order to effectively promote
long-run growth, the quality of fiscal institutions, potential nonlinearities as well as the
type of financing of productive expenditures have to be considered.
JEL classification: E62, H11, H21, H5
Keywords: fiscal policy structure, long-run growth, distortionary taxation, productive
public expenditures, endogeneity, nonlinearity, emerging Europe
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4.1 Introduction
The impact of fiscal policy on long-run economic growth is a topic that has been widely
discussed in the economic literature. From a theoretical point of view, the issue roots
in the pioneer publication of Musgrave (1959) who distinguished different “branches”
of government activity. According to the allocative role of government activity, public
resources should be used in an efficient manner, which, in turn, is expected to raise
the long-run growth potential of the economy. Clearly, the efficient use of public
resources cannot only be confined to sustainable debt paths, but has also to take the
compositional dimension of public spending and taxation into account.
This essay is going to summarize the theoretical arguments for assigning a different
long-run growth impact to different public spending and tax categories. The conventional
prior is as follows: “productive” spending categories stimulate, while purely consumptive
categories are detrimental to long-run economic growth (e.g. Barro, 1990; Devarajan
et al., 1996). Inspired by this view, the so-called Washington Consensus orientation,
for instance, recommended to redirect public spending from indiscriminate (and often
regressive) subsidies toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth services like
primary education, primary health care and infrastructure investment (Williamson,
1989).
While economic theory is quite advanced in the field, the analysis of aggregate
budgetary items still dominates empirical investigations. Moreover, most of the applied
work is concentrated on advanced economies, while papers dealing with budgetary
composition in emerging Europe are scarce. Given incisive reform steps in the field
of public finance since the early 1990s, it is of utmost interest to get also knowledge
about the compositional dimension of fiscal policy in these countries. There are several
reasons for hypothesizing that the countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern
Europe (CESEE) differ systematically from high-income OECD countries in terms
of budgetary composition and its productivity impact. The catching-up process in
CESEE has pushed the demand for realizing large-scale infrastructure projects (e.g.,
modernization of transportation facilities), while the degree of social protection has still
not reached the levels of western European countries. From the revenue perspective, a
majority of CESEE countries have introduced flat-rate income tax schemes (the Baltic
countries were the first movers in the mid-1990s, Slovakia followed in 2004, Romania
in 2005, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic in 2008, currently debated in Hungary).
The reduction of tax evasion, broadening of the tax base, and efficiency gains in tax
administration have been frequently raised as being the main reasons for this incisive
reform step.
The composition of public spending and revenues is also intensively debated in the
context of the current consolidation efforts in Europe, which became necessary given
that public indebtedness had strongly increased throughout the Great Recession. It
is not only of interest what type of spending cuts and/or revenue increases are most
conducive to a sustainable consolidation of public budgets; it is also important to
examine their impact on the long-run growth potential. Pitlik (2010) warns that short-
sighted politicians may have an incentive to abandon long-term investment projects
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instead of cutting current outlays during episodes of rule-enforced fiscal adjustment.
Gupta et al. (2005) show that a protection of capital expenditure during recessions
increases long-run growth. They accordingly advocate, first, to cut current outlays and,
second, to raise public revenues instead of cutting capital expenditures in the situation
of a fiscal consolidation. Baldacci et al. (2008) found that a restructuring of public
expenditures toward productive spending categories reduces sovereign bond spreads in
emerging markets, thus reducing debt servicing costs and contributing to quicker fiscal
consolidation.
Against this background, the remainder of this essay progresses as follows. Section 4.2
reviews theoretical and empirical papers which examined the impact of fiscal structure
on long-run economic growth, whereby papers with relevance for the CESEE region are
explicitly emphasized. Section 4.3 discusses econometric caveats in existing empirical
investigations and highlights necessities of further research. Section 4.4 has an exclusive
CESEE-focus and provides descriptive statistics for the structure of public revenues and
expenditures in the EU member states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe
(CESEE-10) in comparison to the EU-15 and/or Austria. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Composition of Fiscal Policy and Long-Run Growth:
Literature Review
Economic theory started to allow for an explicit growth impact of fiscal policy items
only with the emergence of endogenous growth theory. In neoclassical growth models
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) fiscal policy is only able to affect equilibrium factor ratios
and long-run (steady-state) growth depends on (the exogenous factors) population
growth and total factor productivity. In this setting, public spending and revenues
can affect the transition path to the steady state, but not the steady-state growth
rate itself (see Kneller et al., 1999). Switching to endogenous growth theory, fiscal
policy was allowed to affect the accumulation of physical and human capital, which,
in turn, can directly change the steady-state growth rate of the economy. Depending
on the respective impact, the seminal papers in the field (Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 1990;
Slemrod, 1995; Devarajan et al., 1996) separate distortionary from nondistortionary
taxation and productive from nonproductive spending. In the following, I am going to
work within this coarse theoretical distinction, collect more arguments for the growth
impact of specific tax and spending categories and review the empirical evidence.
4.2.1 Taxes and Growth
A tax category can be classified as distortionary if it changes the agents’ allocative
decisions with regard to factor accumulation (investment or saving decisions, see Kneller
et al., 1999) or factor supply (e.g., work in innovative or manufacturing sectors of the
economy, see Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003). This type of taxes is assumed to reduce
long-run growth because of its disincentive impact on investment decisions (see Romero
de Ávila and Strauch, 2003). Empirically, distortionary taxes are associated with direct
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taxes, i.e. taxes on property, income, profits and capital gains. Nondistortionary taxes,
on the other hand, are captured by indirect taxes on production and imports.
Nĳkamp and Poot (2004) provide a valuable meta-analysis for the effect of different
fiscal policies on long-run growth. They reviewed 93 different papers that were published
in the period 1983-1998. Studies of tax effects were less common than studies of
expenditure effects on growth. Overall, tax increases are related negatively to long-run
growth (robust over most studies; yet, there are differences with regard to the extent of
this relationship). The result that higher tax rates lower growth is more pronounced
for studies which focused on marginal rather than average tax rates.
When it comes to the distinction between different tax categories, it is striking that
empirical investigations have been primarily run for OECD country samples (most of
them used fixed-effects panel regressions with more-year averages). The theoretically
expected negative impact of distortionary taxes on long-run growth is broadly confirmed
in these studies. Kneller et al. (1999) showed that distortionary taxes reduce per capita
GDP growth significantly, while nondistortionary taxes have no impact on growth.
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) found that the overall tax burden has a strong negative
impact on output per worker.2 For a given level of taxation, additional negative
effects stem from an extensive reliance on direct taxes. Less clear-cut is the evidence
for the EU-15 for the period 1960-2001, provided by Romero de Ávila and Strauch
(2003). Direct taxes have in this paper a robust negative impact on physical capital
accumulation but an inconclusive impact on per capita GDP growth. When direct
taxes were included simultaneously with other expenditure categories in the set of
explanatory variables, they even had a positive growth impact. Besides the fact that
this paper did not include important standard growth regressors, such a result could
also indicate that reverse causality is prevalent (see, for instance, Kirchgässner, 2004,
and Section 4.3).
Alesina et al. (1999) examined the impact of different tax categories on profits (value
added minus labor costs) and found that taxes on labor have the largest negative effect.
Analogously, Daveri and Tabellini (1997) emphasize: “Higher labor taxes have been
shifted onto higher real wages. This has led firms to substitute labor with capital and
it has slowed down economic growth. Thus, higher unemployment and slower growth
in Europe are related, but in the sense that they stem from the same cause.” (p. 38).
For the CESEE region only preliminary evidence is available. Panel growth regressions
with multi-annual averages were not estimated at all given the lack of satisfactory
long time series for these countries. Of relevance is the paper of Horváth et al. (2006)
who used a backward-looking, New Keynesian macroeconometric model of the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank and showed that the output loss after a fiscal consolidation is particularly
large in the medium run if direct taxes were increased (the same is also true for increases
in social security contributions or regulatory prices).
2“An increase of about one percentage point in the tax pressure—e.g. two-thirds of what was observed
over the past decade in the OECD sample—could be associated with a direct reduction of about 0.3
per cent in output per capita.” (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001, 35).
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4.2.2 Public Expenditures and Growth
Productive expenditures are spending categories that directly enter the economy’s pro-
duction function and/or have an indirect impact on capital accumulation (e.g. by
increasing the productivity of private sector capital). According to Zagler and Dür-
necker (2003) government spending is able to raise the steady-state growth rate of the
economy if it is able to increase the marginal productivity of private capital and/or
labor in the economy. The coarsest empirical proxy for productive expenditures is
government investment. In a more refined manner, productive expenditures are typi-
cally associated with resources devoted to property rights enforcement, infrastructure,
education, research and development (R&D) or health (see, e.g., Lucas, 1988; Barro,
1990; Romer, 1990). Nonproductive expenditures, on the other hand, are government
spending categories, which enter the economy’s utility function and thus have a purely
consumptive character, i.e. government consumption or more concretely expenditures
for public wages, social transfers, subsidies as well as various administrative services.
Government Consumption and Government Size
According to Barro (1990), government consumption not only proxies for nonproductive
public expenditures but also for political corruption and bad public governance. It is
the government spending category which is most satisfactorily available across countries
and time as it is included in national account statistics. Its share of GDP has therefore
often been included in empirical investigations as a proxy for the size of the government.
Existing empirical evidence largely confirms the theoretically expected negative linkage
between government consumption and growth (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
Alesina et al., 1999; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; Romero de Ávila and Strauch, 2003;
Gupta et al., 2005). A negative relationship can also be confirmed for the CESEE
countries (see Eller et al., 2006, who regressed the annual growth rate of real GDP per
worker on the government consumption-to-GDP ratio, controlling for other important
growth determinants).
Nevertheless, there are some statistical difficulties for cross-country comparisons
of government consumption: “Public financing of education, health care and other
social policies are classified as government consumption in some countries and as
transfers in others” (Fölster and Henrekson, 2001, 1509). To satisfactorily proxy for
nonproductive government expenditures it is important to use government consumption
figures which do not comprise education and health expenditures. Moreover, Bassanini
and Scarpetta (2001) found that controlling for taxation, both government consumption
and investment seem to have a positive impact on output per capita. The effect of
government consumption becomes negative when taxes are not included. This result
underlines the necessity to explicitly distinguish between government size effects and
pure nonproductive expenditure effects. Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) interpret
accordingly: “The coefficient on consumption when the tax variable is not included
should be taken to indicate the effect on growth of the ‘size’ of government, rather than
the true effect on growth of one specific element of total expenditure” (p. 30).
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Government size is also frequently considered to work as an automatic stabilizer
(see Chapter 3). Several scholars found a negative relationship between government
size and output volatility (measured as the standard deviation of real GDP per capita
growth, e.g. Galí, 1994; Karras and Song, 1996; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Debrun et al.,
2008). At the same time, there is broad evidence that countries with lower output
volatility have higher long-run growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Barrell et al., 2009;
Badinger, 2010). Thus, while the direct impact of government size on long-run growth
is apparently a negative one (not least due to the fact that nonproductive spending
dominates the chosen empirical proxy), it could also have a positive, indirect growth
effect via reduced output volatility. Two caveats should be mentioned in this respect.
First, the volatility-dampening effect of government size might actually be a nonlinear
one. Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) showed for a panel of EU countries that fiscal
stabilizers reduce cyclical volatility at lower levels of government size, but refuse to do so
beyond a specific threshold for the government expenditure-to-GDP ratio (see Section
4.3). Second, once again, the composition of fiscal policies matters. The government
size measure, which is typically used in empirical investigations, also contains spending
related to discretionary fiscal policy. Fatás and Mihov (2003) found that the volatility
of discretionary fiscal policy increases output volatility. Debrun and Kapoor (2010)
showed that this destabilizing effect, which actually results in lower long-run growth (see
Furceri, 2007), is more pronounced in developing than in high-income countries. Crucial
in this respect seems to be the quality of institutions and political constraints, which
according to Fatás and Mihov (2003) are decisive determinants of volatile discretionary
fiscal policy.
Productive Government Expenditures Related to Phyiscal Capital
Next, let us turn to specific productive expenditure categories and address them more
in detail. Most discussed in the literature is the growth impact of public infrastructure
expenditures. Economic theory identified two basic channels through which infrastruc-
ture can raise long-run growth. First, a direct effect where public infrastructure is
seen as additional physical capital stock (besides the private one) that can be used as
input in a production function. Second, an indirect (spillover) effect whereby public
infrastructure improves the productivity of private capital stocks. This idea that in-
frastructure expenditure of the government is an input to private production and also
raises the marginal product of private capital can be seen in Barro (1991) – one of the
first endogenous growth models that explicitly incorporates the public sector. Barro
(1991) specified the production function as follows:
y = Ak1−αgα, (4.1)
a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, i.e. α ∈ (0, 1). y is
output per capita, A represents total factor productivity (the so-called “Solow-residual”),
k is private sector capital per capita (includes physical capital, human capital and
privately-owned knowledge) and g corresponds to real government purchases per person
(direct effect). g is financed in this model with a (distortionary) proportional income
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tax at rate τ . Assuming a balanced budget, g = τy, we can calculate the marginal
product of private capital as follows:
∂y
∂k
= (1− α)A1/1−ατα/1−α, (4.2)
i.e. an increase in τ = g/y increases the marginal product of private capital (indirect
effect). We can now use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and
maximize it with respect to consumption, subject to the intertemporal accumulation of
physical capital. This is usually done in the framework of a Hamiltonian optimization
for a representative agent. From the first-order conditions of this Hamiltonian we can
calculate the (per capita) steady-state growth rate of consumption:
γc =
c˙
c
= 1
σ
[
∂y
∂k
− δ − ρ
]
, (4.3)
where σ is the rate of risk aversion, δ is the depreciation rate for physical capital
(assumed to be zero in Barro, 1991) and ρ is the intertemporal discount rate. One can
show that in the steady state γc = γy = γk = γ. We can see from equations 4.2 and
4.3 that the steady-state growth rate of the economy γ depends on the fiscal policy
variable τ = g/y, as mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.2. Moreover, Barro (1991)
showed that γ and τ are linked nonlinearly to each other (the so-called “Barro curve”,
see Figure 4.1): γ rises initially with τ because of the positive effect of infrastructure
expenditure on private productivity. However, if the government expands its activity
beyond a certain threshold (in Barro’s model τ = α), the rise in the tax rate τ deters
private investment. Besides this negative growth effect of infrastructure expenditure
that can be attributed to the type of financing, the literature also discusses a second
reason: public infrastructure might not always be complementary to the private sector
capital stock (as assumed in equation 4.1), resulting in crowding-out of private sector
capital (see Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003; Rutkowski, 2009).
Given this theoretical ambiguity, it is very useful to examine the findings of empirical
investigations. According to the “Barro curve”, we can expect that the growth effect of
infrastructure expenditure is stronger in countries with less developed infrastructure
such as the countries in CESEE. Gupta et al. (2005) stressed that the impact of
productive spending on growth is especially pronounced in developing countries with
relatively poor infrastructure. Égert et al. (2009) raised the concern that data on public
investment or public capital stocks, respectively, are increasingly unreliable measures of
public infrastructure because of wide-spread privatization and off-budget procurement
of infrastructure projects (e.g. in the context of public-private partnerships). Therefore,
Égert et al. (2009) used for a sample of OECD countries physical indicators for
infrastructure in network sectors (railtrack, motorways, line subscriptions and electricity
generation capacity) and were able to confirm the nonlinear link between infrastructure
and growth: the impact of additional infrastructure is higher in countries with initially
lower levels of provision. Nĳkamp and Poot (2004) concluded that a considerably
long time span in the data is necessary to identify a positive relationship between
infrastructure spending and growth (about 30–40 years). This is obviously not the case
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Figure 4.1: The Barro Curve: Economic Growth and the Size of Government
for CESEE countries. But, still, Rutkowski (2009) conducted a respective exercise for
Poland and found that an increase in the public investment-to-GDP ratio increases
both GDP growth and private investment (though, it is hard to speak about long-
term growth in this setting, as Rutkowski used only quarterly data from 1999 until
2007). Lendvai (2007) also used a VAR model to examine the response of private
investment and private consumption to a shock in government investment in Hungary
(using quarterly data from 1997 until 2005). Her results point to some crowding-out:
while private consumption increases after the government investment shock, private
investment significantly declines but recovers two and a half years after the shock.
Productive Government Expenditures Related to Human Capital
While infrastructure expenditures affect long-run growth via the accumulation of
physical capital, there is a second class of productive expenditures whose growth impact
works through the accumulation of human capital. Economic theory distinguishes
at least between three different related spending types: education, health and R&D
spending. In empirical investigations, however, human capital expenditures are mostly
defined in terms of education expenditures (Bloom et al., 2004).
A positive impact of education on human capital and thus on output was for the first
time postulated in Lucas (1988). Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) apply an innovation-
driven growth reasoning: more education increases the knowledge about existing
innovations and thus raises the likelihood for future innovations, stimulating research
and development and thus contributing to more economic growth. Empirically, the
positive relationship between education spending and long-run growth has been broadly
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confirmed (e.g. Zhang and Zou, 2001; Bose et al., 2003; Nĳkamp and Poot, 2004).3
Health is expected to have both a direct and an indirect effect on growth (Zagler
and Dürnecker, 2003). On the one hand, a higher share of healthy employees reduces
absenteeism, increases the factor labor (e.g., measured by working hours) and thus has
a direct, positive impact on output. On the other hand, health also affects the quality
of human capital. Good health improves the ability to acquire knowledge and skills and
thus increases the likelihood for more innovations in the economy. Bloom et al. (2004)
found that good health has indeed a positive and sizable effect on aggregate output.
A one year improvement in life expectancy of the population leads to a four percent
increase in output. Nevertheless, the empirical investigation of the impact of health
expenditure on growth and productivity of the work force has so far been a largely
neglected area (see Nĳkamp and Poot, 2004). One insightful paper in this respect is
that of Webber (2002), who concluded that policies to increase economic growth should
favor investments in education over health.
Finally, public expenditures devoted to R&D are also expected to push long-run
growth. This view goes back to the seminal paper of Romer (1990), according to
which innovations can be generated by devoting resources to the R&D sector; these
innovations, in turn, produce considerable positive externalities (due to their public good
character) and stimulate technical progress and thus long-run growth (see also Barro,
1990; Devarajan et al., 1996). Empirically, R&D expenditures are largely approximated
with the years of schooling, as the knowledge about existing innovations (“standing
on the shoulders of giants”) is important to produce additional ones and to avoid
duplications.
It should finally be noted that the type of financing is crucial when analyzing the
growth impact of different spending categories (see Kirchgässner, 2004). More productive
expenditures per se need not necessarily increase economic growth. It can actually
be wasteful if it surpasses a certain threshold (crowding-out of private investments),
if it is mis-allocated or financed with additional distortionary taxes. Kneller et al.
(1999) showed that an increase in productive expenditure does not stimulate growth
if it is financed with distortionary taxes. Bose et al. (2003) concluded for a sample
of low-income countries that the most growth-friendly way of financing additional
productive expenditures is the reduction of nonproductive expenditures, leaving taxes
and the deficit unchanged.
4.3 Estimating the Growth Impact of Fiscal Composition:
Econometric Caveats
The previous section already alluded some shortcomings in the existing empirical
investigations of the relationship between fiscal composition and long-run growth. This
3Zhang and Zou (2001) showed for a panel of 29 Chinese provinces that government expenditures
devoted to human capital at the provinical (but not at the national level) were positively associated
with economic growth.
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section addresses two of them more in detail and points to further research necessities
in the field.
Endogeneity
An issue that has only been partly addressed in existing econometric investigations of
the fiscal policy-growth nexus is endogeneity. Consider the following relationship:
∆ log(Yt) = α+ βFt + γXt + t, (4.4)
where ∆log(Yt) represents the growth rate of output Yt, Ft is the fiscal variable
of interest (as share of Yt) and Xt is a vector of control variables. Ft is said to
be endogenous if E[Ft · t] 6= 0. In this case OLS delivers biased and inconsistent
estimates, i.e. limt→∞E[(βˆ − β)2] 6= 0. Thus, the estimator βˆ does not converge
toward the true value β even in the most favorable data situation, i.e. with an infinite
sample size (see standard econometric textbooks such as Kennedy, 2008). There are
several sources for the nonzero correlation of the fiscal regressor with the model’s
residuals. Most prominently discussed is the issue of reverse causality or simultaneity,
respectively. For instance, a strong case for the causality running from economic
growth to government spending is made by Wagner’s law (see Section 1.2). A second
example comes from the output volatility literature according to which very volatile
economies – and thus countries with worse growth performance (see Badinger, 2010) –
opt for larger governments to insure against cyclical shocks (see Rodrik, 1998). Besides
reverse causality, the endogeneity bias can also stem from omitted variables. Several
studies suffer from the fact that they neglect the government’s budget constraint in
the regressions and simply include selected fiscal variables from either the spending or
the revenue side (issue raised already by Kneller et al., 1999). Suppose that the “true”
model consists of:
∆ log(Yt) = α+ βGGt + βRRt + γXt + ξt, (4.5)
where Gt represents government expenditures and Rt stands for government revenues.
Assume that the econometrician disregards Rt and includes only Gt in his estimation
equation:
∆ log(Yt) = α+ βGGt + γXt + t, (4.6)
with t = βRRt+ ξt. If E[Gt ·Rt] 6= 0 (quite likely if the government’s budget constraint
is binding) and βR 6= 0 (equally likely given the discussion in the previous section), the
omission of Rt in equation 4.6 yields E[Gt · t] 6= 0 and βˆGOLS is thus biased.
As a consequence of unreliable OLS estimates in the presence of endogeneity, instru-
mental variable techniques have been implemented. For instance, institutional variables
could serve as instruments Zt, which affect economic growth only via the fiscal variable
such that E[Zt · Ft] 6= 0 and E[Zt · t] = 0. In practice, it is pretty hard to find suitable
instruments for fiscal policy variables. Existing instrumentation attempts have a weak
theoretical foundation as most authors do not derive their instruments from economic
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theory but only use lagged values of right-hand side regressors (see the dispute between
Agell et al., 2006 and Fölster and Henrekson, 2006).
Further research in this area should follow a careful two-stage least squares approach
and examine in a first step the determinants of different fiscal policy categories (see
the comprehensive study of Shelton, 2007) and then check which of the significant
determinants (strong first stage) affect economic growth only through the fiscal policy
variable (validity condition). Subject to a sophisticated database, it is additionally
promising to follow the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and distinguish between
different sectors with different input demands when studying the drivers of economic
growth. This approach helps to encounter the reverse causation problem in a more
structural way (difference-in-difference estimations using country-fixed and sector-fixed
effects). Just recently, Aghion et al. (2011) have applied this approach and found for
a panel of manufacturing industries across 15 OECD countries that industries with
relatively heavier reliance on external finance or lower asset tangibility tend to grow
faster in countries which implement more countercyclical fiscal policies.
Nonlinearity
A majority of empirical investigations has imposed a linear relationship between fiscal
variables and economic growth, although we saw in Section 4.2 that economic theory
provides strong arguments for a nonlinear link (recall Barro, 1990; Slemrod, 1995).
In the presence of nonlinearity, the standard linear model is misspecified as it omits
nonlinear terms in the estimation equation (and thus leads to the problem of endogeneity
that was discussed before, see Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).
There are only a few papers that accounted for a nonlinear growth impact of different
public spending and tax categories – most of them studied the impact of government
size. Two different approaches can be distinguished. On the one hand, scholars try to
identify an “optimal” level of government spending at which neither under-provision nor
over-provision of government services occurs (in line with Barro, 1990, this means that
the marginal product of government services equals unity). Karras (1997) estimated
accordingly an optimal share of government consumption in GDP of 16% (±3%) for
an average, high-income European country.
On the other hand, so-called “spline” regressions are used to identify a threshold
for government size that separates two regimes with a different growth impact. In
terms of equation 4.4, a nonlinear fiscal policy-growth relationship could be captured
by including Ft both in linear and quadratic forms, i.e. including besides β1Ft also
β2F 2t . The spline approach would we captured by using β2Dt(Ft−F ∗) instead of β2F 2t ,
where Dt is a dummy equal to 1 when Ft exceeds the threshold F ∗ and equal to 0
otherwise. Debrun et al. (2008) applied this approach for their investigation of the link
between output volatility and government size and found that in a sample of 20 OECD
countries little extra stability can be gained by expanding public expenditure beyond
40% of GDP. In a similar vein, Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) investigated the output
volatility impact of government size (net of discretionary spending to get a proxy for
fiscal stabilizers) for a panel of EU countries. They applied the linearity test of Hansen
57
4 How Productive is the Structure of Fiscal Policy in Emerging Europe?
(1999) and identified 38% as the threshold level for the government expenditure-to-GDP
ratio (fiscal stabilizers reduce cyclical volatility below this threshold, while there is no
stabilization beyond it).
Interestingly, already John Maynard Keynes was convinced of the existence of a
maximum tolerable government size, which is not too far away from the just men-
tioned figures. Clark (1945) argued that a tax share of national income above 25%
is inflationary and therefore unsustainable. Keynes – in his capacity as editor of The
Economic Journal – responded to Clark: “In Great Britain after the war I should guess
that your figure of 25 per cent as the maximum tolerable proportion of taxation may
be exceedingly near to the truth. I should not be at all surprised if we did not find
a further confirmation in our post-war experience of your empirical law.” (quoted in
Kirchner, 2011, p. 15).
In addition to threshold regressions, one could also go for Markov-switching models
where the regression coefficients switch according to unobservable states, depending
on the stochastic outcome of a Markov chain process (for an application to CESEE
countries see Eller et al., 2010). Regime switches are estimated directly from the data
and coefficients can be estimated separately for each regime. This has the advantage
to get information about whether fiscal regressors differ systematically across different
subperiods. There are several additional approaches to address nonlinearity in growth
regressions. They range from simple sample splitting (Giavazzi et al., 2000) over
non-parametric kernel regressions (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003) to Bayesian techniques
(Crespo Cuaresma and Doppelhofer, 2007).
To shed more light on the effective impact of fiscal policy on long-run growth, it is
important for applied studies to address thoroughly the potential nonlinear functional
relationship. Besides overall government expenditures, it is promising to investigate in
a more elaborated manner the nonlinearity of different public spending and revenue
components. The variety of alternative econometric approaches to identify and to
account for nonlinearity, which has been touched only briefly in this section, calls
for a systematic examination of the robustness of the results. Given the uncertainty
about selecting the concrete set of different public spending and tax regressors, the
consideration of both threshold effects and model uncertainty in fiscal policy-growth
regressions (following Crespo Cuaresma and Doppelhofer, 2007) seems to be a promising
avenue of future research.
4.4 Composition of Fiscal Policy in CESEE: Descriptive
Evidence
This section provides a detailed description of the composition of public expenditures
and revenues following the theoretical distinction in Section 4.2 between productive
vs. nonproductive expenditures and distortionary vs. nondistortionary taxation,
respectively.4 Emphasis is put on the CESEE-10 countries and their fiscal policy
4Cut-off date for the data presented in this section is June 2009, when it was compiled for the doctoral
seminar. The (annual) data series are thus only shown until 2008.
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structure compared to the EU-15 average and Austria5.
Two datasets with different classifications of fiscal policy categories are available.
First, the Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) of the European Commission,
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, provides information on the
economic type of different budgetary items, i.e. it decomposes budgetary items by
different societal target groups. Second, the Newcronos database of Eurostat contains
a decomposition of public expenditures by function – basing on the Classification of
the Functions of Government (COFOG) – and gives information for what for purpose
expenses were made (for a comparison of the composition of government expenditure
across EU countries using COFOG data see European Central Bank, 2009, pp. 91–99).
The classification “by economic type” is able to distinguish between distortionary and
nondistortionary taxes, while the classification “by function” allows distinguishing
between productive and nonproductive expenditure categories.
Data refer to the general government. This has the advantage that (i) the general
government provides a more homogeneous data set than the central government, which
may vary strongly according to the organization of national and sub-national authorities,
and (ii) overall government activity should count more from an economic point of view.
4.4.1 Public Revenues and Expenditures by Economic Type
A general observation is that the revenue- and expenditure-to-GDP ratios in the CESEE-
10 are significantly smaller than in the EU-15. This reflects a smaller government
size in the CESEE-10, which can be attributed to broad-based privatizations in the
1990s, when these countries built their social model more in line with the market liberal
tradition of the Anglo-Saxon world than in line with the continental European or the
Scandinavian one.
Figure 4.2 shows the comparatively low revenue-to-GDP ratio and reveals that also
the size of distortionary direct taxes (on property and income) is comparatively small
(ranging from 5.7% of GDP in Slovakia to 10.2% in Hungary in 2008). However, Figure
4.3 shows that the share of direct taxes in total government revenues remains at a
rather constant level over time; it is only rarely improving (i.e. decreasing), namely in
the case of Slovakia, Estonia and Bulgaria. In Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia we can
even observe increasing tendencies. Figure 4.4 shows in detail the revenue dynamics
for Slovakia and indicates that direct taxes have steadily decreased since 1995, while
indirect taxes have remained at an elevated level beyond 10% of GDP. For Austria
(Figure 4.5) we can see a pretty stable structure of revenues over time. The share of
distortionary direct taxes in Austria has slightly increased (especially in 2001), while
indirect taxes have not really changed since the 1970s (remained between 12% and
15% of GDP).
The structure of expenditures by economic type – as shown in Figure 4.6 – distin-
guishes mainly between government consumption (i.e. compensation of public employees
5Pasterniak and Pitlik (2008) provide detailed information on the structure of public expenditures in
Austria (compared to the EU-27 average) from the perspective of the quality of public finances.
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Figure 4.2: Total General Government Revenues by Economic Type, in percent of GDP, 2008
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Figure 4.3: Share of Direct Taxes (on Property and Income) in Total General Government
Revenues
and other final consumption), government investment (i.e. gross fixed capital forma-
tion), social transfers, subsidies, and interest expenditures. In terms of the theoretical
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Figure 4.4: Total General Government Revenues by Economic Type, Slovakia, 1993–2008
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Figure 4.5: Total General Government Revenues by Economic Type, Austria, 1976–2008
discussion in Section 4.2, government consumption is expected to have a negative (or
no) impact on long-run economic growth, while government investment is expected to
have a positive impact. Figure 4.6 indicates that the size of government investment
as percentage of GDP is clearly larger in the CESEE-10 (ranging from 1.8% of GDP
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in Slovakia to 5.7% in Latvia) than in Austria (1%), reflecting also a higher share of
public infrastructure expenditures in the CESEE-10 (see the next subsection). Figure
4.7 shows that the size of government investment has clearly decreased in Austria since
the 1970s. At the same time, the share of GDP devoted to the compensation of public
employees has remained quite elevated at about 10%. In Slovakia, in contrast, there
has been a strong respective reduction from over 10% in 1993 to about 6% in 2008
(see Figure 4.8). The same is also true for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, while in
most of the other CESEE-10 there has been an increase in the compensation of public
employees as percentage of GDP (with a share larger than 10% in the Baltic states,
Slovenia, and Hungary in 2008).
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Figure 4.7: Total General Government Expenditures by Economic Type, Austria, 1976–2008
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Figure 4.8: Total General Government Expenditures by Economic Type, Slovakia, 1993–2008
4.4.2 Public Expenditures by Function
The brief discussion of the proper measurement of government consumption indicated
that a distinction of public expenditures by functions might give us more profound
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information on their productivity content than the classification “by economic type”. In
line with Section 4.2 and with Pasterniak and Pitlik (2008), I am classifying expenditures
for infrastructure, education and health as productive ones, while expenditures for public
goods and services, social security as well as recreational, cultural and religious services
are assumed to be neutral or nonproductive, respectively. These categories correspond
to the COFOG (1-digit) classification, where infrastructure comprises economic affairs
of the state, housing and community amenities as well as environment protection; public
goods and services comprise general public services, defense, public order and safety.
Figure 4.9 shows that in 2007 the expenditure-to-GDP ratio lied in all the CESEE-10
countries (except for Hungary) below the EU-15 average. Social security expenses and
health expenses as percentage of GDP are apparently less pronounced in most of the
CESEE-10 countries compared to the EU-15, while the size of infrastructure expenditures
is tendentiously larger (especially in the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Latvia and Poland). These differences are also reflected in Figure 4.10, where we can
see that the share of infrastructure expenditures further increased and that of social
security expenditures decreased since 2002 in the CESEE-10. The size of the other
categories is basically the same in the CESEE-10 and in the EU-15 (where notably the
size of education expenditures has remained unchanged since 2002).
Using the aforementioned classification of productive vs. nonproductive functional
categories, we can see in Figure 4.11 that the share of productive expenditures in
total general government expenditures is comparatively high in the CESEE-10 (driven
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Figure 4.9: Total General Government Expenditures by Functional Classification, in percent of
GDP, 2007
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Figure 4.10: Functional Categories of Total General Government Expenditures: EU-15 vs.
CESEE-10, 2002 and 2007
mainly by the infrastructure expenditures). It has remained fairly stable throughout
the observation period with marked increases only in Latvia, Slovakia (since 2003) and
Bulgaria (until 2004). In 2007 the share of productive expenditures in total expenditures
lied in most of the CESEE-10 countries clearly above the EU-15 average (37.5%), with
the Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia showing a share that is
even 10 percentage points larger than that of the EU-15 (see Figure 4.12). This picture
changes however strongly once we express productive expenditures as share of GDP
(see Figure 4.13): the size of productive expenditures in economic terms is only in the
Czech Republic and Hungary larger than on average in the EU-15. This relates to the
generally small government size in the CESEE-10.
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Figure 4.12: Share of “Productive” Expenditures (Infrastructure, Education, Health) in Total
General Government Expenditures, 2007
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Figure 4.13: “Productive” General Government Expenditures (Infrastructure, Education,
Health) in percent of GDP, 2007
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This essay showed that our understanding of the long-run growth impact of fiscal policy
can be enhanced if we apply a more disaggregated approach and consider the composition
of public expenditures and revenues, on the one hand, and account for notable cross-
country differences, on the other hand. Economic theory is already pretty advanced in
the field, as it explicitly distinguishes between productive and nonproductive public
expenditures or between distortionary and nondistortionary taxes and also identifies
decreasing returns for additional productive spending. In empirical investigations, in
contrast, aggregate budgetary categories and linear functional relationships dominate.
When it comes to the cross-country dimension, most growth studies have focused
on high-income OECD economies and some studies deal with developing countries.
There is, however, only scarce evidence for countries in emerging Europe although
they have gone through incisive fiscal reform steps during the last 20 years and show
a very specific structure of public spending and taxation, which seems to be more
“growth-friendly” in the CESEE-10 than in the EU-15: They exhibit smaller revenue-
and expenditure-to-GDP ratios, reflecting an overall smaller government size. The
share of distortionary taxes in total revenues is considerably smaller, while the size
of government investment and infrastructure expenditure is clearly larger. In most
of the CESEE-10 countries there has been an increase in the compensation of public
employees over time. Social security expenses and health expenses are less pronounced.
Finally, the share of productive expenditures (i.e. the sum of infrastructure, education,
and health expenditures) in total expenditures is comparatively high and has remained
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fairly stable throughout the observation period.
The reason for the lack of empirical evidence is, of course, the unsatisfactory availabil-
ity of long enough macroeconomic time series in emerging Europe. Panel regressions
with more-year averages, which are typically used in studies of long-run economic
growth, cannot be estimated. Instead, one can run simulations using a macroecono-
metric model. Yet, the calibrations in these models are also subject to a certain small
sample bias. Another possibility are VAR models using quarterly data that inform
about the short-run response of output to a shock in different spending and revenue
items. The information that we get is that of a fiscal multiplier (see Section 1.2),
which represents the business cycle reaction but not necessarily the reaction of long-run
output. The few CESEE-papers, which have been quoted in this essay, follow one of
these two approaches and tend to confirm the negative output effect of direct taxes
and of government consumption.
A good sign for long-run growth in the CESEE-10 is the comparative large weight of
infrastructure expenditures in total government expenditures as several scholars found
that the growth effect of infrastructure expenditure is stronger in countries with less
developed infrastructure. However, a simple rule “more infrastructure expenditure,
more growth” cannot succeed if the type of financing or potential nonlinearities are
neglected. Related to the discussion of lower risk tolerance thresholds in emerging
economies (see Chapter 1), countries in CESEE might also have a lower maximum
tolerable government size than advanced economies. Moreover, a key aspect seems
to be the quality of fiscal institutions in CESEE. We saw that countries with weak
institutions and political constraints are more prone to volatile discretionary fiscal
policy, which, in turn, reduces long-run growth via higher output volatility. Thus,
to contribute effectively to output stabilization and to enhance the long-run growth
potential, it is important for the CESEE countries to improve political institutions first
(see also Chapters 5 and 6) and to keep the overall government size in check.
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The privatization of state enterprises has been acentral element of economic reform over thepast 25 years, and by most, but not all, accounts,
the beneficial effects of privatization have outweighed
the costs (e.g., Guriev and Megginson 2007; McKenzie
and Mookherjee 2003; Megginson and Netter 2001).
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almost two-thirds of respondents believed that priva-
tization was “not beneficial” (Lora and Panizza 2003).
A nationally representative survey in Russia in 2006
revealed that 52% of respondents agreed that “the
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nationalized” (Denisova, Eller, andZhuravskaya 2007,
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ing that recent years have seen significant reversals of
privatization in Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere.
Why do some oppose and others support revising
market reforms such as privatization? Existing studies
of public support for economic reform have focused
almost exclusively on the impact of individual-level
factors (e.g., Duch 1993; Gibson 1996; Kaltenthaler,
Ceccoli, and Michta 2006; but see Grosjean and Senik
2008a, 2008b for studies of the effect of democracy).We
advance the literature by examining how individual-
level traits, such asmarket skills, interact with national-
level factors, such as democracy and governance, in
shaping support for economic reform. In particular, we
test whether democracy and good governance comple-
ment market-relevant skills or substitute for them in
transition countries. We use a survey of 28,000 indi-
viduals from 28 transition countries that is particularly
well suited to study how individual characteristics and
national institutions interact to shape attitudes toward
market reform because it gathers rich individual-level
information comparable across a relatively large num-
ber of reforming states with diverse institutions. We
focus on a crucial component of market reforms in
transition countries (i.e., public support for revising
privatization). We find that under autocracy and weak
governance institutions, there is no significant differ-
ence in the levels of support for revising privatization
between respondents with high market skills (i.e., en-
trepreneurs and professionals) and respondents with
low market skills (i.e., nonentrepreneurs and nonpro-
fessionals). However, as the level of democracy and
the quality of governance increases, the difference in
the level of support for revising privatization between
individuals with high and low market skills grows dra-
matically. In democratic and well-governed countries,
respondents with low market skills support revising
privatization at a much higher rate than respondents
with high market skills. Favorable institutional settings
allow those with market-relevant skills to reap the full
returns of their efforts and thereby bolster their sup-
port for economic reform. Thus, in the postcommunist
transition, there exists an important complementarity
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between a good institutional environment and skills
useful to economic reforms.
Although many argue that groups who gain from
economic reform, such as those with the skills most
suited for a market economy, will be strong supporters
of further economic reform (c.f., Fernandez andRodrik
1991), our study indicates that under autocracy and
weakgovernance institutions, the high skilledwill be no
more supportive of further economic reform than the
low skilled. It is democracy and good governance that
drives a wedge between the preferences over economic
reform of those with high and low market skills. Thus,
our findings help illuminate how democracy and good
governance shape the microfoundations of the politics
of economic policy making: different coalitions may be
needed to advance economic reform under autocracy
and weak governance, on the one hand, and under
democracy and good governance, on the other.1
Our analysis underscores the importance of integrat-
ing national-level variables into analyses of individual-
level preferences over economic policy. Recent years
have seen a renewed interest in comparative politi-
cal economy in this topic. For example, scholars have
examined public attitudes toward trade openness, wel-
fare policy, economic reform, and integration into the
European Union in a broad range of countries (c.f.,
Baker 2003; Hiscox 2002; Iversen and Soskice, 2001;
Tucker 2006).2 These studies have made valuable con-
tributions, but they have not exploredwhether andhow
preferences vary depending on the institutional envi-
ronment. We push this literature forward by identify-
ing the complementarity of national-level institutions
and individual skills for public support for economic
reforms.3
We begin by developing an argument about the in-
terplay of individual and institutional-level factors in
determining support for revising privatization before
discussing the data and measures. We then present our
empirical methodology, results, and robustness checks.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our
findings.
HYPOTHESES: SKILLS AND INSTITUTIONS
The literature on the politics of economic reform typi-
cally assumes that people evaluate policy ex ante based
on its expected impact on their personal welfare and
ex post based on the realized return from the policy
(c.f., Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Roland 2000).4 Indi-
viduals who gain (or expect to gain) from a change in
1 For studies of public support for economic reform in the post-
communist world, see Tucker (2006); for Latin America, see Baker
(2003); and for a more general argument, see Stokes (2001).
2 One potentially relevant area of overlap with our study is those
works in the varieties of capitalism literature that examine how the
institutional environment shapes incentives to invest in specific or
general skills (c.f., Iversen and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003).
3 For studies that integrate national-level variables into analyses
of individual-level preferences on other issues, see, among others,
Anderson and Tverdova (2003); Duch and Stevenson (2005); Huber,
Kernell, and Leoni (2005); and Steenbergen and Jones (2002).
4 There is a large literature on whether citizens evaluate policy
and vote based on prospective or retrospective evaluations (c.f.,
policy are likely to back the change in policy, whereas
those who lose (or expect to lose) oppose it.5 This is
a central assumption that drives much of the theoret-
ical literature on the political economy of reform and
has been the subject of considerable empirical scrutiny
(c.f., Baker 2003; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002;
Przeworski 1991).
Scholars have identified a variety of individual traits
that influence who benefits from economic reforms,
such as market liberalization and privatization. These
include skills, socioeconomic status, and location. Our
primary focus is on skills relevant to amarket economy
based on the idea that higher levels of market skills
are associated with greater returns to economic reform
and, therefore, more vigorous support for reform. In-
deed, there is solid evidence that economic reforms
are related to differential rates of returns to market-
relevant skills in transition economies (e.g., Brainerd
1998; Svejnar 1999). In particular, returns to skills com-
prise an important component of wage decompression
in reforming economies (e.g., Milanovic 1999). If un-
der a planned economy, returns to market skills were
diminished by massive redistribution, the expanded
opportunities offered by economic reform allow those
with the skills most suited to amarket economy to reap
larger gains. The argument is even strongerwith respect
to entrepreneurial skills that were not at all in demand
in a command economy (e.g., Earle and Sakova 2000).
Building on this notion, we expect those with skills
most suited to a market economy to be the strongest
proponents of market reform.
Yet, little is known about whether the impact of mar-
ket skills on support for economic reform depends on
the institutional environment. Indeed, there are two
alternative views of how private returns to skills from
market-oriented reforms interact with the institutional
environment. The ability to realize gains from market-
relevant skills may depend on the extent to which
institutions reward those talents. Theoretically, good
institutions may be complements or substitutes for the
private returns from economic reform.
Complementarity View
Consider the argument for complementarity. It envi-
sions democracy and good governance institutions pri-
marily as a means of constraining rulers from chang-
ing policy opportunistically and engaging in corruption
and rent extraction, thereby allowing citizens to realize
greater gains from economic reforms (c.f., Acemoglu
and Robinson 2006; Zinnes, Eliat, and Sachs 2001).
Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Fiorina 1981). Respondents in our sam-
ple likely evaluate policy based on the effect of privatization that has
already taken place and based on the expected future benefits from
changing current policy, but we do not explore the relative weights
of these factors in their responses. See Stokes (2001) for a discussion
of retrospective and prospective evaluations of economic reform.
5 Of course, personal pocketbook issues are not the only factor influ-
encing support for policy, but there is much evidence that these types
of individual material calculations are an important consideration.
For a discussion of this issue relevant to the politics of economic
reform, see Colton (2000, 94–95) and Stokes (2001, 1–32).
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Secure in the knowledge that state officials are more
constrainedbydemocratic practices and capable gover-
nance institutions, those with the skills most suited to a
market economy can use their talents to their greatest
effect. Low skill citizens may still benefit from good
governance and democracy, but their returns from re-
formwill be lower than for high skill citizens. Given the
greater returns to market skills from economic reform
under good institutions, the high skilledwill be stronger
proponents of market reforms than the low skilled.
In weak institutional environments, the complemen-
tarity view suggests that the difference in the responses
between those with high and low market skills will
be much smaller. Weak institutions may prevent in-
dividuals with high market skills from realizing their
potential returns from market reform, and, therefore,
they may be much less enthusiastic about supporting
economic reform. For example, under autocracy and
weak governance institutions, the returns from market
skills may not be realized because government officials
are well placed to take them away through corruption,
excessive taxation, and other means of rent extraction.
In these environments, individuals with high market
skills and low market skills will be reluctant to invest
the time, energy, and capital to take full advantage
of reform fearing arbitrary changes in policy, corrup-
tion, and simple government malfeasance. Thus, there
is likely to be little difference in the assessment of eco-
nomic reform between high- and low-skilled respon-
dents.
According to the complementarity view, democracy
and strong governance institutions drive a wedge be-
tween the preferences toward economic reform of
those with high and low market skills. This view pre-
dicts significantly larger differences in attitudes to-
ward economic reformbetween thosewith andwithout
market skills under good institutions than under bad
institutions.
Substitutability View
In contrast, the substitutability argument envisions
democracy and good governance institutions primar-
ily as increasing the motives and means for govern-
ments to engage in redistribution. It predicts that when
democracy and governance institutions are strong, the
differences in support for market reform between the
low and high skilled will be smaller. Democracy in-
creases incentives to use policy to redistribute bene-
fits to groups harmed by economic reform, and good
governance institutions can increase state capacity to
deliver these benefits. The gains from economic reform
may be distributed more evenly across the population
under democracy and good governance because those
who gain little from economic reform are better com-
pensated through redistribution paid for by those who
gain more from economic reforms. This argument has
particular bite when the benefits of economic reform
accrue to a small minority (Alesina and Rodrik 1994;
Meltzer and Richard 1981). Under good institutional
conditions, individuals whose skills are most appro-
priate for the market will be less fervent supporters
of economic reform, and those whose skills are less
well suited to a market economy will be less strident
opponents of reform due to redistribution.
According to the substitutability view, good institu-
tions substitute for market skill differences in shap-
ing public support for economic reform; therefore, we
expect smaller differences in the assessment of eco-
nomic reform between individuals with varying levels
of market skills in good compared to bad institutional
environments.
We test the complementarity and substitutability
views by comparing the actual levels of popular sup-
port for revising market reforms for groups with high
and low market skills in good and bad institutional
environments. Our approach has an attractive feature:
becausewe consider attitudes toward economic reform
ex post (i.e., the attitudes of individuals who have
already realized the gains and losses from economic
reform), it implicitly takes into account the possibility
of redistribution and government predation. Potential
winners may gain little from economic reform because
the (potential) gains may be redistributed or simply
taxed away by subsequent government policy. Thus,
we treat the expost individual assessment of reform as
a proxy for the realized net effect of policy change on
the welfare of the individual.
DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY
A Measure of Support for Economic Reform
To study public support for economic reform, we fo-
cus on a critical component of building a market
economy in transition countries: the privatization of
state enterprises (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995;
Megginson 2005). We use the “Life in Transition Sur-
vey” (LiTS), a survey based on face-to-face interviews
using a representative sample of 1,000 individuals in
each of 28 postcommunist countries conducted in the
fall of 2006.6 More specifically, we focus on responses
to the following question from the survey:
In your opinion, what should be done with most privatized
companies? They should be. . .
(1) Left in the hands of current owners with no change;
(2) Left in the hands of current owners provided they pay
privatized assets’ worth;
(3) Renationalized and kept in state hands;
(4)Renationalized and then reprivatized again using amore
transparent process.
Figure 1 summarizes responses to this question. We
dichotomize the responses by treating answers (1) and
6 The survey was conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) in collaboration with the World
Bank. For technical details of the survey, see EBRD (2007a, 2007b).
Countries included in the study are Albania, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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FIGURE 1. Public Support for Revising Privatization across Countries
Note: Weights applied to ensure that the population as a whole is represented, taking into account the age and gender distribution of
the population in each country (see EBRD 2007a, 6). The reported percentages have a Bernoulli distribution. Their standard errors
depend on the actual percentage and the number of observations (1,000 per country); thus, they are equal to SE = 100
√
pi (1−pi )
1,000 ,
where pi denotes the percentage points as reported in the table. The magnitudes of the SE indicate that if a difference between any
two countries exceeds 3 percentage points, it is statistically significant.
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(2) as indicating opposition to revising privatization
and responses (3) and (4) as signaling support for re-
vising privatization. For our purposes, the critical dis-
tinction between these two groups is that the latter two
responses entail the expropriation of privatized assets
held by current owners—either by renationalization or
by renationalization and then reprivatization, whereas
the former two responses allow the current owners to
retain their assets.7 Support for the revision of privati-
zation is the main dependent variable in our empirical
analysis.8
On average, 46.7% of respondents in all countries
support revising privatization by taking assets from
the current owners through either renationalization
or renationalization followed by reprivatization. This
figure varies considerably across countries: from 67.8%
inAzerbaijan to 24.8% in the CzechRepublic. Thema-
jority of the population supports revising privatization
in eleven of twenty-eight countries in our sample. Dif-
ferences in question wording make direct comparisons
with other surveys difficult, but these results are not
too dissimilar from recent studies from Latin America.
For example, Panizza and Yanez (2005) cite Latino-
Barometer data from 17 countries in 1998, which finds
that 50% of respondents believed that “privatization
was not beneficial for the country,” a figure that rose
to more than 65% in 2003.
We focus on support for revising privatization for
several reasons. First, privatization is a key component
of economic reforms in transition anddeveloping coun-
tries, and removing assets from the hands of current
owners marks a significant change in the economic and
political environment. Even the threat of revising pri-
vatization can have important economic consequences
byweakening the incentives of current owners to invest
in their business. Second, privatization and its possible
revision are high-profile policies that have engendered
great public debate, which increases the likelihood that
respondents have given the issue some thought. Third,
the survey has a relatively clean question on support
for and opposition to revising privatization that is com-
parable across countries. Our empirical results are un-
changedwhenwe use amore general question from the
survey that asks directly about “support for a market
7 Note that response (2) does not indicate the size of the payment
that current owners shouldmake. Therefore, we choose to be conser-
vative and treat response (2) as support for the status quo because
the payment may just be an indication of respondent’s preference
for increased taxation. This question has a number of shortcomings.
In particular, it refers to “most” privatized enterprises rather than
offering a more precise wording. It would also be improved with a
filter that asked whether anything should be done about privatized
enterprises before listing the responses. The order of the responses
minimizes the problem somewhat by offering the status quo as the
first response.
8 Taking into account refusals, failures to locate respondents, and
other administrative difficulties, the response rate for this survey is
63%, a rate that is roughly equivalent to the response rate of the
widely used National Election Studies in the US and the American
TimeUse Survey (Singer 2002). The nonresponse rates varied signif-
icantly across countries. However, the overall nonresponse rates as
well as outright refusal rates are uncorrelated across countries with
our main dependent variable (i.e., the support for revising privatiza-
tion).
economy” as a dependent variable, but we prefer to
focus on the revision of privatization as a more con-
crete example of support for economic reforms (as we
discuss in the “Robustness Checks” section later in this
article).9
Measures of Market-relevant Skills
Our main focus is on market-relevant skills. We proxy
for them in two ways, relying on the type of jobs re-
spondents hold and on their professions:
(1) First, we consider those who have become en-
trepreneurs and self-employed during the tran-
sition as having skills particularly suitable for a
market economy. Economic reform gives new en-
trepreneurs an opportunity to reveal their market
skills – talents that were not in demand before
transition.
(2) Second, we deem those respondents who hold high
managerial positions and work as top-level profes-
sionals (i.e., groups 1 and 2 in the 1-digit Standard
Occupational Classification 2000) as having high
levels of market-relevant skills. Top-level profes-
sionals and company managers have skills espe-
cially rewarded in a market economy where the
wage distribution is substantially less compressed
than in a command economy. We refer to these
occupations as professionals in our analysis.10
Seven percent of respondents are entrepreneurs, and
10% are professionals in our sample. The rest of re-
spondents work for wages in the occupational groups
3 to 9 or do not work.11 By construction, there is no
overlap in these two groups (i.e., entrepreneurs and
9 Studies from the postcommunist world have examined attitudes
toward market economies or the private sector more generally, but
few focus directly on the privatization of state-owned enterprises
(c.f., Duch 1993). Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) present a formal model
that incorporates the revision of privatization as a parameter, but
offer only illustrative evidence. Frye (2006, 2007) uses an experi-
ment embedded in surveys of business elites and the mass public in
Russia to examine support for revising privatization, but his findings
are limited to a single country and focus on only a few variables
of interest. Kaltenthaler et al. (2006) estimate individual-level de-
terminants of privatization support in seven post-Soviet countries,
but do not account for cross-country differences in the quality of
institutions. There is a large literature on the politics of privatization
in the postcommunist world, but much of it focuses on elite decision
making rather than mass support for the policy (c.f., Appel 2004;
Shleifer and Treisman 2000).
10 These occupations include legislators, senior government offi-
cials, enterprise managers, directors/chief executives, owners of busi-
nesses, physicists, engineers, mathematicians, architects, comput-
ing professionals, medical doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers,
lawyers, accountants, professionals, and similar occupations.
11 Some questions in the survey are rather demanding for respon-
dents. For example, the technical appendix of the LiTS notes that,
in some cases, interviewers provided guidance to some respondents
in describing their employment history and their occupation. It is
possible that interviewers provided guidance on other questions as
well, but we have no way of detecting whether this is the case. This
possibility introduces the potential for interviewer bias, particularly
among respondents with lower education. We address this issue in
two ways. First, we control for education in our analysis. Second,
we verified that the distributions of occupations for the one case
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professionals), but we argue that both groups have
skills with potentially high returns under a market
economy.
Other conventional measures of human capital, such
as education and experience (proxied by age), are poor
indicators ofmarket skills in a postcommunist environ-
ment. Much of the work experience gained by those
who worked for many years under the command econ-
omy is likely to be of little value in a more openmarket
economy (Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009). Similarly,
education, particularly vocational education, prior to
1990 (and, in some cases, for several years after) was
designed to prepare citizens to perform tasks relevant
to a planned economy – tasks that are largely obsolete
in a market environment. Note that we always control
for these common measures of human capital in our
analysis.
Measures of the Institutional Environment
Our focus is on whether the impact of market skills
on support for economic reform is contingent on the
level of democracy and on the quality of governance.
To be more specific, we examine whether democracy
and good governance serve as complements or sub-
stitutes to market skills. If, for example, democracy
and market skills are complements, then as the quality
of democracy improves, respondents with high market
skills should be significantlymore likely to support eco-
nomic reformcompared to thosewith lowmarket skills.
If democracy and market skills are substitutes, then
in more democratic countries respondents with high
market skills should be less likely to support economic
reform in comparison to those with low market skills.
Given disagreement about how best to measure
democracy, we use four indicators that emphasize
slightly different elements of democracy: (1) the execu-
tive constraintsmeasure fromPolity IV, which captures
the extent of limits on the policy-making power of the
chief executive; (2) the democracy score fromPOLITY
IV, which measures the intensity of political competi-
tion; (3) the voicemeasure fromKaufmann,Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2006), which indicates the level of popular
participation and freedom of expression; and (4) the
Freedom House Nations in Transit index, which is a
score indicating the progress of democracy. Each com-
monly used measure of democracy has strengths and
weaknesses. The two POLITY measures are based on
relatively less subjective indicators, but the rating for
executive constraints has a rather low ceiling.12 The
Freedom House measure seems to provide a closer fit
with the secondary literature in the transition countries
where we have comparable data (Russia) are similar between LiTS
and the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). RLMS
applies a methodology that is much less demanding for respondents:
their verbal answers are recorded and then placed into occupational
categories after the survey is completed.
12 In our data, more than half the countries have the highest or sec-
ond highest level of executive constraint on the 1–7 scale. See Treier
and Jackman (2008) for a discussion of drawbacks of the POLITY
IV continuous measures of democracy.
than the POLITYmeasures, but is based on rather sub-
jective measures. The voice measure from Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) is also based in part on
subjective measures as captured by national-level sur-
veys.
Our indicators of governance quality also come from
Kaufmann et al. (2006). We use the following indices:
government effectiveness, the rule of law, control over
corruption, and regulatory quality. These measures are
designed to highlight somewhat different aspects of the
quality of governance; but, in reality, they are highly
correlated across countries. Each aspect of the quality
of governance, however, has the potential to shape the
economic returns to market skills.
There are 28 countries in theLiTS survey, butmost of
the institutional measures are not available for Mon-
tenegro; in addition, the POLITY measures are not
available for Bosnia. As a consequence, our sample
consists of 27 countries (or 26 when we use theDemoc-
racy Index). We describe and summarize each main
variable of interest as well as all control variables (to be
introduced later) in TablesA1 andA2 in theAppendix.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To test our hypotheses about the complementarity or
substitutability of market-relevant skills and democ-
racy and governance institutions, we compare individ-
ual support for revising privatization between groups
that do and do not have market-relevant skills in good
and bad institutional environments controlling for a
wide range of individual and country characteristics.
As a first step (before we proceed to the core of our
analysis), we want to establish the benchmark of an
average effect of market-relevant skills on support for
revising privatization controlling for all country-level
variation. For that purpose, we conduct the following
Probit estimation:
Prob{Ri = 1} = F(α + β1Ei + γ1Pi + δ′Xi + ϕc + εi),
(1)
where i indexes individuals and c indexes countries in
which individual i lives; Ri is a dummy that equals one
if the individual i supports revising privatization; Ei is
a dummy indicating entrepreneurs and self-employed
persons; andPi is a dummy indicating individualswork-
ing as professionals and top managers. ϕc is a country
fixed effect. Xi is a vector of individual covariates; it
includes a range of factors that may shape support for
economic reform and may be correlated with market-
relevant skills. The LiTS data offer a rich set of con-
trol variables related to individuals’ transition expe-
riences, including labor market history and hardships
that individuals experienced between 1989 and 2006.
In particular, we control for how long the respondents
worked for wages in the state and private sectors, the
number of different jobs they held, the number of years
that respondents experienced food cuts, wage arrears,
and whether they had to sell household assets to make
ends meet. The list of individual controls also includes
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various proxies for the relative and absolute income
and wealth of the respondent, as well as the respon-
dent’s perception of his or her position in the wealth
distribution from the beginning of transition to 2006.
In addition, we control for age, education level, gender,
location of residence (rural vs. urban vs. metropolitan
area), religion, whether the respondent belongs to an
ethnic minority, and current labor market status (em-
ployed vs. unemployed).
In this specification, we use bootstrapped standard
errors adjusted for clustering of a heteroscedastic error
term at the level of primary sampling units (PSUs) (i.e.,
50 residential locations drawn at random within each
country).13 Equation (1) estimates the average effects
ofmarket-relevant skills on the support of privatization
revision, β1 and γ1, which are expected to be negative.
National Institutions and Individual Skills
Our primary interest, however, is in whether the ef-
fect of market-relevant skills on support for revising
privatization depends on a country’s institutional en-
vironment. Thus, as a second step in our analysis, we
introduce interaction effects between variables mea-
suring democracy and governance institutions and vari-
ables measuring market skills. Because this approach
requires the use of variables measured at two different
levels (i.e., individual and country level), we estimate
three alternative models designed to handle multilevel
data, each of which has its desirable and undesirable
features. We begin with a probit model with country
fixed effects, which is a direct generalization of Equa-
tion (1):
Prob{Ri = 1} = F(α + β1Ei + β2EiIdc + γ1Pi
+ γ2PiIdc + δ′Xi + ϕc + εi), (2)
where Ic denotes a particular measure of institutional
environment of country c (i.e., one of our proxies for
democracy or governance quality). Superscript d at Ic
indicates that we subtract the overall sample mean
from the institutional measure Ic before taking the
cross-term in order for β1 and γ1 to have the same
interpretation as in Equation (1) (i.e., the effect of
market-relevant skills evaluated at the average level of
the institutional environment).We include institutional
measures in these regressions one by one because they
are highly correlated with each other and consider
them simply as alternative measures of democracy and
governance quality. The rest of the notation and the
assumptions about the variance–covariance matrix are
unchanged.
13 The sample selection consisted of two stages. First, 50 primary
sampling units (PSUs) were randomly selected in each country based
on information from the most recent census in the country. Second,
20 households were selected at random from each PSU. Within each
household, the head of the household (or another knowledgeable
household member) responded to the questions on aspects of ma-
terial well-being, whereas for the other questions one household
member (age 18 or older) was randomly selected to respond.
The coefficients on the interaction terms, β2 and γ2,
test for the complementarity and the substitutability
of institution I with individual market skills. If they
have the same sign as the direct effect of market skills
(i.e., are negative), we would conclude that there is a
complementarity of skills and institutions. In contrast,
if β2 and γ2 have the opposite sign of the direct ef-
fect of market skills (i.e., are positive), then skills and
institutions are substitutes.
In addition, to highlight the direct effect of institu-
tions, I, we estimate a probit model without country
fixed effects, but with the direct effect of I as an ad-
ditional covariate. In the following specification, we
cluster the error term at the level of countries that is
necessary as we include national-level variables in the
list of covariates. As done previously, standard errors
are bootstrapped.
Prob{Ri = 1} = F(α + β1Ei + β2EiIdc + γ1Pi
+ γ2PiIdc + θIc + δ′Xi + µ′Zc + εi). (3)
Because Equation (3) omits country fixed effects, we
control for the following national-level variables (Zc):
the extent of country’s large and small privatization in
2006 as measured by the EBRD and the log per capita
GDP averaged for 1999 to 2006, because both income
and the extent of privatization may shape the support
for revising privatization.14 The estimation of the pa-
rameter θ in Equation (3) is purely auxiliary because
institutions are likely endogenous to public attitudes
toward market reforms, and we do not claim to es-
tablish direct causality from the level of institutions to
support for privatization revision. We discuss this issue
(as well as the effect of the endogeneity of institutions
for the estimation of our parameters of interest) in
detail in the next subsection.
Estimating Equation (3) with a probit model has
the advantage of simplicity and ease of computation,
but only partially recognizes the nested structure of
the data: responses from many individuals who re-
side in a small number of countries (Leoni 2009).15 To
make sure that our results are not driven by potential
problems with the probit estimation of the variance–
covariance matrix, we estimate Equation (3) using two
additional methods. First, we estimate a one-step, two-
level model using a Generalized Linear Latent and
Mixed Model (GLLAMM), which takes into account
that the data reside in two levels (Rabe-Hesketh and
14 We also investigated the direct effect and the interaction with
market skills of the following potentially important national-level
variables: inequality, growth, type and mode of privatization (e.g.,
insider vs. outsider, voucher vs. direct sales), and years since priva-
tization. None of them had a robust effect on support for revising
privatization or any effect on our main findings. We discuss this in
the “Robustness Checks” section.
15 Clustering of standard errors is designed for data sets with a rela-
tively small number of observations drawn frommany groups. In the
case when the unmeasured residual country-level variance is trivial,
clustered standard errors perform well, but in the presence of large
unmeasured residual country-level variance, this approach produces
biased standard errors (Leoni 2009).
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Skrondal 2008). Finally, we estimate a two-step model
that also accounts for the nested structure of the data
(Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005).16 This procedure
begins by estimating a probit model for each coun-
try using individual-level predictors, and gathers the
coefficients on the constants and individual-level vari-
ables, which are then used as the dependent variables
in second-stage estimations with national-level vari-
ables as predictors (one at a time). The estimates of
the national-level variables are weighted in accordance
with the precision of the first-level estimates (Borjas
and Sueyoshi 1994). This method is less efficient than
one-step estimators, such as GLLAMM, but requires
fewer distributional assumptions about the data (Beck
2005; Leoni 2009). Both GLLAMM and the two-step
method take into account the fact that we have only
27 country-level observations of the institutional envi-
ronment. To the extent that the results are consistent
across estimation procedures, we aremore confident in
them.
Endogeneity of Institutions
There are a number of reasons to believe that the level
of democracy and thequality of governance institutions
are endogenous to public support of market reforms in
general and of privatization in particular.17 Most im-
portant, crucial omitted variables, such as the quality
and timing of reforms themselves, are likely correlated
with both the quality of the institutional environment
and public support for reforms. One can also argue that
reverse causality is a potential problem for estimating
the direct effect of institutions on public attitudes to-
ward privatization because many of the institutional
quality indices are themselves a compilation of survey
responses, which to some extent may have been based
on expert or public assessments of privatization. Note
that this particular source of endogeneity is probably
less damaging for the democracy variables than for the
governance indicators because experts and survey re-
spondents can more easily distinguish between privati-
zation and political rights;moreover, POLITY IVmea-
sures of democracy do not include survey responses.
Our main focus, however, is on the interaction be-
tween the (endogenous) institutional variables, and
our measures of market-relevant skills conditional on
the effect of the institutional environment (either by
controlling for country fixed effects or by the direct
inclusion of institutional covariates). Our main identi-
fication assumption is that omitted variables and other
potential sources of endogeneity of the institutional
environment affect responses of individuals with high
and lowmarket skills to the same extent irrespective of
the institutional environment. Thus, under this assump-
tion, we can estimate the difference-in-differences ef-
fect of the interaction between market skills and in-
16 For discussions of multilevel data analysis, see the special issue
of Political Analysis, vol. 13, no. 4, (2005), which is dedicated to
multilevel models, and see Gelman and Hill (2007).
17 See Grosjean and Senik (2008a) for an interesting approach to
finding a source of exogenous variation in democracy.
stitutions without a bias by comparing the difference
in the support of market reforms between groups with
low and highmarket skills in good and bad institutional
environments.
RESULTS
Benchmark: Market Skills in an
Average Institutional Environment
Table 1 presents the results of an estimation using
individual-level factors as independent variables and
controlling for all country-level variation (including
institutions) with country fixed effects. Most impor-
tant, we find that our measures of market skills are
good predictors of support for the privatization status
quo. Being a professional decreases the probability of
supporting the revision of privatization on average by
4.1 percentage points. In addition, new entrepreneurs
are on average 5.1 percentage points less likely to sup-
port revision of privatization than nonentrepreneurs.
Thus, controlling for other factors, individuals with
skills suited for an economy with extensive private
ownership are especially likely to oppose revising pri-
vatization.
The relationship between other measures of hu-
man capital and attitudes toward revising privatiza-
tion is weaker. This is, perhaps, because in transition
economies thesemeasures do not reflect the possession
of skills specific to amarket economy.Most notably, the
level of education is statistically insignificant.18 Age—
often used in the literature as a proxy for experience—
is positively related to support for revising privatiza-
tion. The most likely reason for this relationship is
that experience under a command economy does not
help adjust to new market conditions (e.g., Guriev and
ZhuravskayaN.d.).Note that the results are unchanged
if we include a squared term for age in the list of re-
gressors.
In addition, we find that employment trajectories are
related to support for revising privatization. Respon-
dents who held more jobs are more likely to favor re-
vising privatization, whereas those who worked longer
in the private sector are more vigorous opponents of
revising privatization. Individuals who experienced ex-
tensive economic hardships related to transition are
significantly more likely to favor revising privatization.
Respondents from higher consumption deciles, those
who own a home or an apartment, and those who
moved up the wealth ladder during the transition sup-
port the revision of privatization significantly less than
their counterparts with lower incomes and wealth and
a less positive wealth trajectory during transition. The
18 In an alternative specification with dummies for each level of
education, only the holders of a university degree have significantly
lower support for revising privatization than all other education
groups. Note that the top managers and professionals are in that
category; nonetheless, the coefficient on the dummy indicating top-
level managers and professionals remains significant in this specifica-
tion. Results from Latin America are inconclusive about the impact
of education on support for privatization (Boix 2005; Graham and
Sukhtankar 2004; Lora and Panizza 2003; Panizza and Yanez 2005).
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TABLE 1. Direct Individual Effects: Binomial Probit, Marginal Effects Reported
Probability of Supporting Privatization Revision
Coefficients Marginal Effects
Market skills
Entrepreneur or self-employed −.1281∗∗∗ −.0509∗∗∗
[.0376]
Professional or top manager −.1036∗∗∗ −.0412∗∗∗
[.0331]
Human capital
Age .0044∗∗∗ .0017∗∗∗
[.0007]
Education [1—below secondary, 2—secondary, −.007 −.0028
3—professional, vocational training, 4—higher] [.0107]
Self-reported poor health status [1—excellent, . . . , 5—poor] .0475∗∗∗ .0189∗∗∗
[.0127]
Transition-related employment history
Number of jobs, 1989–2006 .0322∗∗ .0128∗∗
[.0126]
Years worked for wages in state sector, 1989–2006 −.0008 −.0003
[.0019]
Years worked for wages in private sector, 1989–2006 −.0067∗∗∗ −.0027∗∗∗
[.0023]
Transition-related hardships
Years had wage cuts or wage arrears, 1989–2006 .0208∗∗∗ .0083∗∗∗
[.0057]
Years had to sell household assets, 1989–2006 .0250∗∗∗ .0099∗∗∗
[.0084]
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989–2006 .0123∗∗∗ .0049∗∗∗
[.0030]
Assets
Ownership of a house or apartment −.0719∗∗ −.0286∗
[.0337]
Wealth (decile of per capita household consumption) −.0109∗∗ −.0043∗∗
[.0043]
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006 −.0348∗∗∗ −.0138∗∗∗
[.0048]
Other individual-level controls
Gender [Male compared to Female] −.0237 −.0094
[.0185]
Household size .0121∗ .0048∗
[.0066]
Location = “Metropolitan area” —comparison group
= “Rural” .1007∗∗ .0400∗∗
[.0431]
= “Urban, excluding metropolitan area” .0596 .0237
[.0422]
Religion = “Christian” —comparison group
= “Buddhist” .0145 .0058
[.1027]
= “Atheistic/agnostic/none” .0387 .0154
[.0393]
= “Muslim” .1895∗∗∗ .0753∗∗∗
[.0636]
= “Other” −.0114 −.0045
[.0723]
Member of an ethnic minority .0142 .0057
[.0419]
Unemployed, 2006 .0865∗∗ .0344∗∗
[.0340]
Country dummies Yes
Observations 24311
Pseudo R2 .0647
Log likelihood −15716
Prob> chi2 .0000
Note: Bootstrapped standard errrors in brackets clustered at PSU level. Country fixed effects included.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
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unemployed are significantly more likely to support a
revision of privatization than the employed.19
Market Skills in Different
Institutional Environments
We now turn to the most important part of our analysis
(i.e., testing for the complementarity or substitutability
of democracy and good governance with market skills
of individuals). We begin by exploring the impact of
market skills conditional on the level of democracy and
governance using single-stage estimations in Table 2.
The first two columns present coefficients andmarginal
effects of the interaction terms between measures of
market skills and institutions from the probit estima-
tions with country fixed effects (i.e., Equation (2)). The
top panel of Table 2 presents results for democracy, and
the lower panel for governance institutions. The re-
sults are consistent with the view that both democracy
and good governance institutions complement private
returns to skill from economic reform. In regressions
for all our measures of institutions without exception,
the coefficients on the interaction terms between the
relevant institution, on the one hand, and the dummy
variables for entrepreneur and for professional or top
manager, on the other hand, are negative and statisti-
cally significant. Therefore, as democratic institutions
grow stronger and governance improves, the difference
in the support for revisingprivatizationbetweengroups
with high market skills and lowmarket skills increases:
those with market skills become stronger opponents of
the revision of privatization relative to those without
market skills.
In Columns 3 and 4, we report results from a pro-
bit estimation without country fixed effects, but with
the direct effect of the relevant institution included
and clusters by country (i.e., Equation (3)). The results
comport well with the results based on the fixed effects
estimation. Again, all interaction terms are negative
and statistically significant (with one exception: the co-
efficient on the interaction between professionals and
executive constraints is negative but insignificant). In
Column 5, we repeat this estimation using GLLAMM,
and despite the small number of second-level observa-
tions, the results are again consistent. Overall, the re-
sults strongly support the complementarity argument.
To illustrate the magnitude of our results, we predict
probabilities of support for revising privatization with
their confidence intervals for groups with high and low
market skills at each level of institutional quality using
Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations are based
on a probit estimation similar to the one reported in
19 That respondents in transition countries appear to be able to eval-
uate privatization in line with their material interests is an interesting
finding. Although privatization is a high-profile policy that is often
discussed in the media, it is also a technically complex policy that is a
“hard” issue for the public to decipher (Carmines and Stimson 1980).
Moreover, recent analyses of public support for privatization from
Latin America produce few consistent results (Boix 2005; Graham
and Sukhtankar 2004; Lora and Panizza 2003; Panizza and Yanez
2005).
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 (i.e., Equation (3)).20 Us-
ing the results of these simulations, we generated a
series of graphs. Figure 2 illustrates the differences in
the predicted probability of support for the revision of
privatization for individuals with and without market
skills under varying levels of democracy as measured
by POLITY IV’s executive constraints variable. The
graphs in the left column from the top to the bottom
present predicted probabilities of support for revising
privatization for (1) professionals compared to non-
professionals, (2) entrepreneurs compared to nonen-
trepreneurs, and (3) a group of entrepreneurs and pro-
fessionals compared to a group of nonentrepreneurs
and nonprofessionals for each possible level of con-
straints on executives (in the range present in our data).
The graphs in the right column depict the change in the
predicted probability of supporting a revision of priva-
tization associated with a move from (1) a professional
to a nonprofessional, (2) an entrepreneur to a nonen-
trepreneur, (3) andanentrepreneuror aprofessional to
a nonentrepreneur and nonprofessional, for each level
of executive constraints with 95% confidence intervals.
The first thing to note from these graphs is that at low
levels of democracy there is no appreciable difference
in the attitudes toward the revision of privatization be-
tween professionals and nonprofessionals and between
entrepreneurs andnonentrepreneurs—groupswith and
without market skills have very high levels of support
for revising privatization. At the lowest level of con-
straints on executives (i.e., as in Uzbekistan), the rate
of support for the revision of privatization is at its peak
(70%) for all groups regardless of market skills. As
democracy becomes more robust, market skills begin
to matter. For example, when the executive constraint
score is at its maximum, which is the modal value for
countries in our sample, moving from a professional
to a nonprofessional increases the probability of sup-
porting the revision of privatization by 5 percentage
points and moving from an entrepreneur to a non-
entrepreneur increases this probability by 10 percent-
age points. The effect of market skills is especially pro-
nounced if we compare the support for revising privati-
zation between entrepreneurs and professionals as one
group and nonentrepreneurs and nonprofessionals as
the other group, as we do in the bottom row of Figure 2.
When the executive constraintsmeasure is at its peak, a
change from being either an entrepreneur or a profes-
sional to being a nonprofessional and nonentrepreneur
is associated with an increase in the predicted proba-
bility of support for revising privatization of about 15
percentagepoints (with 10being the lower boundof the
95% confidence interval). At this level of democracy,
40% of individuals in the group with low market skills
support revising privatization, whereas the rate of sup-
port for revising privatization is only about 25%among
20 The only difference is that simulations use clustering at the level
of PSUs rather than countries. For these simulations, we use Clarify
software designed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000); it does
not allow the use of clusters by country because there are only 27
countries. As reported in Table 2, the results are generally robust to
clustering by country and by PSU.
293
WhoWants To Revise Privatization? May 2009
TABLE 2. Interactions Effects for Institutions and Measures of Market Skills
Probability of Supporting Privatization Revision
Estimation Model: Probit Probit GLLAMM
Specification: Country Fixed Effects,
Cluster by PSU,
Bootstrapped SEs
Cluster
by Country,
Bootstrapped SEs
Two
Levels: Individual
and Country
Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients N obs.
Democratic institutions and
entrepeneur
(1) Democracy index −.0558∗∗∗ −.0222∗∗∗ −.0279∗∗∗
[.0185] [.0080]
Entrepeneur × Democracy index −.0433∗∗∗ −.0172∗∗∗ −.0396∗∗∗ −.0158∗∗∗ −.0400∗∗∗
[.0120] [.0123] [.0109]
Professional × Democracy index −.0191∗ −.0076∗ −.0159∗ −.0063∗ −.0182∗∗
[.0100] [.0094] [.0088] 22 457
(2) Voice & accountability −.3347∗∗∗ −.1332∗∗∗ −.3561∗∗∗
[.0972] [.0345]
Entrepeneur × Voice & accountability −.1468∗∗∗ −.0584∗∗∗ −.1351∗∗∗ −.0538∗∗∗ −.1415∗∗∗
[.0477] [.0490] [.0409]
Professional × Voice & accountability −.0932∗∗ −.0371∗∗ −.0911∗∗ −.0362∗∗ −.1000∗∗
[.0378] [.0443] [.0400] 23 387
(3) Executive constraints −.1208∗∗∗ −.0480∗∗∗ −.0893∗∗∗
[.0217] [.0084]
Entrepeneur × Executive constraints −.0689∗∗∗ −.0274∗∗∗ −.0544∗∗∗ −.0216∗∗∗ −.0670∗∗∗
[.0187] [.0187] [.0170]
Professional × Executive constraints −.0339∗∗ −.0135∗∗ −.0289 −.0115 −.0322∗
[.0168] [.0180] [.0170] 23 381
(4) Democracy Freedom House (FH) −.1665∗∗∗ −.0662∗∗∗ −.1315∗∗∗
[.0488] [.0176]
Entrepeneur × Democracy FH −.0730∗∗∗ −.0290∗∗∗ −.0742∗∗ −.0295∗∗ −.0692∗∗
[.0276] [.0308] [.0280]
Professional × Democracy FH −.0529∗∗ −.0210∗∗ −.0463∗ −.0184∗ −.0531∗∗
[.0207] [.0240] [.0213] 23 494
Governance institutions and
entrepeneur
(5) Government effectivness −.27 −.1074 −.1346∗∗∗
[.1824] [.0504]
Entrepeneur × Government −.1706∗∗ −.0679∗∗ −.1872∗∗ −.0745∗∗ −.1978∗∗
effectivness [.0664] [.0910] [.0911]
Professional × Government −.1508∗∗∗ −.0600∗∗∗ −.1620∗∗∗ −.0645∗∗∗ −.1478∗∗∗
effectivness [.0504] [.0570] [.0564] 23 387
(6) Rule of law −.1561 −.0621 −.2610∗∗∗
[.1394] [.0314]
Entrepeneur × Rule of law −.1813∗∗∗ −.0721∗∗∗ −.1762∗∗ −.0701∗∗ −.2065∗∗∗
[.0646] [.0687] [.0743]
Professional × Rule of law −.1495∗∗∗ −.0595∗∗∗ −.1726∗∗∗ −.0687∗∗∗ −.1534∗∗∗
[.0446] [.0525] [.0533] 23 387
(7) Control of corruption −.2579∗ −.1026∗ −.1876∗∗∗
[.1457] [.0273]
Entrepeneur × Control of corruption −.1518∗ −.0604∗ −.1802∗∗ −.0717∗∗ −.1621∗
[.0792] [.0881] [.0896]
Professional × Control of corruption −.1723∗∗∗ −.0685∗∗∗ −.1948∗∗∗ −.0775∗∗∗ −.1825∗∗∗
[.0540] [.0633] [.0584] 23 387
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TABLE 2. Continued
Probability of Supporting Privatization Revision
Estimation Model: Probit Probit GLLAMM
Specification: Country Fixed Effects,
Cluster by PSU,
Bootstrapped SEs
Cluster
by Country,
Bootstrapped SEs
Two
Levels: Individual
and Country
Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients
Marginal
Effects Coefficients N obs.
(8) Regulatory quality −.2471 −.0983 −.4007∗∗∗
[.1554] [.0423]
Entrepeneur × Regulatory quality −.1479∗∗∗ −.0588∗∗∗ −.1465∗∗ −.0583∗∗ −.1389∗∗∗
[.0536] [.0605] [.0516]
Professional × Regulatory quality −.1024∗∗∗ −.0407∗∗∗ −.1074∗∗ −.0427∗∗ −.0994∗∗
[.0376] [.0526] [.0426] 23 387
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
The first column indicates 8 separate regressions run for each model (one regression for each institutional variable).
All regressions include all individual-level factors from Table 1 as covariates. Only the coefficients of interest are reported in the table.
The full regression output is available from the authors. The estimated coefficients on “Entrepreneur” and “Professional” dummies
in every regression are as reported in Table 1 because we subtract the sample mean from the component variables before taking
cross-terms.
those with high market skills. The bottom right graph
shows that if the executive constraint measure falls be-
low 4 (the level of Russia), the differences in attitudes
toward privatization are not statistically significant for
those with and without market skills, whereas for a
level of constraints on executives above the level of
Russia, these differences are statistically significant.
Similar graphs in Figure 3 illustrate the results for
regulatory quality. Again, we see that the difference
in the rate of support for the revision of privatization
between nonprofessionals and professionals and be-
tween nonentrepreneurs and entrepreneurs increases
with the quality of the regulatory environment. More
specifically, as shown in the top row of Figure 3, mov-
ing from a professional to a nonprofessional increases
the predicted probability of supporting a revision of
privatization by about 2 percentage points when regu-
latory quality is at the 25th percentile (−.69, which is
approximately equal to the level of regulatory quality
in Georgia) and by about 7 percentage points when
regulatory quality is at the 75th percentile (.66, which
is approximately the level of the SlovakRepublic). The
middle row indicates that an increase in support for the
privatization status quo associated with moving from
an entrepreneur to a nonentrepreneur is even more
striking. At the level of regulatory quality of Georgia,
becoming an entrepreneur decreases support for re-
vising privatization by about 5 percentage points, but
at the level of regulatory quality of the Slovak Re-
public, this decrease is roughly 12 percentage points.
The graphs in the bottom row, again, indicate that the
greatest differences emerge if we combine different
aspects of market skills (i.e., professional status and
entrepreneurship): the corresponding difference in the
support for revising privatization for people with low
and high market skills at the levels of regulatory qual-
ity of Georgia and Slovak Republic are 7 and 18 per-
centage points, respectively. For the highest level of
regulatory quality in our sample (Estonia), the rate of
support for revising privatization is 35% for the group
with no market skills, whereas it is 15% for the group
with market skills. The differences in support for re-
vising privatization for the two groups become statisti-
cally significant at the level of regulatory quality above
Azerbaijan (−.85). The results using other measures of
democracy and quality of governance are similar.
Finally, we report estimations of support for revising
privatization using the two-stage method, as suggested
by Huber, Kernell, and Leoni (2005). Table 3 presents
coefficients from the second-stage estimation. The top
panel reports results using the measures of democracy,
and the bottom panel for the quality of governance
measures. The results for interactions between market
skills and institutions, reported in Columns 3 and 4,
are somewhat weaker but consistent in certain respects
with the probit and the GLLAMM results (reported in
Table 2). The coefficients on the interaction between
the measures of democracy and the dummy variable
for entrepreneurship reported are always negative, but
reach conventional levels of significance in only two
of four regressions (Column 3). (In a third regression,
the p-value of the estimated coefficient is .12.) The
coefficients on the interaction terms between our four
measures of democracy and a dummy variable for pro-
fessionals and top managers have the correct signs, but
are statistically insignificant (Column 4).
The coefficients on the interaction terms of our
measures of governance and the dummy variables for
entrepreneurs have the correct sign, but do not ap-
proach statistical significance (Column 3). In contrast,
the coefficients on the interaction terms between the
four governance measures and the dummy variable for
professionals and top managers are always significant
and negative. It is important to note that the loss of
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FIGURE 2. Predicted Effect of Interaction between Constraints on Executives and Market Skills on
Public Support for Revising Privatization
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Note: Graphs generated on the basis of probit estimation with clusters on PSU using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) software
“Clarify, 2003” available at http://gking.harvard.edu/. “Conf. Int.” indicates the 95% confidence interval around the change in the predicted
probability indicated by “Predicted.”
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FIGURE 3. Predicted Effect of Interaction between Regulatory Quality and Market Skills on Public
Support for Revising Privatization
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Note: Graphs generated on the basis of probit estimation with clusters on PSU using King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) software
“Clarify, 2003” available at http://gking.harvard.edu/. “Conf. Int.” indicates the 95% confidence interval around the change in the predicted
probability indicated by “Predicted.”
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TABLE 3. Second-Stage Estimates of the Direct Effects and Interactions, Borjas Weights
Direct Effect
(Intercept) Direct Effect
Evaluated at (Intercept)
Means of Evaluated at
Individual Female, 40 Years Interaction with
Characteristics in Old, from 5th Interaction with Professional or
Institutions Each Country Income Decile Entrepreneur Top Manager N Obs.
Democracy
Democracy index −.083 −.0864∗ −.0292∗∗ −.0084 26
[.0574] [.0476] [.0139] [.0164]
Voice & accountability −.8021∗∗∗ −.6893∗∗∗ −.1179 −.1185 27
[.2675] [.2419] [.0741] [.0836]
Executive constraints −.1691∗ −.1583∗∗ −.0402∗ −.0167 27
[.0890] [.0748] [.0228] [.0269]
Democracy Freedom House −.3417∗∗ −.2439∗ −.0225 −.0273 27
[.1580] [.1266] [.0566] [.0538]
Governance
Government effectivness −1.3285∗∗∗ −.8236∗ −.0589 −.3457∗∗ 27
[.4222] [.4022] [.1461] [.1253]
Rule of law −.8786∗∗∗ −.6753∗∗ −.1009 −.1912∗∗ 27
[.2968] [.2760] [.0934] [.0902]
Control of corruption −.9141∗∗ −.6289∗ −.0176 −.2561∗∗ 27
[.3326] [.3082] [.1132] [.0968]
Regulatory quality −1.1547∗∗∗ −.8354∗∗ −.1357 −.2077∗ 27
[.3563] [.3272] [.1161] [.1119]
GDP per capita, avg 1999–2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Privatization scale, 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Coefficients reported. Standard errors in brackets.∗significant at 10%;∗∗significant at 5%;∗∗∗significant at 1%. The baseline in
the first column is mean value for all individual characteristics calculated separately in each country; in the second column, it is a
40-year-old female from the 5th income decile. Coefficients are estimates using linear regression with Borjas weights. Each reported
coefficient is taken from a separate second-stage regression with controls for GDP per capita and extent of privatization.
statistical power is expected given the limitations of
having few (26 to 27) observations in the second-stage
regressions. Overall, a consistent pattern of results
emerges from the three different estimation proce-
dures, which supports the view of complementarity of
skills and institutions.
Direct Effect of the Institutional Environment
Thus far, we have examined the impact of market
skills on support for revising privatization under vary-
ing institutional environments, but have not looked
at whether institutions themselves are correlated with
support for the revision of privatization. If democracy
and good governance institutions help the population
at large to gain from reform, then one might expect
these national-level variables to be negatively associ-
ated with support for the revision of privatization.21
The two-stage model advocated by Huber et al. (2005)
permits an exploration of the direct effects of the
national-level variables on individual-level responses.
The estimates of the effect of national-level variables in
the two-stage method are not invariant to the scaling
of the individual-level variables. As the income dis-
21 This view is consistent with the complementarity argument. Both
low and high skilled benefit from economic reform, but the high
skilled benefit more under good governance and democracy, and are
therefore more ardent supporters of the privatization status quo.
tributions and demographic structures of the popula-
tion vary substantially across countries in our sample,
we present the results for an average respondent in
each country in Column 1 of Table 3 and for a re-
spondent who is a 40-year-old female from the 5th
income decile in Column 2 of Table 3. Each of our
four measures of democracy and governance signifi-
cantly reduces the levels of support for revising priva-
tization for a 40-year-old female, and this is also true
for an average respondent, with the exception of the
insignificant effect of the democracy index. Thus, on av-
erage, citizens inmore democratic and better governed
countries express lower levels of support for revising
privatization.22
The results on the direct effects of institutions are
merely suggestive of correlations and limited in at
least two important respects. First, and most impor-
tant, institutions are endogenous (as we discussed
previously). Second, the number of second-level ob-
servations (countries) is relatively small.
22 These estimates of the direct effects are consistent with the results
of other estimation procedures (i.e., GLLAMMand probit) reported
inTables 2 andA3. TableA3 in theAppendix reportsGLLAMMand
probit results without the interaction terms.Here, the only difference
with other reported results is that, in the probit estimations, the
coefficients of the direct effects of the governance variables are not
statistically significant with the exception of control of corruption,
which is marginally significant.
298
American Political Science Review Vol. 103, No. 2
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In the main part of our analysis, we focus on support
for the revision of privatization as a critical component
of opposition to economic reform, but our results apply
to public attitudes toward the market more generally.
In particular, the results hold if we use responses to
the following question in the survey as a dependent
variable:
With which of these statements do you agree most?
(1) A market economy is preferable to any other form of
economic system.
(2) Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be
preferable to a market economy.
(3) For people like me, it does not matter whether the eco-
nomic system is organized as a market economy or as a
planned economy.
We repeated our analysis using a dichotomous vari-
able that equals 1 if the respondent chose options 2 or
3, and 0, if the respondent chose option 1. This measure
is highly correlated in our baseline measure of support
for revision of privatization (the correlation coefficient
is about .18 with p-value substantially below 1%). The
results are robust to using support for the market as
a dependent variable. The signs of the coefficients of
interest are always the same, and themagnitudes of the
coefficients areoften a little smaller, but the coefficients
remain statistically significant in the vast majority of
cases. Note that some loss of statistical significance is
to be expected given a largermeasurement error in this
question, which ismore generally formulated and is not
directly focused on reform per se, but on the existence
of a market economy.
We also investigated whether institutions interact
with other commonly used measures of human capital:
education, age (as a proxy for experience), and health.
No significant interactions effects were found. These
results indicate that measures of human capital based
on age and education are poor proxies for market-
relevant skills in transition countries.
We further verified the robustness of our results by
limiting the age of respondents to 60 years and younger
to ensure that our results are not driven by the views
of the retired population.
We also experimented with different model spec-
ifications. Because we have few second-level obser-
vations, we are somewhat limited in the number of
independent variables that we can include in our es-
timations. Nevertheless, we also added variables for
gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1999 to
2006 and current levels of inequality to our estimations,
but these variables were not significantly related to
support for revising privatization and did not influence
our main results. Although our results do not indicate
that the impact of market skill on support for reform is
conditional on economic inequality, this result may be
specific to the postcommunist cases. Where economic
inequality is on average higher, as in Latin America,
the incentives for politicians to redistribute the gains
from reform obtained by the highly skilled may be
stronger because the median voter is more likely to
be low skilled (Meltzer and Richards 1981). This logic
is more compatible with the substitution hypothesis.
In contrast, where economic inequality is lower, as in
much of Western Europe, the complementarity logic
may have more bite.
We also examined whether the type of privatization
(voucher vs. nonvoucher) or the method of privatiza-
tion (sale vs. give away) influenced support for revising
privatizationdirectly and through interactionwithmar-
ket skills. These variables were generally unrelated to
support for the revision of privatization and did not
change our findings. However, capturing the type or
method of privatization with a single measure is diffi-
cult, and these measures are likely to be noisy.
We also repeated our analysis using interactions of
our national-level variables with only one of the two
measures of market skills at a time in separate estima-
tions. For example, instead of including interactions for
measures of democracy and entrepreneurship and for
democracy and professionals in each equation, we only
included the latter interaction. The levels of statistical
significance of our main variables of interest in our
estimations remain unchanged.
In addition, we applied a weighting scheme for the
summary statistics to account for the fact that the LiTS
data may be somewhat biased toward elderly and fe-
male respondents due to nonresponses, even though
the sample was originally constructed to be represen-
tative. In the baseline regressions, we do not apply this
weighting scheme, but instead introduce controls for
age and gender. When we use the weights in the re-
gression analysis, the results do not change.
The results are also robust to dropping the two most
authoritarian countries—Uzbekistan and Belarus—
from the sample and to using the most recent values
instead of the overtime averages for the institutional
indicators.
Overall, our results prove to be robust.
CONCLUSION
Identifying the determinants of support for economic
reform has been a central focus of recent research in
comparative political economy, but most studies rely
on data from too few countries to make it possible
to analyze the impact of national-level institutions on
individual preferences over policy. We take advantage
of a new data set that allows us to explore how democ-
racy and good governance interact with market skills
to shape preferences over economic policy in 28 post-
communist countries.We find that under autocracy and
bad governance, support for economic reform among
individuals with market-relevant skills is not different
than among individuals without market-relevant skills;
however, as the quality of democracy and governance
improves, the differences in support for economic re-
form between respondents with high and low market
skills become greater. Thus, market skills and good in-
stitutional environments are complements rather than
substitutes. These results hold not only for public
support for revising privatization, but also for a market
economy more generally.
Our results indicate that theories of the politics
of economic reform may benefit from a considera-
tion of how the institutional environment influences
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individual preferences over policy. Most works implic-
itly assume that groups benefiting or poised to benefit
from economic reform will support economic reform
regardless of the institutional setting, but our findings
indicate that preferences over economic policy are con-
ditional on the quality of democracy and governance.
That the impact of market skills depends on the in-
stitutional environment suggests that theories of the
politics of economic reform that rely on those with
more market-relevant skills to push for economic re-
form, may have limited relevance under autocracy and
in weak institutional environments. This is a poten-
tially important limitation because economic reforms
are often introduced in precisely these settings. Our
results indicate that constituencies in support of eco-
nomic reform may differ under democracy and good
governance, on the one hand, and under autocracy and
bad governance, on the other hand.
More generally, our study emphasizes the value of in-
tegrating national- and individual-level variables in the
study of support for economic policy. Whether these
results extend to policies beyond economic reform or
to other regions of the world is an open question, but
analyzing how skills and institutions interact to shape
support for policy change is an important agenda for
future research.
APPENDIX
TABLE A1. Description of Variables
(1) Main Variables of Interest
(1.1) Dependent variable
Support for privatization revision Dummy equals 1 if the respondent prefers to renationalize most privatized
companies and keep them in state hands or to renationalize most
privatized companies and reprivatize them again using a more
transparent process; 0 if the respondent prefers to leave most privatized
companies in the hands of current owners provided that they pay what
the assets are worth or to leave most privatized companies in the hands
of current owners without any change. Source: Life in Transition Survey
(LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006.
(1.2) Proxies for market skills
Professional or top manager Dummy equals 1 if in 2006 the respondent was within working age and
worked for wages in an occupation that requires high skills (i.e.,
legislators, senior government officials, enterprise managers,
director/chief executives, owners of business, physicists, engineers,
mathematicians, architects, computing professionals, medical doctors,
dentists, pharmacists, teachers, lawyers, accountants, authors,
professionals and similar occupations), 0 otherwise. Source: Life in
Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006.
Entrepreneur or self-employed Dummy equals 1 if the respondent moved to self-employment and
entrepreneurship before 2006. We only refer to working-age respondents
(i.e., respondents with an age between 18 and 60 years for any year)
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006.
(1.3) Democracy institutions
Democracy index Average index of democracy for 1991–2004. Ranging from 0 to 10 with
higher values corresponding to more democratic outcomes. The index is
derived from averaging the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints
on the chief executive (xconst). Source: Polity IV data set, variable
‘democ’, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Executive constraints Extent of the institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of
chief executives. Average index for 1992–2004. Ranging from 1 (no
regular limitations on the executive’s actions) to 7 (accountability groups
have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most
areas of activity). Source: Polity IV data set, variable ‘xconst’,
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
Democracy Freedom House Average democratic progress score for 1998–2006, whose scale from 1 to 7
was inverted such that 1 represents the lowest and 7 the highest level of
democratic progress. The democracy score is an average of expert
ratings (by Freedom House staff members and a panel of academic
advisers) for electoral process, civil society, independent media, national
democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework
and independence, and corruption. Contrary to Polity IV, it provides a
separate score for Serbia and Montenegro. Source: Freedom House,
Nations in Transit, www.freedomhouse.org.
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TABLE A1. Continued
Voice & accountability Voice & accountability represents the extent to which a country’s citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and free media. Higher values
correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000,
2002–2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006).
(1.4) Governance institutions
Government effectiveness Government effectiveness represents the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002–2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2006).
Rule of law Rule of law represents the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.
Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002–2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2006).
Control of corruption Control of corruption represents the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes. Avg. for 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002–2005. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2006).
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality represents the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development. Higher values correspond to better governance
outcomes. Avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002–2005. Source: Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006).
(2) Other Individual-Level Variables (Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), EBRD and World Bank, 2006.)
(2.1) Human capital
Age Age of the respondent.
Educational degree Highest educational degree obtained by the respondent, compressed to
following categories: (1) below secondary; (2) secondary education; (3)
professional, vocational school/training, (4) higher (university, college,
post graduate).
Self-reported poor health status Subjective assessment of the respondent’s health conditions: (1) very good,
(2) good, (3) medium, (4) bad, (5) very bad.
(2.2) Transition-related employment history
Number of jobs, 1989–2006 Number of jobs for respondents worked for wages (for an employer) in any
of the years from 1989 to 2006. A different job is defined by a different
occupational position working for the same employer, by a change in the
ownership type of the enterprise, and by a change of employer.
Years worked for wages in the state
sector, 1989–2006
Number of years (1989–2006) the respondent worked for wages in the state
sector (i.e., the state was the owner of the company).
Years worked for wages in the private
sector, 1989–2006
Number of years (1989–2006) the respondent worked for wages in the
private sector (i.e., the owner of the company was a private one).
(2.3) Transition-related hardships
Years had to accept wage cuts or wage
arrears, 1989–2006
Number of years (1989–2006) the respondent had to accept wage cuts or
wage arrears.
Years had to sell household assets,
1989–2006
Number of years (1989–2006) the respondent had to sell some of the
household assets.
Years had to cut down on basic food
consumption, 1989–2006
Number of years (1989–2006) the respondent had to cut down on basic
food consumption.
(2.4) Assets
Ownership of a house or apartment Dummy indicating that any household member (including the respondent) is
the majority owner of a house (detached, semidetached, townhouse,
terrace house, apartment, or flat). This information is given by the head of
household (or another knowledgeable household member).
Wealth (deciles of per capita household
consumption)
Approximated by the within-country deciles of total household’s annualized
consumption expenditures per (equalized) household member. Children
younger than 14 years enter with a weight of .3. The information for
consumption expenditures is given by the head of household (or another
knowledgeable household member). Our measure of wealth ranges from
1 to 10 based on the expenditure decile in which a respondent is located.
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TABLE A1. Continued
Self-assessed difference wealth ranking
b/w 1989 and 2006
Subjective household’s wealth ranking on an imaginary ten-step ladder
(from the poorest to the richest), difference today with respect to 1989
(retrospective). This information is given by the head of household (or
another knowledgeable household member).
(2.5) Additional individual-level controls
Gender Gender of the respondent (0 = female, 1 = male).
Household size Number of household members.
Location Location of the interviewed household in a (1) metropolitan, (2) rural, or (3)
urban (excluding metropolitan) area.
Religion Religion of the respondent: (1) Christian, (2) Buddhist, (3)
atheistic/agnostic/none, (4) Muslim, (5) other.
Member of an ethnic minority Dummy indicating that the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority in this
country.
Unemployment, 2006 Dummy equals a value of 1 if the respondent is actively looking for a job at
the time of the survey.
(3) Country-Level Controls
Privatization scale in 2006 Degree of current privatization progress: large-scale plus small-scale
privatization in 2006. Large-scale privatization is ranked from 1 (little
private ownership) to 4+ (more than 75 % of enterprise assets in private
ownership with effective corporate governance). Small-scale privatization
is ranked from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (no state ownership of
small enterprises; effective tradability of land). Source: EBRD transition
indicators, www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.
GDP per capita in USD 1999–2006 Real GDP per capita in USD, avg. 1999–2006, Source: EBRD selected
economic indicators,
www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.
TABLE A2. Summary Statistics
# of
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Support for privatization revision 27,840 .46 .50 0 1
Entrepreneur or self-employed 27,640 .07 .26 0 1
Professional or top manager 27,590 .10 .31 0 1
Democracy index 26 5.82 3.22 .0 10.0
Executive constraints 27 5.32 1.77 1.0 7.0
Democracy Freedom House 27 3.99 1.52 1.8 6.5
Voice & accountability 27 −.06 .84 −1.6 1.1
Government effectiveness 27 −.24 .66 −1.2 .8
Rule of law 27 −.34 .66 −1.3 .8
Control of corruption 27 −.37 .61 −1.2 1.0
Regulatory quality 27 −.16 .83 −1.8 1.3
Privatization scale in 2006 28 7.12 1.10 3.3 8.3
GDP per capita in USD 1999–2006 28 3,405.74 3,149.27 255.9 13,506.4
Age 28,000 45.97 16.87 17 97
Educational degree 27,993 2.53 1.04 1 4
Self-reported poor health status 27,996 2.71 .99 1 5
Number of jobs, 1989–2006 27,611 1.09 .99 0 5
Years worked for wages in the state sector, 1989–2006 27,611 4.48 6.11 0 18
Years worked for wages in the private sector, 1989–2006 27,611 2.54 4.92 0 18
Years had to accept wage cuts or arrears, 1989–2006 27,450 .57 1.87 0 18
Years had to sell household assets, 1989–2006 27,450 .27 1.19 0 18
Years had to cut down on basic food consumption, 1989–2006 27,450 1.86 4.10 0 18
Ownership of a house or apartment 28,000 .85 .35 0 1
Wealth (deciles of per capita household consumption) 28,000 5.68 2.93 1 10
Self-accessed difference wealth ranking b/w 1989 and 2006 25,179 −1.37 2.47 −9 9
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) 28,000 .47 .50 0 1
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TABLE A2. Continued
# of
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Household size 28,000 2.81 1.66 1 12
Location = metropolitan 28,000 .22 .41 0 1
Location = rural 28,000 .40 .49 0 1
Location = urban (excluding metropolitan) 28,000 .37 .48 0 1
Religion = Christian 28,000 .65 .48 0 1
Religion = Buddhist 28,000 .02 .15 0 1
Religion = atheistic/agnostic/none 28,000 .11 .31 0 1
Religion = Muslim 28,000 .19 .39 0 1
Religion = other 28,000 .02 .14 0 1
Member of an ethnic minority 27,974 .10 .30 0 1
Unemployment, 2006 28,000 .09 .28 0 1
Note: For the summary statistics of individual-level variables, we apply weights to ensure that the population as a whole is
represented, taking into account the age and gender distribution of the population in each country (see EBRD 2007a, 6). The
summary statistics of country-level variables refer to averages over time. For the concrete time frame for each variable, see Table A1.
TABLE A3. Direct Effects of Institutions
Probability of Supporting Privatization Revision
Estimation Model: Probit GLLAMM
Specification: Cluster by Country, Two Levels:
Bootstrapped Individual and
SEs Country
Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients
Democracy
Democracy index −.0559∗∗∗ −.0222∗∗∗ −.0148
[.0180] [.0092]
Voice & accountability −.3355∗∗∗ −.1333∗∗∗ −.4293∗∗∗
[.0949] [.0496]
Executive constraints −.1221∗∗∗ −.0485∗∗∗ −.0719∗∗∗
[.0211] [.0099]
Democracy Freedom House −.1659∗∗∗ −.0660∗∗∗ −.1191∗∗∗
[.0483] [.0374]
Governance
Government effectivness −.257 −.1021 −.1597∗∗∗
[.1872] [.0561]
Rule of law −.1494 −.0594 −.2724∗∗∗
[.1374] [.0286]
Control of corruption −.2490∗ −.0989∗ −.3091∗∗∗
[.1500] [.0249]
Regulatory quality −.2435 −.0967 −.5227∗∗∗
[.1581] [.0472]
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
All regressions include all individual-level factors from Table 1 as covariates. Only the coefficients of
interest are reported in the table. The whole regression output is available from the authors.
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1. Introduction
In 1991, Shiller, Boycko and Korobov published an influential paper which com-
pared attitudes towards free markets in two random samples of population: the first
in New York City and the second in a pre-transition and suffering-from-severe-
shortages Moscow. The main conclusion of this study was that the Soviet people
surveyed had very similar attitudes towards free markets to those of the Americans.
In particular, in May 1990 – at the time of the survey – Soviets appeared to be no
more concerned about the fairness of free market prices and the possibility of a sub-
stantial rise in inequality as a result of the introduction of free markets. Further-
more, they appeared to have a similar or, perhaps, an even stronger appreciation of
the importance of economic incentives (Shiller et al., 1991, p. 399). Thus, the authors
suggested that the view that Soviets were not ready for the transition towards free
markets, which was very prominent at that time in the public debate, was incorrect.
Nineteen years have passed since this survey was conducted by Shiller et al. in
1990 and in a couple of years Russia will celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the
big bang price liberalization. It is useful to understand whether and how attitudes
of the Russian population towards free markets evolved since the beginning of the
transition. Are Russians satisfied with the transition and just as hopeful of free mar-
kets as they were in 1990? What accounts for the evolution of attitudes towards
markets? According to the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) conducted by the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank in 2006, after
having experienced transition, Russians now have the most negative attitudes
towards the free market and democracy among 28 transition countries. Figure 1
illustrates this point.2 Although, there are no recent studies which compare atti-
tudes towards free markets between Russians and Americans, it is safe to assume
that Russians have grown a lot more anti-market since the Shiller et al. (1991) sur-
vey, as it is unlikely that the United States would compare so unfavourably with
the 27 transition countries included in LITS.
In this paper, we use evidence from a large-scale (over 10,000 respondents) rep-
resentative survey of the Russian population, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms), to illustrate the attitudes of Rus-
sians towards transition, government regulation of markets and direct involvement
of the state in the economy. The RLMS is a survey of the living standards of Rus-
sia’s population and provides comparable data for both a repeated cross-section
and a panel of individuals; with data from 12 rounds between 1994 and 2007 used
for research by many scholars. In 2006, a series of questions were added to the
questionnaire on this single reason to inquire directly about the people’s assess-
ment of various aspects of transition and their preferences towards regulation ver-
sus the free market. We focus on these questions in this paper.
2 For a detailed report on the results of the LITS survey, see EBRD (2007).
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Despite the overwhelming evidence of the economic success of transition in
Russia in the last decade (we survey this evidence next), we find that the Russian
population is divided in its assessment of the transition. About one-half is disap-
pointed with the results of the transition and has nostalgia about life under the
communist regime. Russians exhibit a lot more unanimity in their attitudes towards
the role of the state in the economy. The vast majority of the population opts for a
very high level of state intervention into all spheres of economic life ranging from
price regulation to direct involvement of the government in economic production.
A perception that the state should be more involved in the economy is, however,
combined with a deep distrust in specific state institutions and the recognition of a
high and increasing level of corruption.
We apply the theoretical framework developed in a recent paper by Aghion
et al. (2009) to interpret these basic facts. They built a model which showed that the
Armenia
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Croatia
czechrep
Fyrom
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Moldova
Montenegro
Lithuania
PolandRomania
Serbia
Belarus
Russia
Slovakrep
Slovenia
Estonia
Mongolia
Azerbaijan
Albania
tajikistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 p
eo
le
 w
ith
 p
re
fe
re
nc
e 
fo
r m
ar
ke
t e
co
no
m
y
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Fraction of people with preference for democracy
Figure 1. Support for free markets and democracy across transition countries
Notes: The figure summarizes the proportions of respondents by country who chose option (1) to the follow-
ing two questions [those who chose option (3) are not included for calculation of the mean by country]: (a)
With which one of the following statements do you agree most: (1) ‘Democracy is preferable to any other
form of political system’; (2) ‘Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to
a democratic one’; (3) ‘For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or
authoritarian’. (b) With which one of the following statements do you agree most: (1) ‘A market economy is
preferable to any other form of economic system’; (2) ‘Under some circumstances, a planned economy may
be preferable to a market economy’; (3) ‘For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system
is organized as a market economy or as a planned economy’.
Source: Life in Transition Survey (http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/lits.htm)
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lack of social capital drives the demand for government regulation in countries
with corrupt and inefficient governments. Regulation, in turn, has a feedback effect
on social capital by lowering private incentives to invest in civicness. Two equilib-
ria emerge in this model: one with low regulation and high trust and another with
high regulation and low trust. A deregulation in a country characterized by low
trust necessarily increases demand for regulation which moves it to the high-regu-
lation-and-low-trust equilibrium. We test the implications of the Aghion et al.
(2009) model on the individual-level data from the RLMS and find strong support
for their story. The level of distrust in various groups across individuals and locali-
ties in Russia is significantly correlated with the individual attitudes towards regu-
lation and government involvement in the economy, even after controlling for
individual-level characteristics. Moreover, general attitudes towards transition also
co-vary with trust in government institutions and in private business. These find-
ings contribute to a large literature which links government performance to trust
and social capital (see Banfield, 1958; Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1993).3
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the evidence based on
the World Values Survey (WVS) and the LITS multi-country surveys of individuals
presented in Aghion et al. (2009) and Pinotti (2009). Unlike these two papers, we
rely on data from a large-scale survey in a single country, Russia. Our approach has
both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages are as follows. First,
studying within-country variation considerably reduces the scope of unobserved
cultural variation, which may be correlated with social capital and has a direct
effect on attitudes towards free markets and regulation. Second, the RLMS allows
us to utilize a richer set of measures of social capital than in the other surveys.
Third, the large sample from within one country ensures representativeness at a
country level which is harder to guarantee with smaller samples. The main disad-
vantage is that the variation in social capital and the demand for regulation is a lot
smaller among localities in a single country, even one as large as Russia, as com-
pared with variation among countries.
Our paper is also related to the literature on determinants of perceptions in tran-
sition economies. This literature includes Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), who
show how the legacy of communism shaped the attitudes of East German residents
about the paternalism of the state, Grosjean and Senik (2008) who show that democ-
racy increases public support for the market in transition economies (based on
LITS), Guriev and Tsyvinsky (2009), who study the determinants of the anti-
Western attitudes of the Russian population, Grosfeld and Senik (2008), who iden-
tify and explain the change in the relationship between individual satisfaction with
the state of the country’s economy and income inequality in transition using data
from Poland. Individual determinants of perceptions in Russia based on RLMS are
3 For early empirical contributions, see Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997). Examples of more
recent works include: Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Guiso et al. (2004, 2006), Tabellini (2005) and Bloom et al.
(2009).
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studied by Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), who seek to explain support for govern-
mental redistribution, and Senik (2004), who studies individual determinants of
subjective life satisfaction.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic facts about the
attitudes of Russians towards the transition and free markets by summarizing the
RLMS responses. Section 3 interprets these findings in light of the theory developed
by Aghion et al. (2009) and tests its predictions using the RLMS data. Section 4 out-
lines the conclusions of our findings.
2. Basic facts: what do Russians think about transition?
2.1 Background
There is a large literature describing the economic effects of transition on many
aspects of economic life of different groups in Russia’s population (see, for instance,
a collection of papers in Aslund and Kuchins, 2009; and references cited therein;
Commander et al., 1999; Eggers et al., 2006). Two recent studies, Shleifer and Treis-
man (2005) and Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), summarize data from a multitude
of sources to illustrate the economic success of Russia’s transition. First, these
papers argue that the official data on the initial output fall (official per capita GDP
fell by 39 percent between 1991 and 1998) understate Russia’s economic perfor-
mance during the initial period of transition. In particular, Shleifer and Treisman
(2005) name two important reasons for this: (1) the value of Russia’s output before
transition was overstated as it summed up wasteful government investment at arbi-
trarily inflated prices; and (2) the initial output fall after transition was overstated
as official statistics failed to account for the rise in unofficial economic activity. Sec-
ond, in the decade which preceded the current global economic crisis, Russia’s real
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an impressive rate of 7 percent
per year on average whereas real per capita consumption exhibited an even higher
growth rate.
More importantly, the proceeds of this economic growth were benefiting not
only the rich, but also disadvantaged groups of the population; namely, the poor,
the uneducated and the elderly. Real incomes and life satisfaction of these disad-
vantaged groups were also rising. To illustrate these points (originally made by
Shleifer and Treisman, 2005, and Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009), we summarize
the dynamics of the average real incomes and the average level of a measure of life
satisfaction (namely, the response to the question ‘All in all, how satisfied are you
with your life now?’) for different groups of the RLMS respondents in Panel A of
Figure 2. The graphs plot the coefficients of survey round dummies (along with
their 95 percent confidence intervals) in ordinary least square (OLS) regressions.
The first of the three graphs is generated using the results of an OLS regression with
individual fixed effects for the whole sample, and, therefore, represents the change
What Do Russians Think About Transition? 253
 2010 The Authors
Journal compilation  2010 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
in income and life satisfaction for an average RLMS respondent. The second and
third graphs use results of the OLS regressions without individual fixed effects, but
on the sub-samples of respondents in relative poverty (that is, respondents with
income below one-half of the median ‘equivalized’ disposable income) and the old
(that is, respondents aged over 60 years) in every round of the survey. Life satisfac-
tion and income rose substantially and (almost) monotonically for the average
RLMS respondent since 1998 and so did the incomes and life satisfaction of the
elderly and of the people at the bottom of the income distribution.4 Real per capita
household income of the respondents in relative poverty had nearly tripled
between 1998 and 2006, whereas for an average RLMS respondent it increased
about 1.8 times. This fact is consistent with recent evidence on declining income
inequality in Russia (Gorodnichenko et al., 2009; World Bank, 2005).
The fact that RLMS respondents have become richer and more satisfied with
their lives is a very important indication of the broad-based positive effects of eco-
nomic growth. The reason for this is that in the RLMS, just as in almost every other
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), the rich are heavily under-repre-
sented (Deaton, 2005). Thus, the RLMS data support the conclusions of Shleifer and
Treisman (2005) and Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) that economically Russia has
done well (particularly in the second half of its transition period) and the disadvan-
taged groups have received at least some benefits from this economic success. With
this in mind, we now turn to summarizing how the RLMS respondents – whose
incomes and life satisfaction rose steadily over nine years – evaluate the transition
process, their own place in it and their attitudes towards the roles of the state and
of free markets in the economy.
2.2 An overall assessment of the transition
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the answers of RLMS respondents to questions
about their general assessments of the transition. The questions are listed in the left
column, while the possible answers along with the percentage of respondents who
chose each particular answer are reported in the rest of the columns. Note that as
the number of respondents is above 10,000, the standard errors on the reported per-
centages are tiny, and therefore, all the differences between percentages of people
who chose different answers to each question are statistically significant.
The most general assessment of transition is given by the answers to the ques-
tion: ‘How did the economic and social changes of the last 15 years affect your life?’
4 It is important to note that, since the second wave of the RLMS data started in 1994, they are insufficient to
assess the dynamics of the individual incomes in the early stages of the transition period (that is, before
1994); thus, for that purpose, we rely on other studies, for example, Shleifer and Treisman (2005) who argue
that even by the most conservative estimates living standards of Russians bypassed the pre-transition level
in the early 2000s. It is interesting to note that there is an apparent slowdown in the rise of life satisfaction
around 2002–2003. More research is needed to understand this phenomenon. (Grosfeld and Senik, 2008, find
a similar pattern in Poland).
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Figure 2. Dynamics of real incomes, life satisfaction and the perceptions of social
cooperation.
Notes: Panel A: Life satisfaction (left scale) and real income (right scale) for all respondents, the respondents
in relative poverty and the elderly. Panel B: Assessment of a possibility of cooperation and understanding
between the poor and rich for all respondents, the respondents in relative poverty and the elderly on the scale
from 1 to 5 where 1 is ‘surely possible’ and 5 is ‘surely impossible’. The values for 1997 and 1999 are simple
linear interpolations as the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) did not take place in these
years. For each series, we present the 95 percent confidence interval along with the mean estimate. ‘Relative
poverty’ refers to respondents with income below one-half of the median disposable income and ‘the old’
refers to respondents over 60 years of age. The real income is measured in 1992 Russian rubles.
Source: RLMS.
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Only 19 percent of Russians think that their lives ‘strongly improved’ or ‘improved’
as a result of the transition, whereas 49 percent think that the transition ‘worsened’
or ‘strongly worsened’ their life.
This general picture translates also into the assessment of individual success
since the start of transition: 55 percent of the respondents ‘disagree’ or ‘completely
disagree’ with the statement that they live better now than before 1991, while only
23 percent ‘agree’ or ‘completely agree’ with this statement. One finds a similar
level of disagreement with the statement that ‘Most people live better now than
before the reforms of 1991’.
Respondents were asked to mark their relative income position on an imaginary
nine-step wealth ladder at present and before the start of the transition. The vast
majority of the sample feels that they have become poorer relative to others. The
overall perceived wealth distribution shifts to the left and becomes more
right-skewed, indicating a sharp increase in subjective income inequality. The share
of respondents who placed themselves on the top five steps of the ladder as of 1991
was 60.4 percent, whereas only 36 percent of respondents viewed themselves as
being on these top five steps in 2006. In addition, the share of respondents who
considered themselves as very poor (that is, on the first two steps of the ladder) in
2006 is more than twice as large as the share of those who thought of themselves as
being very poor in 1991: 16.2 versus 7.5 percent.
The following question sheds further light on evaluating the situation at present
compared with that before transition: ‘Would you like your kids to grow up in an
environment like the modern Russia or like the Soviet Union?’ About one-half of
the respondents would prefer their kids to grow up in the Soviet Union.
As most of the objective data show that the majority of Russians in economic
terms are better off today than they were before the transition (Guriev and Zhu-
ravskaya, 2009; Shleifer and Treisman, 2005), the respondents must be assessing
transition and its effect on their lives on more than these economic criteria alone.
As we argue next (in Section 3), the social environment and, in particular, the lack
of civic engagement and trust may be responsible for such a negative assessment of
transition by the Russian population.
Two questions are aimed at figuring out the perceptions of people about the
change in social capital between pre-transition and 2006; both of them indicate a
perceived sharp decrease in social capital (see Panel B of Table 1). First, respon-
dents were asked about their general trust in people in 2006 compared with 1991:
38 percent of respondents say that most people could be trusted whereas 39 per-
cent of respondents say that one could not be too careful in dealing with people in
1991. In contrast, in 2006 only 16 percent say that most people could be trusted
and 58 percent say that one could not be too careful in dealing with people at the
time of the survey. (The rest of the respondents chose the option that it ‘depends
on personality’.) Second, respondents were asked about their opinion on what
was most respected in the Russian society before transition and at the time of the
survey. Possible answers were: ‘money and power’, ‘honesty and decency’, ‘talent,
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hard work and knowledge’, ‘wisdom’ and ‘none of the above’. ‘Honesty and
decency’ is the most popular answer for the Soviet Union; 43.6 percent of respon-
dents chose this option. In contrast, only 13.4 percent of respondents thought that
‘honesty and decency’ was most respected in 2006. The next most popular answer
for the Soviet Union was ‘talent, hard work and knowledge’; 39.5 percent of
respondents chose this response. Only 8.4 percent of respondents thought that
‘talent, hard work and knowledge’ were most respected in 2006. ‘Money and
power’ is the most popular answer for 2006 with 72.1 percent of respondents
making this selection.
A word of caution is in order here. It is quite possible that people have for-
gotten the true level of social capital in the Soviet Union and owing to the hard-
ships of transition they tend to overestimate trust before transition. Given the
widespread snitching and under-cover KGB agents in all organizations, a rela-
tively high level of trust was quite unlikely. In addition, according to a very pop-
ular joke in the Soviet Union, the state pretended to pay workers, while workers
pretended to work. Therefore, the fact that talent, hard work and knowledge
were so much respected in the old days than now also may be the result of a
recall bias.
2.3 Attitudes towards regulation and direct involvement of the state
Panel C of Table 1 summarizes the attitudes of Russians towards free markets com-
pared with state regulation and towards the private provision of goods and services
compared with state provision. The survey asked a series of questions: ‘Should the
government or the market set prices for utilities, fuel, food and housing?’ State con-
trol over prices is overwhelmingly popular in Russia. Between 80 percent of the
population (for food prices) and 95 percent (for utilities) think that the state should
set prices for these particular goods and services rather than the free market. These
percentages are rather high, given that the majority of the population should still
remember the basic economics lesson that they got at the start of transition when
empty shelves in the shops, long lines for basic consumer goods and coupons for
food rationing disappeared overnight as prices were freed on 1 January 1992. One
should note, however, that as time progressed, people may have disassociated price
regulation and shortages. It would have been even more informative if the question
reminded the respondents of the possible costs of price controls. For instance, the
question on price regulation in the Shiller et al. (1991) survey included such a
reminder. Nonetheless, the basic fact is that the RLMS responses indicate a high
demand for state price regulation.
A set of questions inquired about respondents’ opinions on whether the state or
private firms should be responsible for the provision of employment and various
goods and services (such as the provision of medical care, the provision of garbage
collection and the building of roads). The list of possible answers consisted of:
‘mainly state’, ‘mainly private’, ‘both equally’ and ‘does not matter; only quality
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matters’. ‘Mainly state’ was the most popular answer for all of these activities. The
share of respondents who think that the state should be responsible for providing
employment is 50 percent. As far as goods and services are concerned, the
percentages of respondents who chose ‘mainly state’ are as follows: for garbage
collection – 45; roads – 51 and medical care – 60 percent. The maximum percentage
of respondents who chose ‘mainly private’ is 4.1 percent and it is for garbage
collection.
Finally, respondents were asked about their opinion on what should be done
with the majority of previously privatized enterprises. The list of possible answers
included: (1) ‘leave in the hands of current owners with no change’; (2) ‘leave in the
hands of current owners, but make them pay the assets’ worth’; (3) ‘re-nationalize
and keep in state hands’; and (4) ‘re-nationalize and then re-privatize again using a
cleaner procedure’. ‘Re-nationalize and keep in state hands’ was chosen by 51.9
percent of the respondents. This figure is consistent with the results from the LITS
survey (see Denisova et al., 2009a,b, who study the determinants of preferences
towards legitimacy of privatization using LITS data).
Overall, we find that the vast majority of the Russian population demands price
controls for basic goods and services and about one-half of the Russian population
also demands direct involvement of the state in the provision of goods, services
and employment.
2.4 The level of trust in state institutions and private business,
perceptions of corruption
Given that the majority of Russian people demand increased state regulation and
direct state involvement in the economy as a provider of goods and services, it is of
interest to find out how much trust people have in various state institutions and
how much trust they have in private business. Overall, we find that trust in govern-
ment institutions and in private business is rather low.
Panels D and E of Table 1 summarize responses to questions on this topic.
First, respondents were asked directly how much they trust different institutions
and groups. Only 38, 25 and 21 percent say that they ‘trust’ or ‘rather trust’ the
government, courts and police, respectively; whereas, 29, 37 and 49 of respon-
dents say that they ‘distrust’ or ‘rather distrust’ these state institutions.5 (The rest
of the respondents say that they ‘neither trust nor distrust’.) The level of trust in
private business is comparable and even slightly lower than in government insti-
tutions. Approximately, 33, 41 and 48 percent of the respondents say that they
‘distrust’ or ‘rather distrust’ domestic banks, small business and insurance
companies. The corresponding percentages for ‘trust’ and ‘rather trust’ are 34, 22
and 21, respectively.
5 Here (and next), ‘rather trust’ refers to a situation in which a person is just slightly inclined to trust.
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In addition, we find that there is an overriding concern about corruption:
73.8 percent of Russians do not agree that the level of corruption has declined
in the past few years and only 20 percent disagree with the statement that
judges are corrupt.6
Respondents were also asked if they feel that it is possible to achieve
understanding and cooperation between the rich and the poor and between
the ‘common’ people and the people with political power. One-half of Russia’s
population (50.1 percent to be precise) think that understanding and coopera-
tion between common people and people in power is impossible; a slightly
lower share of Russians (41.5 percent) think that cooperation and understand-
ing between the rich and the poor is impossible (see Panel B of Table 1).
These two questions, unlike all the other ones that we describe in this paper,
were asked consistently in each of the rounds in 1994, 1996 and 1998 of the
RLMS surveys and again in each round after 2001. Thus, we can trace the
dynamics of the answers. Panel B of Figure 2 presents the mean response to
the question about the possibility of cooperation between the rich and the
poor over time on the scale from 1 to 5, where ‘surely possible’ was given
the value of 1 and ‘surely impossible’ was given the value of 5. An average
respondent assessed the possibility of cooperation most negatively around the
1998 crisis. In other years, this assessment stayed relatively constant around
the value of 3.5 (which is in between ‘in some circumstances’ and ‘rather
impossible’).7 It is worth noting that the dynamics of responses to the question
about possibility of cooperation between the ‘common’ people and those with
political power looks exactly the same (these results are available from the
authors upon request).
To summarize, the high demand for increased state intervention and govern-
ment regulation coexists with a rather low trust in government institutions and rec-
ognition of high and rising levels of corruption. The level of distrust in private
business is comparable and, for some questions, slightly higher than the level of
distrust in government. In the next section, we will interpret these findings in light
of the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009).
6 RLMS respondents report a rather high incidence of paying bribes while interacting with government
agencies. Bribes are especially common when people interact with road police: about 8 percent of respon-
dents interacted with road police and nearly 20 percent of those who encountered police report that they
always paid bribes and 41 percent report that they sometimes bribed. We do not use the question on the actual
level of bribery in our regression analysis next because it was asked only to people who encountered govern-
ment officials (14 percent of respondents), whereas we are interested in the perception of corruption among
all respondents irrespective of whether they had or had not met officials.
7 The relatively poor and the elderly, on average, are more negative about the possibility of cooperation than
the average respondent, but the dynamics of responses for these groups is slightly positive, that is, towards
a better possibility of cooperation. We describe how the individual characteristics explain the variation in
responses in Section 3.
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3. An economic explanation for these responses?
In the previous section, we showed that the Russian population demands high state
regulation and direct involvement of the state in the production of goods and ser-
vices even though the vast majority understands well that the government in Rus-
sia is corrupt and inefficient. A recent paper by Aghion et al. (2009) provides a
useful framework for understanding this puzzling phenomenon: why, it asks, do
individuals who recognize that government is corrupt and distrust it, nonetheless,
demand less market and more state?
3.1 The theoretical framework of Aghion et al. (2009)
In the model by Aghion et al. (2009), individuals have a choice to become civic or
uncivic, for instance, parents educate their children to be of either type. This choice
is not associated with a direct cost, for example, education is free. Once the choice
of type – civic or uncivic – is made, individuals decide whether to become entre-
preneurs or stay in routine production, that is working for a state-owned factory.
State-owned factories are unproductive but do not impose any externalities on the
society. Entrepreneurs, in contrast, may be productive or unproductive and, if unci-
vic, entrepreneurs can impose a negative externality on the society (by producing
poor-quality products or polluting). After the individual choices of civicness and
employment (entrepreneurship or state factory) are made and the productivity
level of the entrepreneurs is realized, society in an election decides whether to regu-
late entrepreneurs’ entry into the economy to curb externalities or not. If society
decides to regulate, regulation is administered by public officials, chosen randomly
from the society after all the individual choices are made. Public officials cannot
observe the level of productivity or the civic-mindedness of entrepreneurs. Civic
public officials always forbid entry, as they fear externalities. Entrepreneurs, who
were forbidden entry, come back to work in a state factory. Uncivic officials use
their position to collect bribes in exchange for allowing entry whereas uncivic entre-
preneurs agree to pay bribes and enter.
Equilibrium in the model by Aghion et al. (2009) is characterized by the fraction
of civic individuals in the society, the level of regulation, externalities and output
produced by entrepreneurs who entered the market. There are two equilibria in this
model: (1) with mass civicness, no regulation, no externalities and a high level of
production (good equilibrium); and (2) with mass uncivicness, regulation, external-
ities and relatively low level of production (bad equilibrium). To understand the
nature of these equilibria, note that if there is no regulation, all entrepreneurs enter
and all uncivic ones impose externalities. In contrast, if there is regulation, civic
entrepreneurs do not enter (as they refuse to pay bribes), whereas only those unci-
vic entrepreneurs enter who are regulated by an uncivic official (as civic officials
ban entry) and who are sufficiently productive to find paying bribes worthwhile.
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Thus, if the level of uncivicness in the society is high, it is optimal for the society
to regulate and it is optimal for individuals to become uncivic. This is because civic
individuals are engaged only in state production and do not earn anything as pub-
lic officials, whereas uncivic individuals can earn extra money as entrepreneurs if
sufficiently productive and/or by collecting bribes as public officials. In contrast, if
the level of uncivicness is low, there is no additional benefit for individuals to
become uncivic. If civic individuals are just an epsilon more productive than unci-
vic ones (which could happen, for instance, if production involves some social
interaction), it is optimal for individuals to become civic. Thus, uncivicness creates
demand for regulation even though officials are corrupt and regulation is ineffec-
tive (in other words, it does not allow for externalities).
3.1.2 Interpretation of basic facts in light of the Aghion et al. (2009)
framework
Overall, the basic facts about the views of Russians that we presented in the previ-
ous section are described fully by the bad equilibrium in the model by Aghion et al.
(2009). In this bad equilibrium, rational individuals, who distrust business and gov-
ernment, demand state regulation and production via state enterprises rather than
private entrepreneurs even though they understand well that the government is
corrupt and inefficient.
The model by Aghion et al. (2009) also explains the (perceived) deterioration of
social capital and the increase in corruption since the beginning of Russia’s transi-
tion. If liberalization occurs in a low trust environment, the economy is predicted to
converge to a bad equilibrium. Therefore, one should expect an increase in corrup-
tion and further deterioration of social capital (as more people would choose to
become uncivic) before the economy reaches the steady state.
3.2 Tests of the theory
The main implication of the model by Aghion et al. (2009) for empirical analysis is
that distrust in government, distrust in business, corruption, demand for regulation
and regulation should all be positively correlated. To be more precise, as the model
has multiple equilibria and in each equilibrium all agents have the same level of
distrust, the empirical prediction is about the variation among economies in differ-
ent equilibria. Indeed, Aghion et al. (2009) show that variation in distrust, regula-
tion, demand for regulation and corruption across countries is consistent with the
predictions of the model.
Our aim here is to test the implications of the model by Aghion et al. (2009)
using the RLMS data, which cover only one country. There are two alternative
approaches to thinking about within-country variation with reference to Aghion
et al. (2009). The first and the most straightforward approach is to think about
Russia – which is a large federation – as a collection of local economies. In this
case, the model predicts variation in equilibria among these local economies. With
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the RLMS data at hand, we can think about each primary sampling unit (PSU) as
a local economy, and, therefore, can run individual-level regressions with a clus-
tering of error terms at the PSU level. Another possible level at which to consider
local economies would be the level of Russia’s regions, that is, sub-national
administrative units. The RLMS, however, is not representative at the regional
level and, therefore, we use data from another source: the ‘Public Opinion Foun-
dation’ polling company (FOM, http://english.fom.ru), which collected data on
the level of general trust for representative samples of individuals in 68 Russian
regions.
The alternative approach is to introduce heterogeneous beliefs about the level of
social capital in the society for individuals as was done in Pinotti (2009) who
assumes that there is an idiosyncratic component in an individual’s belief about the
share of civic (trustworthy in Pinotti’s terminology) individuals in the economy. In
other words, people are not completely sure about which equilibrium the economy
is in and have heterogeneous beliefs about it. In this case, the individual variation
in distrust should explain the individual demand for regulation and individual per-
ceptions of corruption. Those who believe that the share of civic (trustworthy) peo-
ple in the economy is relatively large expect relatively low negative externalities
from private business and, hence, have relatively low individual demand for regu-
lation. In contrast, those who believe that business is not to be trusted expect large
negative externalities and hence demand regulation, but also expect higher corrup-
tion.
Thus, we perform a series of tests. First, we test whether the individual
demand for regulation and state provision of goods and services positively corre-
lates with individual distrust in business, individual distrust in state institutions
and other individual-level perceptions of social capital (such as the perceived
degree of social cooperation) as well as individual perceptions of corruption. Sec-
ond, we test whether individual demand for regulation is associated with regio-
nal-level general distrust (from FOM data). Third, we test whether our measures
of distrust are also positively correlated with perceptions of corruption. In all
regressions, we allow for a clustering of error terms at the level of PSUs because,
as we discussed before, individual attitudes within localities are not independent.
We perform all of these tests controlling for a wide range of individual character-
istics, such as age, education, income, labour market status and labour market
history. We expect these individual controls to have an independent direct effect
on demand for regulation and state involvement in the economy owing to varia-
tion in ideology or potential material benefits from state redistribution (for the
role of individual attributes, see Fleisher et al., 2005; Graham and Pettinato,
2002).
3.2.1 Individual characteristics as determinants of the variation in attitudes
To illustrate the importance of controlling for individual characteristics, before
testing the implication of the Aghion et al. (2009) model, we report the results of
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regressions in which people’s attitudes are regressed on individual characteristics
only. Table 2 presents the results of selected probit regressions with general
attitudes towards the transition (Column 2), attitudes towards the regulation of
Table 2. Individual determinants of attitudes. Marginal effects
General
attitudes
towards
transition:
worsened life
Price
regulation:
housing
Direct
involvement
of the state:
garbage
removal
Age 0.025 [5.85]*** 0.001 [1.58] )0.003 [1.50]
Age-squared )0.0001 [4.93]*** )0.0001 [1.01] )0.0001 [3.00]***
Education [compared with ‘Secondary and below’]
‘Junior and Secondary professional’ )0.003 [0.23] 0.000 [0.02] )0.038 [2.92]***
‘University and higher’ 0.011 [0.42] )0.031 [4.27]*** )0.102 [5.36]***
Used personal computer last 12 months )0.069 [3.90]*** )0.031 [4.93]*** )0.047 [2.86]***
Used the internet last 12 months )0.039 [1.50] )0.026 [4.23]*** )0.016 [0.76]
Self-reported health [1 – poor, 5 – excellent] )0.1 [8.07]*** )0.005 [1.30] )0.003 [0.41]
log of per capita household consumption )0.089 [7.95]*** )0.008 [3.15]*** )0.051 [5.38]***
Employment [compared with ‘Work for wages in public sector’]
‘Work for wages in private sector’ 0.004 [0.25] )0.009 [1.36] )0.028 [1.48]
‘Unemployed’ 0.172 [5.32]*** )0.019 [1.62] 0.054 [1.77]*
‘Out of labour force’ 0.097 [3.74]*** )0.019 [3.47]*** 0.018 [1.08]
Has experience as
entrepreneur or self-employed
)0.006 [0.26] )0.018 [2.71]*** )0.044 [2.38]**
Had to accept less-qualified job 0.114 [6.08]*** )0.006 [0.96] )0.009 [0.48]
Got job in new sector )0.091 [3.85]*** )0.025 [3.29]*** )0.06 [2.74]***
Gender [man compared with woman] 0.009 [0.96] )0.018 [3.80]*** )0.032 [2.66]***
Location [urban compared with rural] 0.022 [0.42] )0.019 [1.65]* 0.008 [0.15]
PSU dummies Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 7329 10019 10127
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.12 0.09
log-likelihood )4417.34 )2347.66 )6276.84
LR chi-square 2407.95 39729.56 123342.49
Notes: Probit model. Marginal effects are reported. Absolute value of z-statistics is in brackets. Robust
Huber–White standard errors, clustered on primary sampling units (PSUs). PSU fixed effects are included.
*Significant at 10 percent.
**Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.
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housing prices (Column 3) and towards whether mainly the state should orga-
nize removal of garbage (Column 4) as dependent variables. Using other mea-
sures of attitudes towards government regulation or state involvement in the
economy generates very similar results. Throughout the analysis, we dichotomize
the independent variables to ease the interpretation of the results (for detailed
variable descriptions and summary statistics, see the Appendix). The table
reports the marginal effects from the probit regressions with PSU fixed effects (to
condition on locality-level institutional variation) and with clustering of error
terms at the level of PSU (to control for correlation of errors within localities).
As one would expect, we find that individual attitudes are affected by human
capital, income and labour market experiences of respondents. In particular, the
elderly are more likely to report that transition worsened their lives although they
differ less from the young with respect to price regulation and direct state involve-
ment. The more educated are not more pro-transition but are less pro-state both in
terms of price regulation and direct state involvement. Exposure to more diverse
and free sources of information via computer and internet usage makes people
more pro-transition and adds to the effect of higher education when state regula-
tion is concerned. The unemployed have a higher probability to report that the
transition worsened their lives as compared with those who work for wages. They
are also more supportive of direct state involvement in the provision of services.
Within the work-for-wages sector, those who work in private firms tend to
support the idea of price regulation or direct state involvement to a lesser extent
as compared with those employed in the public sector.8 In contrast, there is no dif-
ference between the two groups with respect to their general assessment of the
transition.
Labour market experiences during transition also matter. Those who had to
accept a job below their qualification are more likely, whereas those who got a job
in a new sector of the economy (such as services) are less likely, to report that the
transition worsened their lives. In addition, respondents who got a job in a new sec-
tor demonstrate a lower level of support for the state regulation of prices and for
direct state provision of services. Respondents with entrepreneurship or self-
employment experience tend to be less supportive of state involvement in the econ-
omy, although they do not differ from those who work for wages in their general
assessment of transition.
Now we turn to our tests of the model by Aghion et al. (2009). In what follows,
we always condition on individual backgrounds as they have an important effect
on perceptions of the role of the state, free markets and on their assessments of the
transition.
8 The difference is insignificant at conventional levels (significance level is about 14–19 percent) for the
regressions reported; the difference is significant at the 1 percent level for demand for price controls over
fuel and demand for state involvement in provision of employment and health services (not reported).
268 Denisova, Eller and Zhuravskaya
 2010 The Authors
Journal compilation  2010 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
3.2.2 How do distrust and perceptions of corruption co-vary with individual
attitudes?
Table 3 explores whether variations in the level of distrust and in the perceptions
of corruption have explanatory power for the variation in the individual attitudes
towards government regulation, direct involvement of the state and general atti-
tudes towards the transition. The table reports marginal effects along with the
respective z-statistic from probit regressions with attitudes as the dependent vari-
able and various measures of distrust and perception of corruption included in the
regressions on a one-by-one basis, controlling for all individual characteristics
which we discussed in the previous sub-section (listed in Table 2). We omit PSU
fixed effects from these regressions in contrast to Table 2 because the main focus of
these regressions is on variation in locality-level institutional environment mea-
sured by distrust, corruption perception variables and demand for regulation. We
continue to cluster the errors at the PSU level to control for intra-locality correla-
tions.
At the individual level, we consider three measures of distrust in private busi-
ness (distrust in small business, in insurance companies and in domestic banks),
two measures for the lack of cooperation in society (the perceptions that no cooper-
ation is possible between the rich and the poor and between ‘common’ people and
those in power), three measures of distrust in state institutions (distrust in govern-
ment, in courts and in political parties) and two measures of perception of corrup-
tion (whether the respondent agrees that judges are corrupt and disagrees that
corruption decreased in the last years). In addition, we consider a measure of gen-
eral distrust at the regional level from the FOM data, namely the regional fraction
of individuals who do not agree that most people can be trusted and who think that
one cannot be too careful in dealing with people.9 All of these measures are
described and summarized in the Appendix.
Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions of the model by Aghion
et al. (2009). In particular, we find that all measures of distrust in private business
are significantly associated with all of the measures of the demand for the state reg-
ulation and direct state provision of goods and services (with the exception of price
regulation of utilities, for which the correlation has the right sign but is insignificant
at the conventional levels). The measures for the lack of cooperation and of general
distrust have a strong significant association with the demand for price regulation,
9 The RLMS provides an additional question on general trust (presented in the top row of Panel B in
Table 1): ‘In your opinion, could most people be trusted or one could not be too careful in dealing with peo-
ple?’ This would have been an ideal (and rather standard) measure of general trust had there not been an
option to answer ‘depends on personality’. This option is not included in the standard version of this ques-
tion. As this option is included as a possible answer in the RLMS, we cannot use the responses to this ques-
tion to test the theory of Aghion et al. (2009). The reason is that the responses are not informative as in both
the good and in the bad equilibrium people may wish to answer ‘depends on personality’, that is, on the
civicness of people, but this would imply completely different levels of social capital.
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but have no significant correlation with the demand for direct involvement of the
state in the economy. Distrust in state institutions is more significantly and posi-
tively correlated with the demand for direct involvement of the state than with the
demand for price regulation, for which all the coefficients are also positive, but
many are imprecisely estimated. The perception that judges are corrupt is posi-
tively and significantly related to the demand for state provision of goods and ser-
vices and unrelated to the demand for regulation.10 The perception that corruption
increased in the last years is positively and significantly related to the demand for
price regulation of fuel and utilities.
Table 4 highlights the conditional correlations between distrust and perceptions
of corruption. As before, we regress individual perceptions of corruption on our
measures of social capital and distrust in state institutions one-by-one conditional
on individual-level controls and report the coefficients of interest only. As before,
PSU fixed effects are excluded from the list of covariates. We use OLS estimation
and allow for a clustering of error terms at the level of PSUs. Again, just as the pre-
diction by the model by Aghion et al. (2009), we find a strong and robust positive
correlation between distrust and perceptions of corruption.11
It is worth noting that the different measures of social capital, perceived corrup-
tion and of the demand for government regulation and state provision of goods
and services, which we consider, reflect different aspects of the phenomena we are
trying to measure and they are noisy. Therefore, it is important to look at the gen-
eral pattern that emerges. This general pattern is supportive of the predictions of
the model by Aghion et al. (2009). It points to a robust positive association between
the measures of the demand for regulation and the demand for the direct involve-
ment of the state in economic production, on the one hand, and the lack of social
capital and corruption on the other.
The last column of Table 3 also relates measures of social capital and corruption
to the general assessment of the transition by respondents. All of the measures of
distrust in private business, distrust in state institutions, perception of the lack of
cooperation in society and perceptions of corruption (with the only exception being
the general regional level of distrust) have a significant, very strong and robust
positive association with the perception that the transition had a negative effect on
the life of the respondent. The results are practically identical for the answers to the
question where people would have liked their kids to grow up: in an environment
like the Soviet Union or like modern Russia (available from the authors upon
request). As these results about the general assessment of the transition are condi-
10 There is one exception, that is, for the demand for regulation of prices for utilities, the corruption of judges
is marginally significant with the wrong sign. This is the only significant coefficient which has the opposite
sign of what was expected among 99 regressions which we present.
11 We made additional tests to make sure that our results are not driven by cohort effects. In particular, we
re-ran regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 separately for three age groups: 18–30, 31–55 and 55+. Overall,
the results are robust to restricting the age of respondents to a particular group.
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tional on all the individual characteristics, including income and labour market sta-
tus, we can conclude that the social environment, indeed, plays an important role
in the assessment of the transition process by individuals. The inclusion of the mea-
sures of social capital to the list of covariates in regressions which explain the
assessment of transition with all individual characteristics adds approximately an
additional two percentage points of explained variation in perceptions (that is,
pseudo-R2 increases from 0.13 to 0.15).
4. Conclusions
We use data from the 2006 round of the RLMS to describe perceptions of the
Russian population about the transition process and the role of the state compared
with that of free markets. We find that about one-half of the Russian population is
disappointed with the transition and has nostalgia about the life under the
communist regime. A large majority of Russians is in favour of very high state
Table 4. Correlation between distrust and corruption
Judges
are
corrupt
Disagree that
corruption decreased
in recent years
Distrust in private business
Distrust in small business 0.141 [6.05]*** 0.178 [8.24]***
Distrust in insurance companies 0.201 [8.07]*** 0.224 [10.53]***
Distrust in domestic banks 0.198 [9.20]*** 0.213 [12.98]***
Lack of cooperation
No cooperation between rich and poor 0.059 [3.50]*** 0.134 [8.07]***
No cooperation between common and powerful 0.102 [5.90]*** 0.158 [9.65]***
General distrust
General distrust, regional level (FOM) )0.072 [0.18] 0.482 [2.16]**
Distrust in state institutions
Distrust in government 0.271 [12.28]*** 0.233 [10.74]***
Distrust in courts 0.406 [19.14]*** 0.236 [10.15]***
Distrust in political parties 0.27 [9.84]*** 0.264 [11.42]***
Notes: Ordinary least squares model. Abbreviated results: each reported coefficient comes from a separate
regression with all individual controls from Table 2 except for primary sampling unit (PSU) dummies (as
the main variation explored in these regressions is among equilibria in different PSUs). Absolute value of
t-statistics is in brackets. Robust Huber–White standard errors, clustered on PSUs.
**Significant at 5 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.
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intervention in all spheres of economic life, starting with regulation and ending
with the direct provision of goods and services. The high demand for increased
state intervention and government regulation coexists with a rather low level of
trust in government institutions and recognition of high and rising levels of corrup-
tion. We apply the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009) to interpret these basic
observations. It is the lack of social capital in Russia that drives the demand for gov-
ernment regulation. In an environment with low social capital, private business
imposes negative externalities on the society and society chooses to demand more
state regulation and tolerate corruption to reduce these externalities. We also show
that variation in the individual demand for the state regulation co-varies with dis-
trust and perceptions of the extent of corruption as predicted by this theory.
According to Shiller et al. (1991), the attitudes of Soviets and Americans
towards free markets (before Russia’s transition) were very similar in all aspects
but two. Soviets and Americans differed in: (1) their expectation about the security
of property rights, and (2) their attitudes towards civicness of private entrepre-
neurs. In light of our findings, it is clear that these two differences have foretold
the nature of transition. Just as the prediction by the model by Aghion et al. (2009),
Russia has been trapped in a bad ‘uncivic’ equilibrium in which the government is
corrupt and predatory but the public demands regulation and high involvement of
the government in the economy to protect itself from untrustworthy business.
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Appendix
Table A1. Description of variables used in the regressions12
(1) General perception of transition
Transition
worsened life
Dummy equals 1 if the respondent marked that the economic and social
changes of the last 15 years worsened, or strongly worsened her/his life; 0 if
the respondent stated that the economic and social changes of the last
15 years did not change, improved or strongly improved her/his life.
(2) Demand for state price regulation and direct state involvement
State price
regulation
Dummy equals 1 if the respondent marked that the state and 0 if the market
should fix prices for: (a) food goods, (b) accommodation, (c) petrol and fuel or
(d) housing and communal services.
Direct
involvement
of the state
Dummy equals 1 if the respondent marked that mainly the state should: (a)
supply people with work, (b) organize removal of garbage, (c) give medical
services, or (d) build roads; 0 if the respondent marked that these tasks should
be executed mainly by the private sector or by both the state and the private
sector equally or if she or he marked that it does not matter whether the state
or the private sector are primarily responsible as long as it was subject to
satisfactory quality of this provision.
(3) Distrust
General
distrust,
regional level
Regional fraction of individuals who do not agree that most people can be
trusted and who think that one cannot be too careful in dealing with people.
Regionally representative individual-level data on social trust were
aggregated – using weights to the regional level. Source: Public Opinion
Foundation (FOM), Russia, http://english.fom.ru.
12 Source of variables (if not explicitly indicated): RLMS, Data Round 15, 2006, Carolina Population Center at
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms.
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Table A1. (cont) Description of variables used in the regressions
Distrust in
state
institutions
and private
business
To what extent does the respondent trust in: (a) the government, (b) courts, (c)
political parties, (d) domestic banks, (e) insurance companies, (f) small and
middle private business: (1) completely trust, (2) rather trust, (3) trust nor
distrust, (4) rather distrust, (5) completely distrust.
Lack of social
cooperation
To what extent is it possible to have mutual understanding and cooperation
between: (a) poor and rich people, (b) ‘common’ people and those who have a
lot of power: (1) surely possible, (2) rather possible, (3) somewhat possible
and somewhat not, (4) rather impossible, (5) surely impossible.
(4) Corruption
Disagree that
corruption
declined in the
past fewyears
To what extent does the respondent agree or disagree that the level of
corruption in Russia has declined in the past few years: (1) strongly agree, (2)
somewhat agree, (3) both yes and no, (4) somewhat disagree, (5) strongly
disagree.
Agree that
judges are
corrupt
To what extent does the respondent agree or disagree that judges in Russia
are corrupt: (1) strongly disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) both yes and no,
(4) somewhat agree, (5) strongly agree.
(5) Individual-level controls
Age of the
respondent in
2006
In years, adults are those 14 and over.
Educational
degree
Highest educational degree obtained by the respondent, compressed to the
following categories: (1) secondary school and below, (2) junior and
secondary professional, (3) university and higher.
Used personal
computer last
12 months
Dummy indicating whether the respondent has used in the last 12 months a
personal computer for any purpose.
Used the
internet last
12 months
Dummy indicating whether the respondent has used the internet in the last
12 months.
Self-reported
health status
Subjective assessment of the respondent’s health condition: (1) very bad, (2)
bad, (3) not good but not bad, (4) good, (5) very good.
log of per
capita
household
consumption
log of total household consumption expenditures per household member.
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Table A1. (cont) Description of variables used in the regressions
Current
employment
status
Derived from the type of primary occupation in 2006: (a) worked for wages in
the public sector, (b) worked for wages in the private sector, (c) out of labour
force, (d) unemployed.
Has experience
as self-
employed
Dummy equals 1 if: (i) in the current primary or secondary job the respondent
was not working at an enterprise or at an organization but was involved in
entrepreneurship or individual labour activity; (ii) in the current primary or
secondary job the respondent was working at an enterprise or organization
and doing entrepreneurial work at this job; or (iii) if the respondent ever tried
to organize her/his own enterprise or begin her/his own business; 0
otherwise.
Had to accept
less-qualified
main job
Dummy indicating that from 1991 till 2006 the respondent had to change the
place of work for another permanent job, which did not correspond to her/his
qualifications and she or he did not like it.
Got job in new
sector
Dummy indicating that from 1991 till 2006 the respondent decided to try
himself in a new economic sector, which had appeared only in the period of
reforms.
Gender Gender of the respondent (0 = woman, 1 = man).
Location Location of the respondent (0 = rural, 1 = urban).
Table A2. Summary statistics for variables used in the regressions
Variable No. of
observations
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Transition worsened life 6,059 0.49 0.50 0 1
State rather than market should fix
prices for food goods
8,479 0.80 0.40 0 1
State rather than market should fix
prices for accommodation
8,447 0.92 0.27 0 1
State rather than market should fix
prices for petrol and fuel
8,431 0.90 0.30 0 1
State rather than market should fix
prices for housing and communal
services
8,437 0.95 0.22 0 1
Mainly state should supply people
with work
8,650 0.49 0.50 0 1
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Table A2. (cont) Summary statistics for variables used in the regressions
Variable No. of
observations
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Mainly state should organize removal
of garbage
8,558 0.44 0.50 0 1
Mainly state should give medical
services
8,664 0.59 0.49 0 1
Mainly state should build roads 8,634 0.50 0.50 0 1
General distrust, regional level (FOM) 8,764 2.72 0.14 2.4 2.9
Distrust in the government 8,409 2.96 1.11 1 5
Distrust in courts 8,031 3.23 1.06 1 5
Distrust in political parties 7,443 3.87 1.03 1 5
Distrust in domestic banks 7,778 3.11 1.11 1 5
Distrust in insurance companies 7,116 3.48 1.10 1 5
Distrust in small and middle private
businesses
7,238 3.36 1.07 1 5
Impossibility to reach understanding
and cooperation between poor and
rich people
8,524 3.32 1.13 1 5
Impossibility to reach understanding
and cooperation between ‘common’
people and those who have a lot of
power
8,514 3.55 1.08 1 5
Disagree that corruption declined in
the past few years
7,645 4.01 1.03 1 5
Agree that judges are corrupt 7,608 3.39 1.10 1 5
Age of the respondent in 2006 8,222 45.10 18.17 18 96
Educational degree: secondary school
and below
8,764 0.31 0.46 0 1
Educational degree: junior and
secondary professional
8764 0.50 0.50 0 1
Educational degree: university and
higher
8,764 0.19 0.39 0 1
Used personal computer in the
last 12 months
8,753 0.39 0.49 0 1
Used the internet in the last 12 months 8,750 0.19 0.39 0 1
Self-reported health status 8,719 3.14 0.73 1 5
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Table A2. (cont) Summary statistics for variables used in the regressions
Variable No. of
observations
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
log of per capita household
consumption
8,148 8.41 0.82 2.5 13.1
Current employment status: work for
wages in the public sector
8,764 0.19 0.39 0 1
Current employment status: work for
wages in the private sector
8,764 0.29 0.45 0 1
Current employment status: out of
labour force
8,746 0.19 0.40 0 1
Current employment status:
unemployed
8,746 0.03 0.17 0 1
Has experience as self-employed 8,764 0.10 0.29 0 1
Had to accept less-qualified main job 8764 0.13 0.34 0 1
Got job in new sector 8,764 0.06 0.23 0 1
Gender (male compared with female) 8,764 0.46 0.50 0 1
Location (urban compared with rural) 8,764 0.74 0.44 0 1
Note: For the summary statistics, we apply weights to ensure that the population as a whole is represented.
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